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Introduction
From the end of the 1970s, inequality increased significantly in almost all in-
dustrialized countries. This trend has produced a huge economic literature
examining possible causes of this rise. The most prominent explanations range
from technological change to trade and globalization (Katz and Autor, 1999;
Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).
The purpose of this thesis is to further contribute towards our understanding
of increasing disparities in the labor market. For that, I investigate three different
aspects of wage inequality: Chapter 1 analyses the influence of changing returns
to skill on overall wage inequality – in the face of worker self selection. In
Chapter 2, I study the importance of shifts in skill prices for declining wage
differences between men and women. Last, Chapter 3 investigates the impact
of worker sorting across locations on growing spatial disparities.
Apart from the topical focus on wage inequality, there are two further uni-
fying aspects which connect all three chapters. First, the unit under study in all
parts of this dissertation is the German labor market; partly because Germany al-
lows the researcher to derive results from high quality, large scale administrative
data which contain information on individual workers’ behavior and associated
outcomes: the “Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies”.1 However,
Germany is also an interesting case to look at because of its impressive “resur-
gence” during the last two decades in terms of economic growth (Dustmann,
Fitzenberger, et al., 2014) as well as the accompanied increase in wage inequality
(Dustmann, Ludsteck, et al., 2009).
Second, all chapters are based on the idea that workers within an observed
entity (e.g., occupation, firm, region, educational track) represent a self se-
lected group as they make decisions based on their comparative advantage (Roy,
1951). On the one hand, workers’ selection response raises serious challenges
for identifying causes of increasing wage inequality within observational data.
On the other hand, self selection represents an interesting object to study it-
self as workers’ decisions may work against forces which essentially contribute
to rising inequality (Heckman and Honoré, 1990). In fact, this is one of the
1All chapters contained in this thesis make use of the factually anonymous Sample of
Integrated Labor Market Biographies (version 7514). Data access was provided via a Scientific
Use File supplied by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment
Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) under contract Number 101357.
i
ii INTRODUCTION
central findings of the first chapter.
In Chapter 1, which is joint work with Michael Böhm and Hans-Martin
von Gaudecker, we make two contributions to the existing literature. One is
methodological, one is empirical. Firstly, we develop a new method to separate
changes in skill prices (which are likely to stem from changes in labor demand
because of technology or trade, for instance) from individual skill changes within
a Roy model setting. This method represents the underlying framework for the
following analyses as well as the approaches taken in Chapters 2 and 3.
Secondly, we apply our method to provide a more comprehensive picture of
two of the most important trends in developed countries’ labor markets during
the last decades: a strong increase in wage inequality and a substantial reallo-
cation of employment across occupations broadly characterized by polarization,
i.e., a hollowing out of the middle class. More specifically, we study the re-
lationship between changes in occupational employment, occupational wages,
and rising overall wage inequality. Using long-running administrative panel data
with detailed occupation codes, we first document that in all occupations, en-
trants and leavers earn lower wages than stayers. This empirical fact suggests
substantial skill selection effects that are negative for growing occupations and
positive for shrinking ones. We develop and estimate a model for prices paid
per unit of skill in occupations, which incorporates occupation-specific skill ac-
cumulation over the career and endogenous switching across many occupations.
Our results shed light on two important puzzles in prior literature. First, consis-
tent with leading explanations for occupational employment changes, price and
employment growth are positively related. Strong counteracting skill changes
along the lines of our new empirical fact explain why occupational wages are
unrelated to employment growth. Second, skill prices establish a long-suspected
quantitative connection between occupational changes and the surge in wage
inequality.
Chapter 2 utilizes the estimated skill price changes to shed light on the de-
cline in wage inequality between men and women. Despite the findings from
Chapter 1 suggest that changing occupational skill prices have strongly con-
tributed to rising overall inequality, changing prices might have reduced wage
inequality between men and women. Despite sounding paradoxical, the reason
for that is simple: men and women work in very different occupations. This
means, gender wage inequality might decline if skill prices rise within occupa-
tions important for female employment. Overall, I find that roughly 65% of
the observed decline in the average gender wage gap between 1985 and 2010
can be explained by a reduction in occupational segregation between men and
women. The remaining 35% are explained by shifts in occupational wages which
increased within occupations important for female employment; and declined in
many occupations important for male employment such as producing occupa-
tions. Motivated by the finding from Chapter 1 that average wages do not
move as much as skill prices, though, I reestimate the part of the declining
wage gap attributed to changes in (selection corrected) skill prices. The impact
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of movements in these prices on the reduction in gender wage inequality has
roughly been 13 percentage points larger than the impact of changes in average
wages alone. Similar findings hold when decomposing the rise in the propor-
tion of women at higher percentiles of the wage distribution and vice versa for
lower percentiles. From a methodological point of view, this underscores the
importance of accounting for selection effects in decompositions.
Last, Chapter 3 moves to the geographic aspect of inequality. During the
last few decades, aggregate wage growth has been very unevenly distributed
across space in Germany and other countries (Moretti, 2012). While wages in
Southern German local labor markets rose by up to 28 log points, they increased
only modestly or even declined in the north. Similar results apply to employment
changes. Overall, this has led to a strong positive correlation between local
wage and employment growth. What is driving these differential trends across
space? Chapter 3 examines to what extent regions with growing employment
are increasingly paying workers higher wage premia or, in contrast, to what
extent the quality of workers in growing regions has risen. To decouple demand
and supply for skill from each other, I estimate how regional wage premia paid
for a unit of skill have changed over time using administrative panel data that
allow me to hold constant changes in unobserved worker quality. I find that
wage premia in regions with expanding employment did not rise more than in
regions with declining employment. Instead, the quality of workers in growing
regions went up. I investigate the importance of various possible observables
for this relationship including local amenity differences, changes in occupation
and industry structure as well as variation in education rates. Last, I explore
the impact of changing wage premia and worker sorting on the recent rise of
the density wage premium.
In summary, this dissertation consists of three self contained essays about the
influence of worker self selection on the rise in wage inequality. Each chapter
examines a different aspect of changing inequality with the purpose to get a
better understanding of why we are increasingly living in a world of growing
disparities. Comprehensive knowledge about the causes of inequality is essential,
not least to guide policy for moderating future developments.
iv INTRODUCTION
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Chapter 1
Occupation Growth, Skill
Prices, and Wage Inequality
Joint with Michael Böhm and Hans-Martin von Gaudecker
1.1 Introduction
During the past decades, occupational employment has changed profoundly
across Europe and the United States. A burgeoning literature has established
fundamental shifts in labor demand as the most important cause of these
changes (Autor, Levy, et al., 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007; Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011; Goos, Manning, and Salomons, 2014).1 Yet, it remains puzzling
that neither occupational wages nor wage inequality show a clear reflection of
these demand shifts. First, occupational employment growth has been decou-
pled from occupational wage growth (Goos and Manning, 2007; Mishel et al.,
2013; Green and Sand, 2015; Hsieh et al., 2019; Taber and Roys, 2019). Sec-
ond, while wage inequality has risen dramatically over the same period that
occupational employment has changed, there remains debate in the literature
about how much of this can be attributed to demand shifts (Autor, Katz, et al.,
2008; Dustmann, Ludsteck, et al., 2009; Card et al., 2013; Firpo et al., 2013;
Autor, 2019).
To solve these puzzles, we develop and estimate a model in which workers
have occupation-specific skills that evolve endogenously over the career. Work-
ers’ optimal choices lead growing occupations to attract less skilled workers,
which depresses these occupations’ average wages. Shrinking occupations re-
tain the most skilled parts of their workforce, lifting their average wages. The
key distinction we make is between wages paid per constant unit of skill (skill
prices)—which are directly affected by shifts in demand—and average occupa-
1We discuss the literature in detail in the next section.
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tional wages. Worker selection drives a wedge between the two. The evolution
of skill prices will not be fully reflected in occupational wages and could even
be neutralized or turn in the opposite direction. Moreover, between-occupation
inequality will underestimate the impact of shifting occupational demand on
wage inequality.
These mechanisms are consistent with stylized facts from our rich adminis-
trative panel data. As in the studies cited above, occupational wage growth and
occupational employment growth bear no systematic relation with each other.
At the same time, we find that individual workers’ wage growth is substan-
tially faster within expanding occupations. The discrepancy must stem from
marginal workers. We newly document that workers who enter any occupation
earn substantially less than incumbents. The same is true for workers leaving any
occupation compared to stayers. Both effects are increasing in net occupation
growth. The raw data thus reveal that net growth of an occupation will have
a direct attenuating impact on average wages with selection operating in both
directions. Growing occupations attract workers at the start of their careers,
dragging down average wages. Declining occupations tend to shed workers who
earn below-average wages, raising these occupations’ average wages.
To quantify these effects, our economic model distinguishes between skill
prices and skills. Workers have multidimensional skills that evolve heteroge-
neously across occupations and over the career. The model is explicitly based
on Roy (1951) and therefore relaxes the exogenous mobility assumption (e.g.,
Abowd et al., 1999; Card et al., 2013; Cortes, 2016). That is, the choice
of occupation may be driven by contemporaneous unobservable shocks. We
employ a linear approximation to obtain an empirical formulation that is trans-
parent and straightforward to estimate, even in settings with a large number of
occupations. Our key identifying assumption is temporal stability of the skill
accumulation function, which generalizes prior approaches. Accounting for this
skill accumulation, the estimator then exploits workers’ varying wage growth
within and across occupations over time to identify changes in skill prices.
Our empirical analysis uncovers three main findings. First, there is a clear
positive relationship between the development of skill prices and employment
growth at the level of detailed occupations. This indicates that demand shifts
were indeed the dominant drivers of both occupational employment and skill-
constant wages over the past decades. Characterizing occupations by their task
intensities, we find that the patterns are in line with routine-biased technical
change (RBTC) as one of the important drivers of occupational demand.2 More
2Note that this paper does not measure occupational demand or supply shocks directly.
We instead infer from the co-movements of quantities and prices that these are consistent
with demand shocks. Forces of occupational demand may include RBTC and related technical
changes (e.g., Autor, Levy, et al., 2003), international trade and offshoring (Autor, Dorn, and
Hanson, 2013; Goos, Manning, and Salomons, 2014), transformation of the industry structure
(Bárány and Siegel, 2018), changes in consumption patterns (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Mazzolari
and Ragusa, 2013), social skills content (Deming, 2017), among others.
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generally, the patterns are consistent with polarization, since employment and
skill prices of broad occupation groups with high as well as low wages increased
compared to mid-wage occupation groups.
The positive correlation of occupational employment with skill prices and
the lack of a correlation with average wages means that skills must deteriorate
in growing compared to shrinking occupations. Our second main finding is that
these skill changes from the estimation are consistent with those implied by
our new empirical fact: lower-earning workers’ net entry into growing and their
net exit out of shrinking occupations fully account for the negative correlation
between skill changes and employment growth. We term this the marginal selec-
tion effect. Viewed through the lens of our model, it stems from both entrants
and leavers possessing lower skills than stayers in any occupation. We exploit
the longitudinal dimension of the data to show that marginal selection conforms
with economic notions of the underlying selection effects: The skill differences of
entrants and leavers compared to stayers consist of differences in endowments,
skill accumulation, and endogenous switching (staying) of those workers who
experience negative (positive) shocks during their stint in an occupation.
Our third main finding is that occupational changes have driven much of the
increase in wage inequality over the past decades. We decompose the trends
in the wage distribution using our estimated model and find that changing skill
prices in particular were a key driver of inequality. This impact is muted when
studying between-occupation wage inequality in the raw data because average
occupational wages do not systematically vary with skill prices, as implied by
our second finding. Via reweighting, we also exploit the changing demographic
structure to approximate some of the shifts of skill supply to occupations. These
would have further raised inequality between occupations, had it not been for
the strong selection effects.
This paper is structured as follows. Next, we describe the German SIAB
data that we employ, relate to prior literature, and present the stylized facts
motivating the course of our subsequent analysis. In the third section, we
develop the model and estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the results on
the evolution of skill prices, dissects the marginal selection effect, and reports
on extensive robustness checks. In Section 5, we examine the impact of skill
prices and skill selection on rising wage inequality. The last section discusses
our findings’ relationship to labor market institutions and sketches directions for
further research.
1.2 Data, Literature, and Stylized Facts
We use the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB) provided
by the IAB Institute at the German Federal Employment Agency. The SIAB
is a 2% random sample of administrative social security records from 1975 to
2014. It is representative of 80% of the German workforce and includes employ-
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ees covered by social security, marginal part-time workers, benefit recipients,
individuals officially registered as job-seeking, and those participating in active
labor market programs. The SIAB excludes the self-employed, civil servants,
and individuals performing military service. Most notably, it contains individu-
als’ full employment histories including detailed data on wages, industries, and
occupations along with socio-demographics such as age, gender, or the level
of education. The data is exact to the day as employers need to notify the
employment agency upon changes to the employment relationship.
In order to work with a homogeneous sample throughout, we restrict the
main sample to German men aged 25 to 54 years who are working full-time in
West Germany. See Appendix 1.A.1 for the reasons behind these choices and for
details on the wider dataset construction. We will relax all of these restrictions in
robustness checks. We transform the spell structure into a yearly panel by using
the longest spell in any given year, adjusting wages appropriately for spells that
do not last the entire year. Due to a cap on social security contributions, 12%
of wages are right-censored at this ceiling; we follow imputation procedures in
Dustmann, Ludsteck, et al. (2009) and Card et al. (2013). We inflate all wages
to 2010 prices using the German consumer price index.
A key strength of the SIAB data is that it provides high-quality longitudinal
information on workers’ occupations. Until 2010, the SIAB Scientific Use File
contains a consistent set of 120 occupations; we cannot use subsequent years
because the classification changes drastically thereafter. Most of our analyses
will be based on the raw 120 occupations. To ease interpretation, we also
aggregate them into broader groups following Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and
others. These comprise managers, professionals, and technicians (Mgr-Prof-
Tech); sales and office workers (Sales-Office); production workers, operators
and craftsmen (Prod-Op-Crafts); and workers in services and care occupations
(Srvc-Care). See Table 1.4 for the mapping of detailed occupations into these
groups.
1.2.1 Wage Inequality and Changes in Occupational Employment
Two of the most important trends in developed countries’ labor markets over
the past decades have been a strong increase in wage inequality and a sub-
stantial reallocation of employment across occupations broadly characterized by
polarization (for a summary see Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). As documented
by, e.g., Spitz-Oener (2006), Dustmann, Ludsteck, et al. (2009), Card et al.
(2013), and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014), Germany is no exception to
either phenomenon. Figure 1.1 reproduces both trends in our dataset.
Figure 1.1a shows the trends of wage percentiles over the 1985–2010 period
normalized to zero in 1985; thereby reproducing Figure 1 in Card et al. (2013) up
to the normalization, sample, and the percentiles. Inequality increased strongly
and steadily both in the upper half, measured by the difference between the
85th and the 50th percentile of log wages, and in the lower half (50 − 15 dif-
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ference). These trends have arguably led to a broader debate about inequality
and opportunity,3 as well as reignited policy efforts with regard to living wages
and minimum wage regulations. For example, Germany introduced a statutory
minimum wage in 2015; substantial raises to it are a constant source of public
debate. Similarly, U.S. localities are in the process of or have already imple-
mented a $ 15 minimum wage (e.g., Jardim et al., 2017), more than twice the
nationwide minimum wage.
Using the year 1985 for the normalization once more, Figure 1.1b plots the
trends in the logarithms of the detailed 120 occupations’ employment (shaded
lines) and the four aggregated groups (bold lines with markers). Employment in
Production-Operators-Crafts occupations declined by more than 20 log points
from a baseline share of over 60 percent, whereas the employment share of
the other occupation groups increased. This trend has been termed “job” or
“employment polarization” because Prod-Op-Crafts workers tend to be located
in the middle of the occupational wage distribution (Goos and Manning, 2007).
An important share of the declining employment in middle-paying occupations
appears to be due to changes in technology (affecting codifiable routine-type
jobs, see e.g., Autor, Levy, et al., 2003) as well as international trade and
offshoring (affecting manufacturing-type jobs, e.g., Autor, Dorn, and Hanson,
2013). The resulting deterioration of employment opportunities—particularly
severe for low and medium educated men—have been linked to societal trends
of much wider concern.4
One may expect to see such shifts of the demand for different types of
occupations directly in the wage distribution, not least because the wage and
employment trends occurred largely in parallel (e.g., see Figure 1.1). There ex-
ists, however, surprisingly little quantitative evidence on the role of occupational
change for the evolution of wage inequality: holding occupations’ wages fixed at
their initial levels and reweighting them with employment in subsequent decades,
Goos and Manning (2007) show that composition effects due to employment
polarization can account for a substantial part of changing wage inequality in
the U.K. Very recently, Autor (2019) finds that in the U.S. a similar exercise
explains only small shares of the income growth differentials across five educa-
tion categories. Additionally accounting for the degree of urbanization comes
close to matching the evolution of real wages of the non-college educated. For
the German case, Dustmann, Ludsteck, et al. (2009) conclude that the rise of
lower-half inequality was unlikely to stem from changes in demand. Card et
al. (2013) run a set of Mincer regressions and incrementally add occupational
identifiers, finding that the role of the latter for rising wage inequality is rather
small.
3Among others, see the research agenda by Chetty et al. (e.g., 2011, 2018), which has also
spilled over to Europe and Germany (e.g., Cornelissen et al., 2018).
4These include, among others, rising morbidity and mortality in midlife (Case and Deaton,
2015) as well as political polarization in various guises (Fetzer, forthcoming; Autor, Dorn,
Hanson, and Majlesi, 2016).
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Figure 1.1: Evolution of wage inequality and occupational employment
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Notes: The vertical axis in Panel 1.1a shows the 15th, 50th and 85th log wage percentile over time
relative to 1985. The vertical axis in Panel 1.1b shows the log change in the number of employed
workers within an occupation over time. Shaded lines in the background represent the 120 detailed
occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations
as described in Appendix Table 1.4. The thickness of a shaded background line corresponds to the
number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010.
Figure 1.2a hints at why these types of analyses tend to have limited ex-
planatory power. The graph plots changes in employment against changes of
average wages over the 1985–2010 period for each of our 120 occupations.
Variation along the horizontal axis shows that employment changes are very
substantial. Many occupations grew or shrank by more than 50 log points. Yet,
movements of average wages are surprisingly small given the variation in occu-
pation growth and the large increase of wage inequality. Therefore, between-
occupation decompositions—such as wage regressions with occupation dummies
or reweighting strategies—may attribute little of the trends in wage inequality
to factors like changing skill prices and employment structure, and much of its
increase to unexplained within-occupation inequality. More fundamentally, the
employment and wage changes in Figure 1.2a are uncorrelated: occupations
that grew a lot did not experience larger average wage increases than shrinking
occupations. To pick the two highlighted examples, IT experts’ employment
increased by 102 log points or 178% and their average wages grew by 10%,
just above the overall average. Machine operators—a prototypical occupation
one would expect to be negatively affected by routine-biased technical change—
shrank by 73 log points or 51%. Yet, their average wages grew by the same
amount as those of IT experts.
Within the broader groups, the non-correlation between wage and employ-
ment growth even turns negative for the lower-earning Prod-Op-Crafts and Srvc-
Care occupations. This is consistent with the regressions reported by Dustmann,
Ludsteck, et al. (2009) in their Section IV.D, which led them to conclude that
demand shifts were unlikely to drive lower-end inequality. The finding of little or
negative correlation between occupational wage and employment growth is not
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Figure 1.2: Correlation of changes in employment, average wages, and wage
growth
(a) Average wage growth (b) Individuals’ wage growth
Notes: The vertical axis in Panel 1.2a shows the change in average wages between 1985 and 2010.
The vertical axis in Panel 1.2b depicts individual wage growth averaged across years 1985 until 2010.
The horizontal axis in both panels shows the change of the log number of employed workers within
an occupation between 1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations
in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in
Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed workers in an occupation
averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression lines across all occupations (black) and within the
four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
confined to Germany. Hsieh et al. (2019) and Taber and Roys (2019) document
correlations between the growth rates of occupational employment and wages
in the U.S. that are very small and positive or zero, respectively. Employment in
low-skill occupations increased in the U.K. and Canada, while at the same time
wages in these occupations dropped compared to routine occupations (Goos
and Manning, 2007; Green and Sand, 2015). Next to the role that occupations
have to play for wage inequality, this begets the more fundamental question of
whether, on aggregate, shifts in demand versus supply of labor to different occu-
pations were the dominant factor for the changes of the employment structure.5
We will find that, while the latter may have a role to play, the data strongly
suggest that demand changes along the lines of routine-biased technological
change or international trade are important.
1.2.2 Individual-Level Wage Growth and Selection
As a first pass, Figure 1.2b shows that there is a strong positive correlation
between employment and individual-level wage growth. The horizontal axis is
the same as in Panel a whereas the vertical axis plots the average annual wage
growth of workers who stayed in their occupation for any two consecutive years.
Wage growth rates within occupations clearly line up with their employment
5E.g., Glitz and Wissmann (2018) argue that a declining supply of medium versus low-
skilled young workers in Germany was responsible for part of the rising lower-end inequality
depicted in Figure 1.1a.
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Figure 1.3: Selection into and out of occupations
(a) Entrants’ minus incumbents’ wages (b) Leavers’ minus stayers’ wages
Notes: The vertical axis in Panel 1.3a shows the average wage of an entrant to an occupation relative
to the average wage of incumbents. The average is taken across years 1985 until 2010. The vertical
axis in Panel 1.3b shows the average wage of a worker leaving an occupation next period relative to the
average wage of stayers. The average is taken across years 1985 until 2009 to avoid all workers being
leavers at the sample end. The horizontal axis in both panels shows the change of the log number
of employed workers within an occupation between 1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of the
120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of these detailed
occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed
workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression lines across all occupations
(black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
growth. Abstracting from other factors that we will control for later—most
notably, occupation- and age-specific returns to experience—the main factor
leading to the stark differences between the two panels of Figure 1.2 may well
be differential selection into occupations. Put differently, demand shifts could
indeed be driving the changes of employment and prices paid for skilled labor
across occupations, but negative selection of entrants into growing occupations
shrouds this relation when looking at average occupation-specific wages. The
underlying occupational prices would be spreading out more than the average
occupational wages, which are captured in the above-discussed decomposition
analyses.
Data limitations have prevented a more thorough analysis of the presence
and magnitude of such selection effects. In particular, the main sources in the
U.S. are repeated cross-sections (CPS, Census) or longitudinal data too small
in size for investigating individual-level dynamics across detailed occupations
(PSID, NLSY). The SIAB data allow us to track occupational biographies over
the entire career. Figure 1.3 gives more direct evidence on the importance of
selection effects by plotting employment changes against the wage differentials
between marginal workers who switch and inframarginal workers who stay in
their occupations.6
6McLaughlin and Bils (2001) perform a related exercise with a coarser set of industry
sectors in the PSID data. They report similar results on wage differences but struggle to find
a correlation with changes in employment shares, possibly due to the small sample size.
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The vertical axis of Figure 1.3a shows the difference between entrants and
incumbents. An occupational entrant is defined as anybody who is newly ob-
served in the occupation in the current period. He could be joining the labor
force for the first time, switching from a different occupation, or entering from
unemployment or outside of the labor force. The difference between this group
and incumbents is strongly negative and strongly declining in occupation growth.
The latter suggests that skill selection is the reason for the wage gaps—rather
than, e.g., delayed wage contracting (Lazear, 1981)—since it is consistent with
a situation where the skill pool that growing occupations can draw from shrinks
with the extent of their expansion. Returning to our example, a machine opera-
tor might find it attractive to switch careers and become an IT expert in reaction
to more lucrative employment opportunities there. It is not unreasonable, ei-
ther, because controlling complex machines often involves some programming
and algorithmic knowledge. However, given that he preferred a different career
before, it is likely that the former machine operator’s specific skills are such that
he will obtain a lower wage than incumbent IT experts.
In principle, the patterns in Figure 1.3a could be generated if occupation
choice only happened at labor market entry in combination with substantial
returns to experience. If this was the sole effect, however, we would expect
that the wages of workers leaving their occupations would be higher than the
wages of those who stay on. Put differently, in such a scenario individuals
dropping out of our sample after age 54 should dominate the difference between
leavers and stayers. Figure 1.3b shows that the opposite is the case. As for
entrants, marginal workers have substantially lower wages than those who stay
on. Again, the difference is increasing in employment growth. Put differently,
only the lowest-skilled workers leave fast-growing occupations. All patterns in
Figure 1.3 persist when controlling for age and education or considering only
moves between occupations, i.e., discarding switches to or from non-working
states.7 These pieces of evidence indicate that the wage gap is not just due to
entrants being at an earlier stage of their career compared to incumbents.
The prominent models in the literature on occupational changes have dif-
ficulties matching Figure 1.3 because they feature one-dimensional skills (e.g.,
Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013). One-dimensionality en-
sures tractability in general equilibrium, which led to many important insights.
The flipside is that it leads to a hierarchical ranking of occupations by skill,
implying both that switchers to higher-ranked occupations leave lower-ranked
occupations from above and that switchers from higher-ranked occupations en-
ter lower-ranked occupations from above (Papageorgiou, 2014). This is hard
to square with the fact that even entrants and leavers in low-wage occupations
7See the figures in Section 1.A.2 of the Appendix. When controlling for covariates, the
magnitudes of the differences become smaller on average and the slopes tend to become more
pronounced. As one would expect, considering only switches that happen directly between
occupations has an attenuating effect on all patterns, but the qualitative pattern is always the
same and highly significant.
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generally earn less than incumbents and stayers, respectively.8
Instead, the patterns in Figure 1.3 call for a Roy-like approach to model sort-
ing across occupations, with workers who possess specific skills such that both
entrants and leavers are less skilled than incumbents and stayers. For exam-
ple, in a model with two occupations and two skill types, Papageorgiou (2014)
shows that switching workers earn wages below the average in the occupation
they are leaving as well as the one they are entering so long as they do not
have an absolute advantage in both occupations. Young (2014) calls this the
case where “comparative advantage is aligned with absolute advantage”, which
leads to declining skills in growing sectors. The conditions in Papageorgiou and
Young are sufficient for marginal workers to have lower skills than inframarginal
workers and for occupation growth causing skills to deteriorate. The necessary
conditions are weaker; they only require that skills across occupations are not
perfectly correlated and thus multidimensional (e.g., Heckman and Sedlacek,
1985). This level of generality forms our point of departure for the next section,
where we develop a model that allows us to quantify these effects.
1.3 Estimating Skill Prices under Optimal Occupa-
tional Choice
This section presents our model to estimate skill prices, which enables us to
distinguish price from selection effects when occupational wages change over
time. We start by describing how we can exploit workers’ occupation choices
in a classic Roy (1951) model to estimate the growth of potential wages across
sectors. In Section 1.3.2, we outline our decomposition of wages into prices and
workers’ skills along with a discussion of our main identifying assumptions. We
then show how the model lends itself to a straightforward estimation strategy,
which is feasible even for the 120 occupations × 35 years in our application.
In Section 1.3.4, we bring the estimation strategy to its limits in a series of
Monte Carlo experiments and show how to incorporate additional features, for
example, non-pecuniary job attributes in the generalized Roy model.
1.3.1 A Tractable Model of Sector Choice
There are k = 1, . . . ,K distinct occupations. At time t a worker i earns po-
tential wages Wi,t =
(
W1,i,t W2,i,t . . . WK,i,t
)
. Most of our analysis will
be in relative terms and we use lowercase letters to denote the logarithm of a
variable. As in Roy (1951), we assume that workers maximize their incomes by
8Honing in on evidence similar to Figure 1.3, we explicitly test and reject the model of
one-dimensional skills in Online Appendix 1.B.2. We do however obtain some evidence for a
hierarchy between Mgr-Prof-Tech and the other broad occupation groups. This aspect of our
data is consistent with the findings in Groes et al. (2014).
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choosing the occupation in which they earn the highest wage:
wi,t = max{w1,i,t, . . . , wK,i,t} =
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,twk,i,t, (1.1)
where Ik,i,t ≡ 1[maxj=1,...,K{wj,i,t} = wk,i,t] = 1[wk,i,t ≥ wj,i,t ∀j 6= k] is a
choice indicator for occupation k.
Ignoring the source of changes in potential wages in this subsection, we begin
by considering the effect of marginal changes thereof on realized wages. By the
envelope theorem,9 such changes will only have marginal effects on realized
wages because occupation choices are the solution to the optimization problem
(1.1). Put differently, workers do not enjoy discrete gains in realized wages when
switching occupations in response to marginal changes of potential wages. For
notational simplicity, we suppress the case of indifference at the prevailing wage
(it will be trivially captured once we move to discrete wage changes immediately
below) and write the marginal change in worker i’s realized wage at time t as:
dwi,t =

dw1,i,t if I1,i,t = 1
...
dwK,i,t if IK,i,t = 1
or, equivalently,
dwi,t = I1,i,tdw1,i,t + . . .+ IK,i,tdwK,i,t =
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,tdwk,i,t. (1.2)
In order to understand wage changes between discrete time periods, we in-
tegrate over Equation (1.2) from potential wages {w1,i,t−1, . . . , wK,i,t−1} to
{w1,i,t, . . . , wK,i,t}. With a slight abuse of notation—made precise in Ap-
pendix 1.B.1.1—we obtain
∆wi,t =
K∑
k=1
∫ wk,i,t
wk,i,t−1
Ik,i,τdwk,i,τ . (1.3)
This result is rather intuitive: if a worker stays in his occupation k′ between two
points in time (Ik′,i,t−1 = Ik′,i,t = 1), his realized wage change is equal to the
change in his potential wage in the chosen occupation (i.e., ∆wi,t = ∆wk′,i,t). If
the worker switches from some other occupation k′′ to k′, (Ik′′,i,t−1 = 1, Ik′,i,t =
1), his realized wage change is made up of two hypothetical components. One
9The optimization problem (1.1) fulfills the conditions for the general envelope Theorem
2 of Milgrom and Segal (2002). Incidentally, Milgrom and Segal derive the change in their
general value function as an integral over the choices similar to our Equation (1.3). Böhm
(2019) provides a derivation similar to ours in a static setting; he also provides special cases
that do not even require the envelope theorem.
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part stems from the wage change he would have experienced had he stayed in
his previous occupation. The other part is the corresponding wage change had
he been in the destination occupation all along. The relative size of both parts
is determined by the point of indifference, i.e., the potential wages wk′,i,τ∗ =
wk′′,i,τ∗ so that ∆wi,t = (wk′,i,t−wk′,i,τ∗)+(wk′′,i,τ∗−wk′′,i,t−1). This trivially
simplifies to ∆wi,t = wk′,i,t − wk′′,i,t−1, which is exactly the wage change that
the definition of the realized wage (1.1) implies. The fact that only potential
wages in his origin and destination occupations matter for the observed wage
change makes sense given that the worker has comparative advantage in both
of these occupations.
In empirical analyses, Equation (1.3) is directly observable for occupation
stayers. That is, occupation choices on the right-hand-side and realized wage
changes on the left-hand-side appear directly in the data. For switchers, we
need to approximate the choices because we cannot observe switchers’ point of
indifference. We linearly interpolate the choice indicators for τ ∈ (t− 1, t):
Ik,i,τ ≈ Ik,i,t−1 + Ik,i,t − Ik,i,t−1
wk,i,t − wk,i,t−1 (wk,i,τ − wk,i,t−1) (1.4)
Defining I¯k,i,t ≡ 12(Ik,i,t + Ik,i,t−1) and combining Equations (1.3) and (1.4),
we obtain
∆wi,t =
K∑
k=1
I¯k,i,t∆wk,i,t. (1.5)
A detailed derivation is in Appendix 1.B.1.2. The intuition of Equation (1.5)
after the approximation is the same as before: if a worker stays in his occu-
pation, his wage gain is the change of his potential wage in that occupation.
If the worker switches, he obtains equal parts of the origin and destination
occupations’ wage change. The strength of this result is that it allows to re-
cover potential wage changes—even for switchers when occupational choice is
endogenous—from panel data on occupation choices and realized wages, allow-
ing for many occupations due to its simplicity. In particular, mean changes of
potential wages can be recovered from a regression of first-differenced wages on
“average” occupation choices {I¯k,i,t}Kk=1. This hinges, of course, on the quality
of the approximation. We first note that (1.4) is not an approximation at all
for the majority of workers who stay in their occupation. To assess the impact
of those who switch, we run a large set of Monte Carlo simulations. We will
report on them in Section 1.3.4, noting here that the approximation in (1.4) is
not a first-order concern.
1.3.2 Price and Skill Changes
We denote potential wages as the product of workers’ skills
Si,t =
(
S1,i,t S2,i,t . . . SK,i,t
)
and the occupation-specific prices paid for
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a unit of skilled labor Πt =
(
Π1,t Π2,t . . . ΠK,t
)
that prevail in the econ-
omy.10 The worker’s potential log wages become for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}:
wk,i,t = pik,t + sk,i,t (1.6)
The framework outlined in the previous section relies on differences; we thus do
not place any restrictions on the initial levels of prices or skills. The empirical
challenge is to disentangle changes in prices from changes in skills. In order
to do so, we impose some structure on the skill accumulation process, which
we model by learning-by-doing on the job. Its speed is occupation-specific and
depends on observables; working in one occupation k′ impacts subsequent skills
in all other occupations. In particular, we assume that for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}:
∆sk,i,t =
K∑
k′=1
Ik′,i,t−1X ′i,t−1Γk′,k + uk,i,t. (1.7)
The vector Xi,t−1 consists of a constant and observable variables controlling
the speed of skill acquisition or depreciation via the vector Γk′,k. Note that
this formulation contains a full set of interactions of the skill accumulation
coefficients Γk′,k with the covariates Xi,t−1. The summation term in (1.7) thus
maps the previous occupation choice k′ interacted with Xi,t−1 into skill changes
in all potential occupations in the current period.
Our key identifying assumption is that the systematic part of the skill ac-
cumulation function (1.7) is time invariant. This is embodied in the fact that
Γk′,k does not carry a time-subscript. Our condition is implied by an assump-
tion made in virtually the entire literature studying occupational changes (e.g.,
Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Firpo et al., 2013; Young, 2014; Gottschalk et al.,
2015; Cortes, 2016; Bárány and Siegel, 2018; Yamaguchi, 2018; Böhm, 2019)
that differences in returns to worker characteristics over time are due to changes
in the returns to skills rather than changes in skill endowments. That assump-
tion pins down the levels and growth rates of skills; ours does the same for
the growth rates only. Our requirement is thus weaker in the sense that we
do not place a restriction on the initial skill levels when entering an occupa-
tion11 or on the precise contents of work within occupations, which may have
changed (Spitz-Oener, 2006). We also richly model the skill accumulation func-
tion, most importantly including fully stratified occupation choices Ik′,i,t−1 and
10Contrary to previous literature, we do not draw an explicit distinction between workers’
skills and occupational tasks because we do not need the tasks as a dimension-reduction device.
Our formulation is, however, perfectly general and nests, for example, the wage setting model
in Firpo et al. (2013). We will eventually use tasks information to help interpret our results
and connect back to previous work.
11This is along with other papers using panel data (Cortes, 2016; Cavaglia and Etheridge,
2017). Removing the restriction on levels seems important in light of the first-order shifts
in some observable characteristics. E.g., Carneiro and Lee (2011) show that in the U.S., the
average skill of college graduates declined substantially as enrollment rates increased between
1960 and 2000. One may expect similar effects in Germany given that college completion rates
doubled between the older and younger cohorts in our analysis.
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ages Xi,t−1 among the observables, so that composition changes of workers’
learning-by-doing are flexibly accounted for. Conditional on these observables,
we do however assume that the speed of learning on the job has not changed
over time. For example, a car mechanic in 2010 may well spend more time fixing
electronics than his counterpart in 1975. A secretary will send e-mails rather
than typing letters. But there is no temporal change in the speed at which these
people get better at their jobs from one year to the next.
Our identifying assumption implies that within occupations, the ratio of
wage growth across different groups remains constant over time. We check
this in Figure 1.4, which plots the year-to-year wage growth of 25-34 year-olds
(Panel 1.4a) and 35-44 year-olds (Panel 1.4b) minus the wage growth of 45-
54 year-olds. We subtract the overall mean everywhere so that all eight lines
should be flat at zero under our assumption. The lines in the right panel come
very close to it. The left panel is somewhat noisier, particularly for the group
of managers, professionals, and technicians. The noise is not too surprising
given that many in this group enter the labor market at ages 25-34 and initial
wage growth should be more susceptible to business cycles.12 For example,
the largest changes of wage growth across age groups can be found during the
dotcom bubble in the late 1990s.13
Another identification strategy is to assume that seasoned workers’ average
skill growth is zero (“flat spot identification”, Heckman, Lochner, et al., 1998),
allowing us to interpret all occupation-specific wage growth over the decades
as price growth (but still incorporating endogenous choices as derived in Equa-
tion (1.5)). We will explore this as a robustness check that yields qualitatively
similar results to our main specification.
In terms of unobservables, we allow the joint distribution function
F (u1,i,t, . . . , uK,i,t) to vary freely across occupations. For example, idiosyncratic
skill shocks can be correlated among similar occupations in an unrestricted
way. The restrictions we do impose are independence across individuals and an
identical conditional distribution over time. That is, each skill shock’s mean,
conditional on all predetermined variables, is assumed to be zero:
E
[
uk,i,t
∣∣ Ik′,i,t−1, Xi,t−1] = 0 ∀ k′, k ∈ K
These restrictions are considerably weaker than in existing fixed effects ap-
proaches (e.g., Abowd et al., 1999; Card et al., 2013; Cortes, 2016), which
12Consistent with that argument, Liu et al. (2016) find that the probability of an initial
mismatch between jobs and workers is strongly countercyclical. This feeds into lower initial
wages as well as persistently lower wage growth in subsequent periods.
13As an alternative for the 120 occupations, we split the sample in the middle (1993) and
plot the change in log employment against the change in wage growth of young (age 25–34
or 35–44) minus old (45–54) workers in the resulting two periods. Naturally, there is more
variation than for the four broad occupation groups but most of the occupations have very
modest changes in relative wage growth rates and we cannot detect substantive patterns
among them. See Online Appendix 1.A.3.
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Figure 1.4: Individual wage growth relative to 45–54 year olds
(a) 25–34 year olds
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Notes: The lines show average individual wage growth from t− 1 to t by year of 25–34 (Figure 1.4a)
and 35–44 (Figure 1.4b) year olds minus average wage growth of 45–54 year olds. Results are centered
at zero to show trends over time. The shaded areas around the four lines are 95% confidence intervals.
The four groups are based on an aggregation of detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF as described in
Appendix Table 1.4.
require mean zero shocks conditional on contemporaneous variables (‘exoge-
nous mobility assumption’). We can do this because we explicitly derived wage
growth when workers endogenously choose occupations in Section 1.3.1. We
will see that this is important in the results below. Our restrictions are also
more flexible than the types of assumptions that previous estimations of the
Roy model (Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985) or of fully specified structural mod-
els (Lee and Wolpin, 2006) have invoked. In particular, we do not impose a
parametric functional form for the distribution of unobservables.
1.3.3 Estimation of the Model and Interpretation of Coefficients
Under the assumptions we have made, we can compare price growth across
different periods. The simplest intuition is that we can estimate the skill ac-
cumulation parameters Γk′,k in a base period t = 0, . . . , Tbase and use these
to predict individuals’ skill growth in t = Tbase + 1, . . . , T given their occupa-
tion choices. Subtracting predicted skill changes from realized wage growth and
aggregating over all workers in an occupation yields price growth.
More formally, we substitute (1.7) into the equation for wage growth (1.5)
to obtain our baseline estimation equation:
∆wi,t =
K∑
k=1
I¯k,i,t
(
∆pik,t +
K∑
k′=1
Ik′,i,t−1X ′i,t−1Γk′,k + uk,i,t
)
(1.8)
Our goal is to estimate the parameters in ∆pik,t and Γk′,k for all k, k′ ∈ K.
As it stands, they are not separately identified from each other because of
the intercept in Xi,t−1, which represents a level shifter for the speed of skill
accumulation in each occupation by virtue of the interaction with last period’s
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occupational choice indicator. We can, however, compare the speed of skill price
growth in different periods of our sample. Having to distinguish between price
and skill growth is a general challenge of panel-data based estimations. We make
the necessity for this explicit and will abstract from any short-term influences
by using an entire decade (1975–1985) as the base period.14 Figure 1.12 in the
Appendix depicts the employment and wage trends also for our base period. The
decade 1975–1984 covers the entire business cycle. Between 1976 and 1979,
average GDP growth was almost 4% annually; it then was below one percent
on average until 1984 and picked up again in 1985. Furthermore, the resulting
analysis period of 1985–2010 is the same as in Card et al. (2013).
In practice, we set ∆pik,t = 0 ∀ k ∈ {1, . . .K}, t ∈ {1, . . . , Tbase}. The
interpretation of ∆pik,t, t ∈ {Tbase + 1, . . . , T} changes depending on whether
this holds as an assumption or whether it is better viewed as a normalization.
The simplest interpretation obtains in the former case; i.e., skill prices during
the base period were indeed constant. It is clear that the skill accumulation
coefficients Γk′,k in this case will be identified from the base period. Accordingly,
the estimates of ∆pi can be interpreted as actual changes of skill prices for
t > Tbase.
Now suppose that constant skill prices during the base period are a poor
approximation; i.e., there were substantial systematic changes between t = 1
and t = Tbase. This implies that our estimated skill price changes in subsequent
years are accelerations or decelerations relative to their (unknown) trends during
the base period. To be precise, in the absence of other confounding factors,
the estimated skill accumulation coefficients will be Γˆk′,k = Γk′,k+ 12∆pik,base+
1
2∆pik′,base. Accordingly, the skill price estimates for t = Tbase+1, . . . , T identify
∆pˆik,t = ∆pik,t − ∆pik,base. In our discussion, we mainly stick with the eas-
ier literal interpretation of the parameter estimates. We will note the caveat
on several occasions, taking particular care to point out instances where the
acceleration/deceleration interpretation does make a substantive difference.
Turning to the estimation of the model, we first obtain a standard regression
equation from (1.8) by writing out the summations:
∆wi,t =
K∑
k=1
I¯k,i,t∆pik,t +
K∑
k=1
K∑
k′=1
I¯k,i,tIk′,i,t−1X ′i,t−1Γk′,k + vi,t , (1.9)
where vi,t ≡ ∑Kk=1 I¯k,i,tuk,i,t. It is clear from this definition that v and the
regressors are correlated since a large innovation to skills in a particular occupa-
tion makes it more likely that choosing this occupation happens to be optimal.
First, we argue that a basic OLS regression of (1.9) will often yield good results.
We then outline an instrumental variables strategy.
14As an alternative, Cortes (2016) and Cavaglia and Etheridge (2017) do not use a base
period and thus implicitly set one of the skill accumulation parameters to zero (details in
Appendix 1.B.4).
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The regression (1.9) is a saturated skill model including all combinations of
occupation choices Ik′,i,t−1 and Ik,i,t. In the base period, the regression gives:
E
[
∆wi,t
∣∣∣ {Ik,i,t, Ik,i,t−1}Kk=1 , Xi,t−1] =
E
[
K∑
k=1
K∑
k′=1
I¯k,i,tIk′,i,t−1X ′i,t−1Γk′,k + vi,t
∣∣∣∣∣ {Ik,i,t, Ik,i,t−1}Kk=1 , Xi,t−1
]
The fully interacted base period regression identifies this conditional expectation
function and therefore yields expected skill changes:
E
[
∆sk,i,t
∣∣ {Ik,i,t, Ik,i,t−1}Kk=1 , Xi,t−1] (1.10)
Defining νi,t ≡ ∑Kk=1 I¯k,i,t [∆sk,i,t − E [∆sk,i,t∣∣ {Ik,i,t, Ik,i,t−1}Kk=1 , Xi,t−1]],
the regression equation in the analysis period can be re-written as:
∆wi,t =
K∑
k=1
I¯k,i,t∆pik,t +
K∑
k=1
I¯k,i,tE
[
∆sk,i,t
∣∣ {Ik,i,t, Ik,i,t−1}Kk=1 , Xi,t−1]+ νi,t
(1.11)
Conditional on Xi,t−1 and any combination of Ik′,i,t−1 and Ik,i,t, the expecta-
tion of
E
[
∆sk,i,t − E
[
∆sk,i,t
∣∣ {Ik,i,t, Ik,i,t−1}Kk=1 , Xi,t−1]] is zero by construction. The
point here is that in the base period we already estimate the wage changes of
occupation switchers, including the skill accumulation as well as idiosyncratic
skill shocks. Therefore, if
E
[
∆sk,i,t
∣∣ {Ik,i,t, Ik,i,t−1}Kk=1 , Xi,t−1] is consistently estimated in the base pe-
riod, the error term in regression (1.11) is uncorrelated with the regressors I¯k,i,t
and changes in skill prices are identified under our assumptions.
An alternative approach to removing the bias in Equation (1.8) is by in-
strumenting the regressors
{
I¯k,i,t
}K
k=1
with their predetermined components{
Ik′,i,t−1
}K
k′=1, which are not a function of uk,i,t. As in dynamic panel data
models (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Arellano and Bond, 1991), we could in
principle use long occupational histories as instruments. It is well-known, how-
ever, that this leads to issues with many weak instruments (e.g., Newey and
Windmeijer, 2009). We thus instrument I¯k,i,t to get pik,t with Ik,i,t−1, i.e.,
individual i’s occupation choice in the year before in order to have an instru-
ment for skill price changes between years t − 1 and t. For skill changes, we
instrument I¯k,i,tIk′,i,t−1X ′i,t−1 with the occupational history in the two years pre-
ceding t−1, i.e., Ik,i,t−2Ik′,i,t−1X ′i,t−1 and Ik,i,t−3Ik′,i,t−1X ′i,t−1. This amounts
to (T −Tbase) ·K + 2 ·K2 ·L instruments, where L is the number of elements
in Xt. This strategy will not be feasible for large K but we will use the IV as a
major alternative specification for the four broad occupation groups.
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Finally, notice that the OLS estimates Γˆk′,k may not correspond to the struc-
tural skill accumulation parameters in Equation (1.9). The reason is that the
Γˆk′,k are the averages of skill changes, whether due to systematic accumulation
or due to idiosyncratic shocks, of k′ 6= k switchers or k′ = k stayers. Since
switching or staying is endogenous, we expect the skill accumulation parame-
ters to be overestimated in the OLS. The IV does not have this problem and
we expect skill accumulation estimates for stayers to be unbiased. But the first
stage may be weak for predicting occupational switches and thus it may also be
difficult in the IV to obtain the correct structural estimates of the off-diagonal
elements in Γk′,k.
1.3.4 Performance of the Estimation Strategy and Model Exten-
sions
We test the limits of our estimation method in a broad range of Monte Carlo
experiments, also exploring extensions of the underlying economic model. Fur-
thermore, we compare the performance of our approach to an alternative that
uses occupation-specific fixed effects pioneered by Cortes (2016). We limit our-
selves to a short description of the results, all details can be found in Section 1.C
of the Appendix.
In the Monte Carlo simulations, we aim to create a fairly realistic setting.
We draw a sample of occupations and wages at labor market entry from our
SIAB dataset. The remaining potential wages are drawn from truncated dis-
tributions so that the observed initial choice is optimal within the model. The
subsequent trajectories of wages in all occupations are simulated using our es-
timates for price changes and skill accumulation, varying the dispersion of the
idiosyncratic shocks across experiments. We stick to the four broad occupa-
tion groups and draw 100× 50,000 careers for each experiment. This balances
the ability to summarize the results on the one hand and broadly resembles
the effective size of detailed occupations in our application on the other hand.
Section 1.C.2 of the Appendix reports on some dimensions of the actual data—
occupational switchers, the distribution of wage innovations, and the evolution
of wage inequality—that serve as a backdrop for judging what may constitute
reasonable values for simulation inputs like, for example, the variance of skill
shocks.
In Section 1.C.3, we analyze the performance of our estimation method when
the data generating process is precisely the one described in Sections 1.3.1–
1.3.2. A detailed verbal description is provided at the beginning of 1.C.3; its
four subsections contain tables and figures for varying specifications regarding
the distribution of the idiosyncratic skill shocks. In order to judge the quality
of the approximation (1.4), we first shut these shocks off altogether. The
only randomness in this experiment comes from the initial draws and from
the evolving prices at the aggregate level. None of the 4 × 100 estimated
lines is visually discernible from the respective truth; we thus conclude that the
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approximation of individual wage growth under optimal occupation choice in
Equation (1.4) is unlikely to be causing a bias in our basic setting.
We then set the standard deviation of idiosyncratic skill shocks to half of the
standard deviation of innovations to wages in the SIAB. This yields switching
behavior, wage innovations, and an evolution of the wage structure very similar
to those in that actual data; we thus term this distribution to have “moderate
shocks”. As predicted at the end of the previous section, the OLS estimates
show a modest upward bias of stayers’ skill accumulation coefficients, whereas
the IV estimates are almost exactly on target.15 Both sets of skill price estimates
track the evolution of their actual values very closely. Intuitively, mistakes we
make with respect to the structural accumulation in the base period cancel
out in the estimation period, i.e., in Equation (1.11) for the OLS. This basic
pattern holds true even when tripling the size of the shocks.16 We overestimate
skill accumulation, particularly when using OLS, but skill price estimates remain
remarkably close to their targets. Finally, adding persistence to the skill shocks
by means of an AR(1)-process does not alter these conclusions either.
One aspect that previous literature has emphasized are fixed costs of switch-
ing occupations (e.g., Cortes and Gallipoli, 2017). In our framework, the point
of indifference between staying in an occupation and switching will now be de-
termined by wages adjusted for switching costs. This means, however, that
unadjusted wages of switchers will exhibit jumps at the indifference point, in-
troducing a potential bias to our estimates. We work this case out theoretically
in Section 1.B.3 of the Appendix; Section 1.C.4 presents Monte Carlo analy-
ses examining the bias’ importance. First, in a model without skill shocks and
with moderate switching costs (5% of annual wages), our approximation (1.4)
continues to work well. OLS estimates recover skill prices and stayers’ skill ac-
cumulation coefficients almost exactly in such a specification. As previously, we
then add moderate and large skill shocks, paired with moderate and high (20%
of annual wages) switching costs. All pictures show that the basic conclusions
from the corresponding exercises without switching costs remain the same: We
slightly overestimate the structural skill accumulation coefficients,17 but skill
prices are estimated with remarkable precision.
Another key extension of our approach is to the generalized Roy model,
including non-pecuniary values of occupations in the worker’s decision problem
(e.g., as in Lee and Wolpin, 2006). Similar to the case with switching costs,
workers who move to an occupation with lower (higher) non-pecuniary value will
exhibit positive (negative) jumps in wages to compensate for the amenity differ-
15Also as expected, the cross-accumulation parameters are generally upward-biased in the
OLS; and in the IV with weak instruments, they are large in absolute values.
16The descriptives on the resulting data in 1.C.3.3 show that tripling the shocks is clearly an
extreme case. There is far more switching in all directions compared to the SIAB, wage growth
is twice as high and more dispersed than in the data, and wage inequality is skyrocketing.
17As one would expect based on our theoretical analysis, the inertia generated by switching
costs leads to a somewhat larger overestimation of the off-diagonal elements of Γ.
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ence. We show formally in Appendix 1.B.3 that, if the non-pecuniary values are
time-constant, the skill accumulation parameter Γˆk′,k in our main specification
will absorb them. If they are time-changing, the estimation Equation (1.9) has
to be augmented and include regressors for occupation switches (∆Ik,i,t) on top
of average occupation choices (I¯k,i,t) to control for (and estimate) the respec-
tive “wage compensation”. Section 1.C.5 of the Monte Carlo analyses examines
such a case with rising amenities in one of the occupations, finding that the
∆Ik,i,t correction is indeed necessary but then we recover the skill prices and
skill accumulation as well as before (plus the changing amenities themselves).
We also show formally in the Appendix that what we have referred to as
idiosyncratic skill shocks is observationally equivalent in our analysis to a basic
model of employer learning about workers’ skills (e.g., as in Altonji and Pierret,
2001; Gibbons, Katz, et al., 2005). This is due to the fact that log-linearity
allows us to write the model in terms of expected skills, which can evolve because
of changes in actual skills (our formulation above) or because employers change
their expectations about individuals’ skills over time. The two interpretations
are not mutually exclusive, of course.
Finally, we examine an alternative panel data approach for estimating skill
prices due to Cortes (2016), who uses individual × occupation specific fixed
effects in order to control for skill selection. First, we show theoretically how
to generalize Cortes’ estimation in order to flexibly control for a rich model
of worker skill accumulation. We then implement this approach in the Monte
Carlo simulations and find that it performs well in most cases. Exceptions are
specifications with a lot of switching (i.e., a large number of occupations K or
large skill shocks), when the ‘exogenous mobility’ assumption of fixed effects
approaches discussed in Section 1.3.2 and Appendix 1.B.4 becomes quantita-
tively important. We conclude that the generalized version of Cortes’ method is
a useful alternative when the goal is to estimate low-dimensional skill prices; it
seems less suitable for applications that feature a large number of occupations.
1.4 Skill Prices and Skill Selection
This section first presents the estimation results for our main model. These in-
clude the evolution of skill prices, the accumulation of skills over the career, and
the relation of prices and occupations’ average skills with employment growth.
We then dig deeper into the nature of the implied selection effects, showing
that the skill differences between marginal workers and those who remain in
their occupations drive the strongly negative association of employment growth
with average skill changes in an occupation.
Throughout the section, we focus on the OLS results because they allow us
to estimate the model for both the 120 detailed occupations and the four broad
groups. We describe the IV results for the latter along the way. In our main
specification, Xi,t−1 contains two dummies for age groups 25–34 and 35–44 in
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t − 1 and an intercept representing the omitted age group 45–54 (recall from
Section 1.3.2 that these are fully interacted with occupation choices). In the
final part of this section, we show that our results are robust to a variety of
alternative choices regarding data preparation, sample selection, and estimation
specification before connecting our results to the literature using a task-based
approach.
1.4.1 Estimated Skill Price Changes and Skill Accumulation
Figure 1.5 depicts the evolution of skill prices, normalizing them to zero in
1985 and cumulating the yearly changes until 2010. In the broad occupation
groups, skill prices increased strongly among Mgr-Prof-Tech occupations, mod-
estly among Sales-Office and Srvc-Care; they decreased among Prod-Op-Crafts.
The thin lines in the background show that these broad estimates mask sub-
stantial heterogeneity among the 120 detailed occupations. We will explore this
in greater detail below.
Several distinct periods are noticeable. All prices increased during the fa-
vorable economic conditions between 1985 and 1991, although this was already
less pronounced for the Prod-Op-Crafts occupations. These have experienced a
continuous decline thereafter to the point that prices in 2010 were more than
five percent below their initial value in 1985. For the other occupations, there
was a drop during the 1992–93 recession as well; prices then stayed constant
until they rebounded before the turn of the century. This rebound was most
pronounced for Mgr-Prof-Tech occupations; prices in this group did not change
much for the remainder of our sample period. Skill prices fell by about 5 per-
centage points for Sales-Office and Srvc-Care occupations between 2000 and
2010. All these broad patterns also hold up in the instrumental variable esti-
mates with slightly different numerical values; see Figure 1.36 in the Appendix.
They are consistent with the job polarization of Figure 1.1b above; even the
temporal changes of employment and skill prices seem to be broadly aligned in
the four broad occupations. We will analyze in detail this relationship between
employment and price changes, and in Section 1.4.3 we use tasks measures to
approximate the role of RBTC versus other underlying factors for these patterns
in the German labor market.
Figure 1.6 graphs the estimates of the skill accumulation parameters for
stayers (i.e., Γk,k) in the four broad groups and for the 120 detailed occupa-
tions. Skill growth in the early years of the career is steep. Absent changes in
skill prices, it implies a 20% growth in wages between age 25 and age 34 for
Prod-Op-Crafts or Srvc-Care occupations and 50% or more for the other two.
It slows down mid-career and flattens out or turns negative toward the end of
prime age. This reflects the well-established concavity of life-cycle wage profiles
(e.g., Lagakos et al., 2018). Skill growth differs substantially by occupation. It
is initally very fast in high-earning Mgr-Prof-Tech and Sales-Office occupation
groups and never completely ceases. Growth is flatter and eventually peters out
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Figure 1.5: The evolution of skill prices
Notes: The figure shows estimated skill price changes. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9).
Shaded lines in the background represent the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four
groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. The
thickness of a shaded background line corresponds to the number of employed workers in an occupation
averaged across years 1985 until 2010. The shaded areas around the four lines are 95% confidence
intervals.
or turns negative in the Prod-Op-Crafts and Srvc-Care groups, i.e., occupations
that often require physical labor.18 Again, the broad groups mask substantial
heterogeneity across the detailed occupations. At the same time, it is the case
that the “blue” occupations on the one hand and the “red and green” occupa-
tions on the other hand are almost separate; there are hardly any occupations
to be found in the other block. This shows that life-cycle wage profiles are
decidedly different across occupations and controlling for this fact is critical in
producing reasonable estimates of prices and skills.
Our discussion in Sections 1.3.3–1.3.4 has shown that the parameter esti-
mates depicted in Figure 1.6 may incorporate both the structural coefficients
Γk,k and shocks. The reason is dynamic selection: Stayers are more likely to
have experienced favorable draws in their occupation,19 whereas IV estimates
should show less such bias. As expected, the IV estimates for the four occupa-
tion groups are slightly lower, but none of the broad patterns change. The full
set of our Γk′,k estimates for the four occupation groups can be found in Sec-
18One fact to note about the occupations in Germany compared to other countries is that
Sales-Office is quite high-earning. Its average wages for men are about halfway between Mgr-
Prof-Tech and Prod-Op-Crafts, employment is not declining over time, and we estimate rapid
skill accumulation as well as rising skill prices for this occupation group. Using survey data,
Cavaglia and Etheridge (2017) also document substantially higher wages for sales and office
occupations in Germany than in the U.K.
19As noted before, for the estimation of skill prices this is a core strength of our approach
because we allow for endogenous staying as well as switching of occupations.
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Figure 1.6: Skill accumulation of occupation stayers
Notes: The figure shows estimates for stayers’ skill accumulation during the life cycle. OLS estimates
as described by Equation (1.9). Shaded lines in the background represent the 120 detailed occupations
in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as described
in Appendix Table 1.4. The thickness of a shaded background line corresponds to the number of
employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010. The shaded areas around
the four lines are 95% confidence intervals.
tion 1.D of the Appendix. The OLS coefficient estimates show that switching
into Mgr-Prof-Tech and Sales-Office goes in hand with substantial gains. The
magnitude of the off-diagonal elements of Γ suggests that these incorporate
sizeable idiosyncratic shocks.20 The IV estimates for switchers also seem large
in absolute value, which is not surprising given that the instruments can only
weakly predict who switches out of his occupation. For the purposes of this
paper, which requires controlling for, but not predicting, occupation switches,
it is perfectly fine to identify the average gains associated with changing oc-
cupations. The critical task at hand for the skill accumulation function is to
appropriately account for any kind of wage growth that may be due to observ-
ables or unobservables changing over the career; the OLS estimates do serve
this purpose.
We now hone in on our key finding of this section, namely that employ-
ment growth and skill price growth go hand in hand. Figures 1.1b and 1.5
show that—consistent with shifts of occupational demand—both employment
and skill prices in the broad Mgr-Prof-Tech, Sales-Office, and Srvc-Care groups
increased compared to Prod-Op-Crafts. Figure 1.7a shows that detailed occu-
pations’ log employment changes between 1985 and 2010 are positively related
to cumulated skill price changes over the same period. The upward-sloping
20Judged against the difference between the true values and coefficient estimates in the
Monte Carlo experiments of Section 1.3.4, they are in line with the specifications with “mod-
erate” shocks.
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black regression line summarizes this strong relationship for the 120 occupa-
tions, which is in marked contrast to the zero correlation for wages not corrected
for composition effects (Figure 1.2a). As shown by the respective sub-regression
lines, the relationship also holds within occupation groups. This indicates that
our result is more general than a particular demand shifter that predominantly
impacts broad occupation groups.
Figure 1.7: Correlation of changes in employment, skill prices, and skills
(a) Skill prices (b) Skills
Notes: The vertical axis in Panel 1.7a shows the change in skill prices between 1985 and 2010 esti-
mated with OLS as detailed in Section 1.3.3. The vertical axis in Panel 1.7b depicts the change in
skills between 1985 and 2010 estimated as the residual between price and wage changes as shown in
Equation (1.12). The horizontal axis in both panels shows the change of the log number of employed
workers within an occupation between 1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed
occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as
described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed workers in an
occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression lines across all occupations (black) and
within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
The deviations of the bubbles from the overall regression line can be in-
formative about differences in labor supply to occupations. For example, Mgr-
Prof-Tech occupations tend to be located to the right of the graph and above
the grand regression line, meaning that prices have grown strongly compared to
employment. This pattern is consistent with a combination of positive demand
shifts and comparatively inelastic labor supply to those occupations, which seems
plausible because of occupational licensing rules and often high educational re-
quirements in Mgr-Prof-Tech. We estimate the largest increase in skill prices
for physicians and pharmacists (bubble at the very top of Figure 1.7a), where
educational requirements are high, places in medical school limited, and licens-
ing rules very strict. In contrast, this argument does not apply to IT experts
and the corresponding bubble is located below the overall regression line.
It is also possible to find examples where contemporaneous shifts of labor
supply and demand seem to be important. For example, the right-most red
bubble in Figure 1.7a are “assistants without further specification”. This occu-
pation has arguably experienced a strong positive shock to labor supply, with
many low-skilled immigrants and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe entering
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it after 1990. At the same time, temporary work agencies substantially increased
their demand for this occupation. Taken together, this may generate the pat-
tern that in Figure 1.7a, these assistants’ skill prices remain almost constant
while their average skills decline strongly according to Figure 1.7b. We will not
attempt to distinguish different labor supply elasticities from contemporaneous
shifts of supply and other factors. These are economic forces that may generate
the variation around the regression line in Figure 1.7a; its positive slope indicates
that demand shifts are the dominant force driving occupational changes.
Figure 1.7b depicts occupational employment growth against the cumulative
changes of average skills implied by the skill price estimates. For every occu-
pation, this is the difference between growth of its average wage (Figure 1.2a)
and its skill price (Figure 1.7a), i.e., the second term on the right hand side of:
E[wi,t|Ik,i,t = 1]− E[wi,t−1|Ik,i,t−1 = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mean wage change
= (1.12)
∆pik,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price change
+ E[sk,i,t|Ik,i,t = 1]− E[sk,i,t−1|Ik,i,t−1 = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mean skill change
summed over the years t = 1985, . . . , 2010. The x-axis once more has occupa-
tions’ growth over the analysis period. Figure 1.7b thus shows that implied skill
changes constitute the flipside of the skill price estimates in the sense that grow-
ing occupations’ decline of skills is strong. For example, the overall regression
line indicates that average skills of the occupations that experience the fastest
growth declined by 35 log points on average compared to those that shrank the
most. These are large effects; we thus devote the next section to examining
their components and their plausibility.
1.4.2 Accounting for Skill Selection
We have documented in Section 1.2.2 that entering (leaving) workers’ skills on
average appear decidedly below those of incumbents (stayers) and that faster-
growing occupations draw even less skilled entrants (leavers). Given that grow-
ing sectors by definition experience net entry, this could substantially drag down
growing occupations’ average wages despite rising demand and increasing skill
prices. Here we formalize and quantify this effect in the context of our model,
showing that it indeed drives the systematic part of the relationship between
employment growth and skills.
The change in average skills of an occupation in Equation (1.12) is de-
termined by three mutually exclusive groups of workers: Those who leave the
occupation after period t− 1; those who stay on after period t− 1 and are thus
incumbent in period t; and those who enter in period t. Denoting the share of
leavers in t − 1 by plvrk,t−1 and the share of period-t entrants by pentk,t , we can
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decompose the change of average skills in occupation k into three terms:
E[sk,i,t|Ik,i,t = 1]− E[sk,i,t−1|Ik,i,t−1 = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mean skill change
= (1.13)
(
1− p
lvr
k,t−1 + pentk,t
2
)
· E[∆sincumbk,i,t ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
1. Skill accumulation of t− 1 stayers
+
plvrk,t−1 + pentk,t
2 ·
(
E[sentk,i,t]− E[slvrk,i,t−1]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
2. Churning: difference entrants in t, leavers after t− 1
+
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
)
·
(
E[sentk,i,t]− E[sincumbk,i,t ]
2 +
E[slvrk,i,t−1]− E[sstyk,i,t−1]
2 ]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
3. Marginal selection
.
See Section 1.E.1 of the Online Appendix for the steps of the derivation. The
first term of Equation (1.13) reflects the skill accumulation of workers who
remain in the occupation. Its impact on occupational skill changes is high if
turnover is small and skill accumulation of staying workers is high.21 The second
term is churning, which is composed of average turnover multiplied with the skill
differences between period-t entrants and t − 1 leavers. This will tend to be
negative since leavers will have accumulated some skills relative to entrants. It
becomes more negative for high turnover occupations and for large estimates of
Γk,k. Hence, the accumulation and churning effects will often act in opposite
directions.22 Importantly, occupation growth does not have a first order effect on
either accumulation or churning. By inducing variation in turnover p
lvr
k,t−1+p
ent
k,t
2 ,
differences between the numbers of entrants and leavers push terms 1. and 2.
in opposite directions.
In contrast, occupation growth directly enters the marginal selection effect
in the third term of Equation (1.13), which is the product of net entry and the
difference in skills between marginal and inframarginal workers in an occupation.
In fact, since we have documented above in Section 1.2.2 that, in all occupa-
tions, entrants’ wages are lower than incumbents’ wages and leavers’ wages are
21In our setup, it will be generated from the estimated Γˆk,k-coefficients and worker demo-
graphics.
22If an occupation is stable in the sense that employment size and skill composition are
constant, they must cancel each other out. The marginal selection effect will be zero because
of constant employment and the left-hand-side of (1.13) will be zero because of constant skills.
Skill accumulation of staying workers must equal the churning effect due to the difference in
skills between entrants and leavers.
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Figure 1.8: Employment growth vs. the components of skill changes
(a) Accumulation + Churning (b) Marginal selection
Notes: Results correspond to sample averages following Equation (1.13). The horizontal axis in both
panels shows the change of the log number of employed workers within an occupation between 1985
and 2010. One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four
groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble
size corresponds to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until
2010. Regression lines across all occupations (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are
weighted by the number of employed workers.
lower than stayers’ wages, occupation growth will determine its sign.23 The
marginal selection effect is negative for growing occupations; it is positive for
shrinking occupations; and it is zero when there is no change in size. Marginal
selection thus formalizes and quantifies the intuition developed in Section 1.2,
whereby the more an occupation grows, the more net entry of less skilled workers
it experiences.
Figure 1.8 plots employment growth against the sum of the accumula-
tion and churning effects (Panel a) and against the marginal selection effect
(Panel b). The patterns are strikingly different. Accumulation and churning
are much more dispersed and there is no systematic relation with employment
growth. The average is significantly above zero. Since the accumulation effect is
generally positive and the churning effect generally negative (see Section 1.E.2
of the Appendix for separate plots), this means that the accumulation effect
dominates overall. This is not surprising given that the German working age
population grew significantly older and more experienced over the period under
study.
Figure 1.8b displays a substantively different pattern. There is a strong
negative relationship between employment growth and marginal selection. All
120 occupations are very close to the overall regression line and the four separate
regressions are almost on top of each other. This implies that there is no large
23Note that skill prices are the same for entrants/incumbents in t and for stayers/leavers in
t − 1. Furthermore, both summands in the second term of the marginal selection effect are
negative. Hence, knowing wages is enough to determine the sign of this second term; any
particular estimate of skills only affects its magnitude.
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variation across occupations in the second term of the product in 3., i.e., the sum
of the differences between entrants entrants/incumbents and stayers/leavers.
However, the absolute level of this term is large and induces strong differences
in marginal selection between growing versus shrinking occupations. Considering
how Figure 1.7b is related to its components in Figure 1.8, marginal selection
in the right panel determines the entire negative slope between skill changes
and employment changes. The location of the regression line and the variation
around it stem from accumulation and churning in the left panel. Therefore,
the systematic part of the large selection effects we found in Section 1.4.1 can
be traced back to changes in occupations’ sizes multiplied with the (negative)
skill differences between marginal and inframarginal workers.24
The marginal selection effect lends itself to further analysis. We can split it
up into the contributions at entry on the one hand and when leaving the occu-
pation on the other hand. Doing so reveals that the slopes of the regression lines
in Figure 1.8b are made up of steeper slopes for entrants versus incumbents and
flatter slopes for leavers versus stayers in the three growing occupation groups;
they are the same for the shrinking Prod-Op-Crafts (see Appendix 1.E.2). This
might not be surprising given that skills should be lower at occupation entry
and that leavers should have a larger impact in shrinking occupations. Digging
deeper into this, Tables 1.1 and 1.2 decompose the marginal selection effects
in two different ways, using the four broad groups for ease of exposition. See
Appendix 1.E.3 for the decomposition formulas.
Table 1.1 breaks down the contributions to marginal selection for the broad
occupation groups by the origin or destination of marginal workers. Maybe not
surprisingly, the single largest contributor are labor market entrants, who make
up at least 35% of the total for the three growing occupations and almost one
fourth for Prod-Op-Crafts. The main reason for this is that new labor market
entrants are a substantial share of entrants into growing occupations and that
they have not accumulated much skills in the respective occupation yet. In gen-
eral, there are some striking differences between the three growing occupation
groups on the one hand and Prod-Op-Crafts on the other hand. For the latter,
switches to and from unemployment are particularly important. They make up
almost 50%; the effect on average skills is positive because of net outflows. En-
trants from unemployment account for the same share of marginal selection in
Prod-Op-Crafts as sample entrants. In contrast, the combined contribution of
unemployment is around 20% for the oter three occupation groups and it neg-
atively affects average skills because of net inflows. Leavers to outside of the
labor force have a fairly large effect everywhere, that is, a substantial amount of
24In Hsieh et al. (2019), increasing wages per efficiency unit of skill in an occupation also
attract workers of lower quality. Their modeling setup equates overall selection effects with
marginal selection. With Fréchet as a specific multidimensional skill distribution, Hsieh et
al.’s setup implies that selection just offsets the increasing wages per efficiency unit. Inter-
estingly, this implication is approximately borne out in our approach, which does not make a
distributional assumption.
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Table 1.1: Contributions to marginal selection by origin and destination activities
Mgr-
Prof-
Tech
Sales-
Office
Prod-
Op-
Crafts
Srvc-
Care
Entrants Switchers from Mgr-Prof-Tech -0.05 -0.00 -0.00
Switchers from Sales-Office 0.01 0.01 0.01
Switchers from Prod-Op-Crafts 0.13 0.11 0.07
Switchers from Srvc-Care 0.01 0.02 0.02
From unemployment 0.11 0.10 0.22 0.11
From outside of the labor force -0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.04
Sample entrants 0.38 0.48 0.23 0.35
Leavers Switchers to Mgr-Prof-Tech -0.05 -0.01 0.00
Switchers to Sales-Office 0.05 0.01 0.02
Switchers to Prod-Op-Crafts 0.10 0.14 0.15
Switchers to Srvc-Care 0.02 0.03 0.01
To unemployment 0.07 0.07 0.26 0.11
To outside of the labor force 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.23
Sample leavers after age 54 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.01
Notes: The numbers represent relative contributions to the marginal selection effect within each broad
occupation group during 1985–2010. Columns sum to one. The actual sizes of the effects are -0.03
(Mgr-Prof-Tech), -0.02 (Sales-Office), 0.06 (Prod-Op-Crafts), and -0.04 (Srvc-Care). The explicit
decomposition formulas are in Appendix 1.E.3.
less-skilled workers are leaving all occupation groups in each period. However,
entrants from outside the labor force exert a counteracting effect on marginal
selection for the growing occupation groups; they often enter from other forms
of employment that are not covered in our data (self-employment, civil servants,
work abroad) and they are quite high-skilled compared to incumbents. Leavers
after age 54 also mostly exert a counteracting effect as they have accumu-
lated substantial skills over their careers and they exit our sample for exogenous
reasons.
Quantitatively, most of the marginal selection effect in Table 1.1 is ac-
counted for by moves into or out of unemployment, the labor market, or the
sample.25 Nonetheless, direct switches between occupations are non-negligible
and of economic interest because they almost always positively contribute to
marginal selection. That is, entrants into an occupation, independent of the
25The lion’s share of these moves is part of transitioning between jobs. In Online Ap-
pendix 1.F.1 we repeat Table 1.1 for our sample where we have filled non-employment spells
using the wage and occupation of the adjacent spell with the lower wage. We find that the
role of switches between occupations approximately doubles (there are still permanent entry
and exit from the sample as alternative contributors). We will come back to this and the
robustness of our results in Section 1.4.3.
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origin occupation, are less skilled than the incumbents. Leavers from an oc-
cupation, independent of the destination occupation, are less skilled than the
stayers. The partial exception is Mgr-Prof-Tech, where switchers from that oc-
cupation group are more skilled than the incumbents in their destination and
switchers into Mgr-Prof-Tech tend to be more skilled than the stayers in the
respective origin occupations.26 But overall this evidence once again indicates
that, at the time of switching, incumbents and stayers have strong specific skills
in their occupation compared to marginal workers, which is hard to reconcile
with a one-dimensional ranking of occupations by skill. Online Appendix 1.B.2
rejects the one-dimensional skill model in our data based on this type of evi-
dence.
Table 1.2 shows the contributions to marginal selection by the sources of
workers’ skills. We employ the longitudinal information in the data to separate
workers’ skill endowment at the most recent entry into the occupation from
their skill accumulation since then. In particular, we calculate the endowment
from observed wages and normalized prices at the time of entry. We then obtain
predicted skill accumulation during the current stint by summing the respective
estimated Γˆk,k over the worker’s tenure. Finally, we calculate the deviation of
workers’ actual wages from our prediction based on systematic skill and price
changes. The first row in Table 1.2’s top panel shows that in all occupation
groups, entrants have lower skill endowments than incumbents had at the time
that they were entrants. The corresponding bottom panel shows that also
leavers are negatively selected relative to stayers when comparing endowments
retrospectively.27 The resulting contribution to marginal selection that is due
to different skill endowments is substantial, ranging from one fifth in Mgr-Prof-
Tech and Sales-Office to two thirds in Srvc-Care. Endowments at entry into the
occupation can be interpreted as a “classic selection effect”, i.e., as in cross-
sectional models where workers’ skill endowments are drawn before making the
occupational choice.
Workers’ skills do however change during their stint in an occupation and
this has important separate effects on marginal selection. Table 1.2 shows
that for the high-accumulation Mgr-Prof-Tech and Sales-Office occupations,
around 40% of marginal selection is due to skills accumulated by incumbents
(accumulation for entrants is zero by construction).28 Another 15–20% percent
is due to more skills accumulated by stayers compared to leavers (i.e., stayers’
tenure is on average longer than that of leavers). Not surprisingly, the magnitude
26The latter makes sense as, e.g., promotions to team leader might yield such a change of
occupation.
27Comparing endowments in Table 1.2 presents a model-consistent way to control for ex-
perience in Figure 1.3 above. Also by this measure, both entrants or leavers earn less than
incumbents or stayers.
28Notice that, while the skill differences due to skill accumulation are in principle temporary,
higher values for incumbents will continue to contribute towards the marginal selection effect
as long as the respective occupation keeps growing and drawing in new, less skilled workers.
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Table 1.2: Contributions to marginal selection by source of skills
Mgr-
Prof-
Tech
Sales-
Office
Prod-
Op-
Crafts
Srvc-
Care
Entrants Endowment at the most recent
entry into the occupation group
0.14 0.16 0.21 0.33
Predicted skill accumulation
since the most recent entry
0.40 0.41 0.24 0.08
Deviation of skills from the
prediction since the most recent
entry
0.10 0.07 0.13 0.08
Leavers Endowment at the most recent
entry into the occupation group
0.08 0.06 0.18 0.35
Predicted skill accumulation
since the most recent entry
0.16 0.19 0.04 0.09
Deviation of skills from the
prediction since the most recent
entry
0.13 0.11 0.20 0.08
Notes: The numbers represent relative contributions to the marginal selection effect within each broad
occupation group during 1985–2010. Columns sum to one. The actual sizes of the effects are -0.03
(Mgr-Prof-Tech), -0.02 (Sales-Office), 0.06 (Prod-Op-Crafts), and -0.04 (Srvc-Care). The explicit
decomposition formulas are in Appendix 1.E.3.
due to skill accumulation is very heterogeneous and it accounts for less than
30% of the marginal selection effect in Prod-Op-Crafts and for even less in
Srvc-Care. This heterogeneity underlines the importance of flexibly modeling
skill accumulation across occupations: In a model with homogeneous returns to
experience the effect would only depend on tenure and entry age, which vary
much less across occupations and may even lead to inverse predictions such as
overall accumulation being highest in Prod-Op-Crafts.29
The final contributor to marginal selection in Table 1.2 are deviations from
what is already captured in our estimates Γˆk,k. These deviations are due to
systematically different skill shocks of incumbents/stayers compared to en-
trants/leavers during the stint.30 Again, the value is zero by construction for
entrants, showing that incumbents are positively selected on this margin as
well. The same holds true for stayers versus leavers. The effects are quantita-
29In our data, Prod-Op-Crafts occupations exhibit the longest average tenure (more than 14
years), Srvc-Care the shortest (10 years), and the other two are right in the middle (just below
12 years). Abstracting from differences in entry age, the skill accumulation effect on marginal
selection would be highest for Prod-Op-Crafts. In contrast, the longer average tenure does
not translate into a quantitatively large effect in our model because the skill accumulation
coefficients are much lower for Prod-Op-Crafts than for Mgr-Prof-Tech or Sales-Office (see
Figure 1.6).
30As discussed in Section 1.3.4, differential employer learning about skills is an alternative
explanation.
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tively substantial and economically interesting. They show that the argument
we made in Section 1.3—that staying in an occupation is endogenous in the
sense that only workers who receive sufficiently favorable skill shocks will decide
to remain in it—is not merely an academic one. The deviations are consistent
with learning models of occupational mobility, such as Groes et al. (2014) and
Papageorgiou (2014), which show that workers who leave an occupation previ-
ously systematically deviate from their peers in terms of wages (expected skills).
While predicted skill accumulation is quantitatively large, stayers in occupations
are clearly selected according to their idiosyncratic skill shocks. This underscores
the importance of the self-selection model underlying our estimation method.31
To sum up the evidence from this section, marginal selection can account
for the systematic part of the relationship between skill changes and employ-
ment changes across occupations implied by our estimates, both qualitatively
and quantitatively. This selection effect fundamentally stems from the fact that
entrants and leavers are substantially less skilled than incumbents or stayers in
any occupation; it is due to sector growth. Marginal selection also conforms
with reasonable economic notions of the underlying selection effects. First, a
large part of it are moves into and out of employment. Second, most almost
all groups of switchers contribute negatively (positively) to skills changes in the
destination (origin) occupation. The skill differences of marginal versus infra-
marginal workers consist of differing endowments at entry, skill accumulation
of incumbents, and endogenous switching (staying) of those workers who ex-
perience negative (positive) shocks during their stint in an occupation. These
effects are strong and seem economically plausible. As their magnitude does not
depend much on our skill price estimates, we consider the results in this section
separate and substantive evidence in favor of the results from our estimation
method.
1.4.3 Robustness of Results and the Task Content of Occupa-
tions
Appendix 1.F examines the robustness of our empirical results in alternative
samples and estimation specifications. We briefly summarize the reasons for
and results of these robustness checks in the following. Finally, we connect to
prior literature by describing occupations via the task content of work.
31This is a case where the more general acceleration or deceleration interpretation of skill
price changes from Section 1.3.3 matters. In particular, if skill prices had already risen in
the base period, we would overestimate the difference in skill accumulation of entrants versus
incumbents (and leavers versus stayers), while underestimating the difference in endowments
at the most recent entry. The (economically instructive) role of deviations from the model pre-
diction is unaffected by this more general interpretation, however. See Online Appendix 1.E.3
for more details.
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Filling non-employment spells: In our view, a key robustness check is to al-
low for endogenous unemployment and exit from the labor force. For instance,
when the skill price in an occupation declines, workers might prefer to tem-
porarily leave employment over switching to another occupation directly if the
benefits they obtain in unemployment are sufficiently high. As an alternative,
we therefore include all intermittent non-employment spells in our sample by
imputing workers’ wages and their occupation choices. We do this by compar-
ing wages before and after the non-employment spell, and assign workers the
lower of those two wages adjusted for inflation as well as the corresponding
occupation. That is, we assume that workers could well have worked in the
lower paying occupation but decided to become unemployed or exit the labor
force for some time instead.
Re-running the entire analysis on the sample constructed in this way, we find
that the estimated skill accumulation coefficients are generally smaller and they
turn negative in cases that one would expect to be “downward” switches (e.g.,
from Mgr-Prof-Tech to Prod-Op-Crafts). Yet the other results are similar to
before: The correlation between wage and employment growth is approximately
zero but it is strongly positive between price and employment growth (though
slightly flatter than in the main sample). In addition, the implied skill changes
are again negative and closely related to marginal selection. Section 1.5 returns
to this filled sample for some of the wage inequality analyses.
Different demographic groups: We have restricted our main sample to prime
age West German men as these can be defined consistently over the 1975–
2010 period and many potentially confounding factors (e.g., rising participation
and education rates, changing discrimination) do not apply. Nonetheless, it
is still informative to see whether the broad results hold up when we change
the demographics. First, in a wide definition that adds women, East Germans,
and workers who are always foreigners, the results are very similar to our main
sample.32 If we consider West German women only, it is striking that the
employment distribution is very different, with substantially more Sales-Office
and Srvc-Care occupations (indicated by the bubbles sizes in the respective
graphs). Nonetheless, the results for the women sample are similar to our main
results: there is no relationship of employment with wage growth but with skill
price growth (even slightly stronger), while implied skill changes and marginal
selection again point in the same direction. Finally, restricting ourselves once
more to West German men, but extending the age range to 20–60, our original
findings are confirmed with somewhat steeper slopes. This makes sense as
very young workers had less time to accumulate skills on their jobs and early
retirement—which was important over many of the years in our sample period—
was likely to be selective.
32The same holds if we conversely exclude anyone who was ever coded as a foreigner;
naturalized citizens who change their foreigner status are discussed further in Section 1.5.
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Different estimation specifications: We also estimate different model spec-
ifications that were discussed in Section 1.3. First, we employ the identification
approach pioneered by Heckman, Lochner, et al. (1998), which assumes that
mature workers’ skill growth should be rather flat. Our estimated coefficients
depicted in Figure 1.6 lend support to this assumption. At the same time,
possibly forward-looking choices—i.e., via picking occupations with high skill
accumulation—should be less of a concern in this age group. We thus follow
Heckman, Lochner, et al. (1998)’s flat spot approach and set skill accumulation
to zero for the 45–54 year old subsample. This obtains a similarly steep relation-
ship between skill price and employment changes as in the baseline estimation.
Marginal selection also works in the same direction as the implied skill changes,
although it is somewhat flatter.
We then return to our main sample and enrich the skill accumulation func-
tion to be education-group specific. The results hardly change compared to the
baseline where occupational skill accumulation differs only across age-groups.
Next, we allow for changing non-pecuniary amenities in occupations by aug-
menting the estimation equation with regressors for occupation switches (de-
tailed derivation in Appendix 1.B.3). We perform this exercise for the four broad
occupations only because of the extensive data requirements. Similar to Hsieh
et al. (2019), we find that changing amenities (or, alternatively, changing pref-
erences) hardly have an effect on the estimated changes of skill prices.33 We
also estimate the alternative occupation-specific fixed effect approach by Cortes
(2016). The relationship between employment and price changes is somewhat
flatter than in our proposed method but still highly significant.
Notably, in each of the different samples and estimation specifications the
relationship between occupational wage and employment growth is essentially
flat, whereas estimated skill prices and employment growth correlate positively.
This indicates that demand shifts were dominant across broader demographic
groups and that selection effects are generally strong, masking this underlying
driving force. Moreover, we find that the estimated price changes positively
correlate across samples and estimation specifications, and that implied skills
and marginal selection work in the same direction throughout.
Connecting to the task-based approach Finally, we connect to a large liter-
ature that has investigated occupational changes with the task-based approach
(e.g., Autor, Levy, et al., 2003; Firpo et al., 2013; Yamaguchi, 2018). For Ger-
many, several authors have used the Qualifications and Career Surveys (QCS)
33Hsieh et al. (2019) introduce a general equilibrium Roy model in which workers sort on
either (unobserved) talent or preferences. They report a small, weakly positive correlation
between occupational employment and earnings growth similar to Figure 1.2a above (Figure
10, p. 41 Hsieh et al., 2019). Based on that finding in combination with their model prediction,
they conclude that workers primarily sort into occupations based on talent as opposed to
preferences.
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to measure routine versus non-routine task content in particular (e.g., Spitz-
Oener, 2006; Antonczyk et al., 2009; Gathmann and Schönberg, 2010). In the
last section of Appendix 1.F, we also employ the QCS to construct routine as
well as analytical, interactive, and manual task content for our 120 occupations.
We then relate these measures to employment growth, wage changes, and our
estimates for prices and skills.
The resulting graphs show that occupations intensive in analytical (often
in the Mgr-Prof-Tech group) and interactive (Mgr-Prof-Tech and Sales-Office)
tasks indeed grew quite strongly, whereas employment in routine-intensive (Prod-
Op-Crafts) occupations declined. High analytical and interactive task content
of occupations helps predict rising wages. However, the relation with estimated
skill prices is even steeper. Conversely, implied skills deteriorate in analytical
and interactive task content. The correlation between routine task intensity
and average wages is zero; this is composed of falling prices and rising skills.
All this is consistent with the impact of RBTC on these occupations and with
our finding that skill price changes are counteracted by selection effects.
The case of manual-task intensive occupations (mostly in the Prod-Op-
Crafts and Srvc-Care groups) is also in line with the latter general finding. But
it seems that the overall demand shift was negative because employment as
well as average wages and skill prices declined. One likely reason for this is
measurement, since the QCS questionnaires have some difficulty distinguishing
between routine and manual job tasks. The other is that alternative demand
forces than RBTC have lifted the employment and skill prices of Srvc-Care
occupations, despite their high (measure of) manual tasks.34
These results demonstrate the usefulness of task measures as a dimension-
reduction device, particularly when working with more limited datasets. It
is especially helpful to study specific drivers of occupational change. At the
same time, using detailed occupations directly is most flexible and does not re-
quire precise measurements of all task dimensions for which demand may have
changed.35
1.5 Skill Prices and Wage Inequality
We have shown that selection effects largely explain why occupational wages
and employment growth are uncorrelated over the period under study. By a sim-
ilar token, selection may shroud the relation between demand shifts and wage
34Additional forces that could have worked on Srvc-Care include demand for social skills
or consumption of low-skill services (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Mazzolari and Ragusa, 2013;
Deming, 2017). In the case of Prod-Op-Crafts occupations, employment may have declined
even more than predicted by RBTC because of trade and offshoring (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson,
2013; Goos, Manning, and Salomons, 2014). See also Footnote 2.
35For example, Firpo et al. (2013), Blinder and Krueger (2013), and Goos, Manning, and
Salomons (2014) construct task measures for offshorability in the U.S. and Europe. Deming
(2017) constructs measures of social skills.
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inequality, particularly between occupations. In this section, we thus examine
to what extent selection may also be responsible for the result that occupations
exhibit limited explanatory power for the increase of wage inequality. Running
Mincer-regressions, Card et al. (2013) obtain only small decreases in residual
wage inequality when adding occupation dummies. Dustmann, Ludsteck, et
al. (2009) find that in the lower half of the wage distribution, occupational
demand is not a first-order factor driving wage differences. We first use only
the estimated skill prices and selection to quantify the forces driving between-
occupation inequality. We then employ the full version of our model to disentan-
gle the components that affect various percentiles of the wage distribution,36
paying particular attention to entry wages, demographics, skill accumulation,
and prices.
1.5.1 The Attenuating Effect of Selection On Inequality
Over the period of our study, the variance of log wages multiplied with 100 went
up by 12.4 points from a baseline of 14.3. The component due to differences
between occupations started at a value of 5 in 1985. It then more than doubled
and reached almost 40% of the overall inequality in 2010. A substantial share
of the increase thus occurred between occupations, consistent with occupa-
tional demand (e.g., due to routine-biased technical change and offshoring as in
Acemoglu and Autor, 2011) but also with other factors having been important
drivers of wage inequality.
In particular, one question that several papers before us have asked is
whether changes in the demographic structure of the population were such a
factor. The first column of Table 1.3 reports on a counterfactual analysis similar
in spirit to that of Figure 16 in Autor (2019).37 Holding wages at their 1985
level, we reweight observations with the distribution of age, foreigner status,
and education in 2010.38 This exercise answers the question: what if choices
conditional on these observables and wages were constant at their 1985 levels,
but the demographic structure had shifted to that of 2010 (due to population
aging, increased immigration, and rising educational achievements of younger
36Due to the nature of our data, we restrict attention to wage inequality as opposed to
overall inequality. It is thus important to note that we do not see a clear trend in labor force
participation rates of German men over most of the period under study. In particular, there
was a decline between 1975 and 1989, but rates stabilized around 93-94% thereafter. This is
in stark contrast to U.S. men, where rates dropped from almost 94% to below 90% between
1989 and 2010.
37The closest to his analysis includes occupational choices among the variables used for
reweighting. The results of this exercise can be found in Appendix 1.G.1. They are quan-
titatively similar to our specification in Table 1.3. We prefer this specification because age,
foreign, and education are arguably all factors that mostly contribute to occupational supply
as opposed to demand.
38To compute the weights, we follow DiNardo et al. (1996) using a logit model with 30
dummies for detailed ages between 25–54, a dummy for being permanently German or not, as
well as three dummies for education status.
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cohorts)? Quantitatively, the answer is similar to that of Autor (2019) in that
the effects make up something like a fifth of the total increase and a third of
the increase in between-inequality.
Table 1.3: Decomposition of the between-variance of wages, data and counter-
factuals
Counterfactuals Actual
Rewgt.
age,
foreign,
educ.
Prices
only
Prices
+
rewgt.
age,
foreign,
educ.
Data +
price
estimates
Overall ∆σ2(wi,t) 2.41 5.13 9.56 12.41
Between ∆σ2(w¯k,t) 1.74 5.13 8.88 5.25
2 · σ(∆w¯k,t, w¯k,1985) 2 · σ(∆pik,t, w¯k,1985) 0.00 3.23 3.23 3.23
2 · σ(∆s¯k,t, w¯k,1985) 0.53 0.00 0.53 -0.53
σ2(∆w¯k,t) σ2(∆pik,t) 0.00 1.89 2.36 1.76
σ2(∆s¯k,t) 1.21 0.00 1.21 3.02
2 · σ(∆pik,t,∆s¯k,t) 0.00 0.00 1.55 -2.24
Notes: All values are multiplied with 100. The levels in 1985 are 14.3 (overall) and 5.0 (between).
Based on specification with 120 occupations. w¯k,t refers to the average wage in occupation k in year
t. The counterfactual experiments are: Rewgt. age, foreign, educ.: take observations in 1985 and
reweight them to match the 2010 distribution of these characteristics with weights computed following
DiNardo et al. (1996) in order to obtain 2010 wages. Prices only : take individual wages in 1985 and
add our estimated price changes to obtain 2010 wages. Rewgt. age, foreign, educ. + prices: Combine
both experiments.
With the help of our model we can gain further insights into the components
that have driven changes of between inequality. Denoting average wages (skills)
in an occupation by w¯k (s¯k), we can write the change between 1985 and 2010
as:
∆σ2(w¯k,t) = 2 · σ(∆pik,t, w¯k,1985) + 2 · σ(∆s¯k,t, w¯k,1985)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2·σ(∆w¯k,t,w¯k,1985)
+ σ2(∆pik,t) + σ2(∆s¯k,t) + 2 · σ(∆pik,t,∆s¯k,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ2(∆w¯k,t)
(1.14)
See Appendix 1.G.1 for the detailed derivation. First consider the terms un-
derneath the braces, which involve only wages. They say that if overall wage
inequality was constant ∆σ2(w¯k,t) = 0 and there were any changes in the wage
structure across occupations σ2(∆w¯k,t) > 0, it must be that occupations at the
bottom of the distribution experienced better wage growth than those at the top
on average σ(∆w¯k,t, w¯k,1985) < 0. Using our model, the main terms in (1.14)
now break these two components into changes of prices and changes of skills.
We start by applying this decomposition to various counterfactual experiments
in order to better understand the mechanisms at work.
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The remainder of the first column of Table 1.3 shows that the reweighting
procedure only affects skills; all terms involving price changes are zero. The
covariance of skill changes with baseline wage levels is positive. This is a re-
flection of the fact that the population grew older and more educated together
with high-wage, high-education occupations (Mgr-Prof-Tech, Sales-Office) fea-
turing faster skill accumulation over the life cycle. However, while we will show
below that these changes in the demographic structure had an important role
for overall inequality, they play a limited role for explaining between-occupation
inequality. Including occupations among the variables used for reweighting does
not change these conclusions (see Appendix 1.G.1).
The second column of Table 1.3 reports on the results from the opposite
experiment, which isolates the effect of price changes. Holding constant the
1985 demographic structure and occupation choices, we add the cumulative
changes of occupational skill prices between 2010 and 1985 to individuals’ wages.
These effects alone generate almost the entire increase of between inequality.
The bulk of the effect stems from the covariance between price changes and
initial wage levels. Prices rose in Mgr-Prof-Tech, Sales-Office, and Srvc-Care
occupations; the first two featured high wages already in 1985 and employment
there is much larger than in Srvc-Care. Our preferred interpretation of this term
is that it reflects the nature of demand shifts: during the period under study,
they happened to benefit high-wage occupations more. Naturally, any term
involving skill changes is zero.
The third column shows what happens if both experiments are turned on.
The variance of price changes rises somewhat due to the different weights; all
other effects from the separate experiments remain the same. The covariance
between price and skill changes is substantial and positive. Overall, this coun-
terfactual overestimates the rise of between inequality by two thirds. Looking at
the first line only, one may even be tempted to think that this exercise explains
a large share of the overall rise in inequality (77%).
However, a comparison with the last column, the actual between variance
and its components, reveals that this large “explained” share is far off, since
there are important dampening effects of selection on wage inequality. In par-
ticular, the economic mechanism described at length in the previous section—a
deterioration of skills in occupations where prices rose—has a strong impact on
inequality. This strong negative covariance is everything but mechanical: if we
interpret price changes as mainly driven by demand shifts and the demographic
changes captured by the reweighting as supply shifts to occupations, the third
column of Table 1.3 suggests that these shifts covaried positively. The impact
of −2.24 points in the actual data as well as the negative covariance of skill
changes and initial wage levels are therefore important attenuating selection ef-
fects. As a result, the actual contribution of skill changes to between inequality
is negligible whereas in the counterfactual it is +3.29 points overall.
What we have just described is consistent with theoretical results by Heck-
man and Honoré (1990) for a two-sector Roy economy. They showed that,
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if the population distribution of skills is log concave, self-selection in the Roy
model will generally lead to more equal wages compared to random assignment
into occupations. With respect to the particular case at hand, when the corre-
lation of skills in the different occupations is sufficiently low, average skills in
the occupation with declining prices will unambiguously improve and they will
unambiguously deteriorate in the occupation with rising prices.
Our results show why decompositions based on observables alone have dif-
ficulties generating quantitatively meaningful increases of inequality: so long
as average wages across occupations are more or less constant (e.g., see again
Figure 1.2), changing demographics and even large shifts of the employment
structure across occupations exert limited impact. The reason is that underly-
ing skill prices and supply changes, which would have raised between-occupation
inequality further than what is observed, are counteracted by strong selection
effects.
1.5.2 Factors Contributing to Wage Inequality
While the economic forces under scrutiny in this paper are most important for
inequality between occupations, our model can be employed to gain a better
understanding of the overall development of the wage distribution, too. In the
following, we use our estimates to disentangle the factors that contributed to
differences between the quantiles of the wage distribution.
Figure 1.9 plots the evolution of the percentiles of the wage distribution
in the data and in various scenarios based on our model. Figure 1.9a just
repeats Figure 1.1a for ease of comparison; it shows the strong widening of the
German wage distribution (Dustmann, Ludsteck, et al., 2009; Card et al., 2013).
Figure 1.9b plots the individual-level predictions from our model. In order to
obtain an individual’s predicted wage in a particular year, we start from the initial
wage observed in our data39 and follow his occupational choices over the life-
cycle, adding the relevant skill accumulation parameters and skill price estimates
along the way. The predictions track the data closely, both qualitatively and
quantitatively. Note that all percentiles in all panels are normalized to zero in
1985; Table 1.25 in the Appendix shows that our model is close to its targets
also for the levels of these percentiles and the variance.
The remaining panels of Figure 1.9 investigate the drivers of the model
prediction by starting with the most basic version and turning on our model’s
features one after the other. Panel c reports on how the three percentiles would
have evolved if workers had kept their initial wages for their entire working life.
Many variants of supply changes would directly affect this scenario. For example,
one may expect the expansion of tertiary education to lead to higher entry wages
39For workers who may have entered the labor market before our sampling period starts—
i.e., those born before 1950 observed to be working in 1975—we use our skill accumulation
estimates to impute their initial wages at age 25, assuming they stayed in the same occupation
all along.
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Figure 1.9: Wage inequality scenarios
(a) Observed
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
lo
g(
pe
rc
en
til
e)
 ×
 1
00
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 1
98
5
15th pct 50th pct 85th pct
(b) Model
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(c) Initial occupation and wage throughout
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(d) Initial occupation + skill accumulation
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(e) Observed occ. + skill acc.; ∆sk,l = 0
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(f) Observed occ. + skill accumulation
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Notes: Panel a: observed wages. Panel b: simulated life-cycle trajectories based on our full model:
starting from the initial wage and occupational choice, add all skill accumulation and price change
estimates using occupational choices observed in the data. Panel c: workers keep their initial wage
throughout the life cycle. Panel d: workers stay in their initial job throughout the life-cycle; in each
period, we add the skills they would have accumulated in that job (i.e., ∆sk0,k0,t). Panel e: use
observed switches, setting direct gains from switching to zero, i.e., ∆sk,l = 0 ∀ k 6= l. Price changes
are zero as well, so the difference to Panel d comes purely from differential skill accumulation in
occupations. Panel f: as in Panel e, but adding the direct gains from switching. The only difference
to the full model in Panel b are the price changes, which continue to be zero. In all scenarios, we treat
unemployment or out-of-the-labor force spells as follows: when such a spell is observed in the data,
simulated workers do not enter the inequality statistics. Furthermore, we assume no depreciation and
upon re-entry into paid work add—where relevant—the ∆sk,l,t with l being the occupation before the
spell.
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for the additional university graduates, raising the upper percentiles. The results
show that the median and the 85th percentile rose somewhat. Quantitatively,
this is not very important, making up between one fifth (median) and one
eighth (85th percentile) of the total increase. All three percentiles evolve rather
smoothly, the distinct temporal pattern over time visible in Panels a and b thus
does not seem to be driven by changing conditions at labor market entry.
After a small initial increase, the 15th percentile exhibits a pronounced de-
cline starting in the mid-nineties. In fact, this decline is so strong that it could
explain the drop of that percentile between 2010 and 1985.40 This large drop
seems due to temporary workers41 and naturalized citizens, both of whom are
frequently the same. Excluding workers ever coded as foreigners from our sample
reduces the fifteenth percentile drop by more than two thirds both in Panels b
and c (see Figure 1.53 in the Appendix). This is consistent with Dustmann,
Ludsteck, et al. (2009)’s hypothesis that, from the 1990s onward, many low-
skilled immigrants and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe increasingly flowed
into the West German labor market, worsening the composition of employment
at the lower end.
In Figure 1.9d, we continue to assign workers to their initial occupation, now
adding the skill accumulation coefficients. There is hardly any change for the
fifteenth percentile compared to Panel c, but the median and 85th percentile rise
strongly. The incremental changes are 4 points at the median and 5 points at the
85th percentile, amounting to one half (one third) of the overall changes between
2010 and 1985. Again, all changes happen rather smoothly. The scenario shows
that the demographic and occupational composition has a quantitatively strong
impact on the rise of the upper half of the wage distribution.
We add the empirically observed switches to careers in Figure 1.9e, but do
not turn on the direct gains from switching, i.e., we set ∆sk,l = 0 ∀ k 6= l.
This exercise drives up the median and 85th percentile by an additional three
points; it hardly affects the fifteenth percentile. The results show that switches
from occupations with flatter age profiles to those with steeper age profiles do
matter even if one ignores the oftentimes large jumps associated with switches.
However, the skill accumulation differentials are not large enough to drive a
majority of earnings inequality. Part of this may be due to timing: For switches
that occur after age 35, the skill accumulation differentials between occupation
groups are not as big as they are at the beginning of careers. Nevertheless, the
rise in the median and 85th percentile is large in Panels d and e in comparison
to Panel c. In Appendix 1.G.3, we show that this is due to the aging of the
40Again, the temporal pattern is far off. One would reach a radically different conclusion
regarding the fit if one were to compare, say, 1991 and 1985.
41We identify temporary workers from the detailed occupation “assistants without fur-
ther specification”, which mostly appears in the industry group “Credit and insurance inter-
mediation, land and housing, rentals”. This industry group contains the subgroup “labor
recruitment and provision of personnel” where temporary agencies are listed. Temporary work
has increased a lot in Germany (Eichhorst and Tobsch, 2013).
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workforce with many more middle-aged workers at the median in 2010 compared
to 1985. Demographic factors were therefore substantially responsible for the
increase of lower half inequality. In contrast, since the 85th percentile was
similarly raised as the median, upper half inequality did not increase much
because of demographic changes or skill accumulation within occupations.
Adding the gains associated with occupation changes in Figure 1.9f raises all
statistics; it does so disproportionately for the 85th percentile. This is not too
surprising given the large coefficient estimates for switches into Mgr-Prof-Tech
and Sales-Office occupations that we reported on in Section 1.4. Comparing
the end points of our sample period, this scenario explains three quarters of the
increase in the 85th percentile and the entire increase in the median; we are too
optimistic about the evolution of the fifteenth percentile by 3 points. There are
two things to note, however. First, the temporal pattern is very smooth and
we do not track the intermittent evolution of any percentile very well. Second,
there is actually a decline in the fifteenth percentile for the specification where
we make unemployment or exiting the labor force a choice by filling such spells
with the lowest adjacent wage (see Figure 1.54 in the Appendix). This suggests
that indeed careers at the lower end of the distribution became more fragmented
and our main way of treating non-employment spells hides parts of this.
Comparing Figures 1.9f and 1.9b, we see that skill prices explain most of the
remaining differences with the actual wage distribution. In particular, changing
prices raise the 85th percentile as well as upper half inequality by an additional
seven log points. As in the case of between occupation inequality, they thus
have a strong impact. In the specification where unemployment is a choice,
price changes hurt both the median and the 15th percentile, again highlight-
ing that we overestimate the gains from switching at the lower end because
occupation changes involving wage losses often go via an unemployment spell.
Finally, adding the price changes allows us to track the temporal evolution of
all quantiles. Thus skill prices are not only aligned with employment across
occupations, but they also align the temporal patterns of the wage distribution.
In sum, we show that initial occupational choices and demographic factors
account for most of the increase in lower half inequality; alternative specifica-
tions suggests that more unstable employment biographies and adverse price
developments have some role to play, too. This is consistent with the hypothe-
sized effects in Dustmann, Ludsteck, et al. (2009), which is an important finding
overall because it has previously been hard to rationalize polarizing demand for
occupations together with wage inequality that increased across the board in
most countries and time periods (Goos and Manning, 2007; Mishel et al., 2013;
Naticchioni et al., 2014; Green and Sand, 2015). Occupational switches and
changing skill prices have a particularly important role to play in the upper half
of the wage distribution, driving almost all of the additional wedge that opened
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up between the 85th percentile and the median over the period 1985–2010.42
1.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper develops a model of occupation choice based on Roy (1951), which
remains empirically tractable for many occupations and accommodates hetero-
geneous skill changes over the life cycle. We use this model to study how oc-
cupational employment growth relates to occupational wages and overall wage
inequality. Our results indicate that skill-constant occupational wages (skill
prices) evolved in a way that is consistent with occupational demand shifts.
Skill selection of workers completely masked this relationship in raw occupa-
tional wages, where the development was unrelated to employment changes.
We show that the systematic part of the skill price-employment growth nexus is
due to what we term the marginal selection effect; net entry into an occupation
multiplied with the skill differences between occupation entrants/leavers versus
incumbents/stayers.
The selection effect that we uncover is more subtle than the one considered in
classic Roy models, where workers’ skills across occupations are fixed over time.
The classic effect accounts for less than forty percent of marginal selection in
most occupations. The more important share is due to skill changes during em-
ployment stints in an occupation, i.e., the fact that incumbent/staying workers
are positively selected, translating into longer tenure and gains from (specific)
experience. These effects vary strongly across occupations, which is a reflection
of the fact that occupational life-cycle wage profiles are very heterogeneous.
We further show that similar lines of reasoning carry over to wage inequal-
ity, where we establish a long-suspected connection to demand shifts and oc-
cupational employment changes that is meaningful also in quantitative terms.
Worker (self-)selec-tion leads to substantially lower wage inequality between oc-
cupations than would be observed if workers in the 1980s were given the skill
prices of later decades while holding their occupational choices fixed. Selection
thus makes it appear that occupational changes were not that important. Us-
ing our model to understand the trends in overall wage inequality, we instead
find that differentially evolving skill prices and heterogeneous skill changes across
occupations are the most important drivers of upper-half inequality. Initial occu-
pation choice and population aging—which induces higher wages at the median
of the wage distribution due to a larger fraction of seasoned workers—are the
main factors driving lower-half inequality.
42The discussion in this section is robust to the more general acceleration/deceleration
interpretation of skill price changes from Section 1.3.3. First, the full estimated model, which
includes both skill accumulation and skill prices, is unaffected by this interpretation. Second,
before the estimated prices are included, one would still like to add the average rates of price
changes in the base period to the skill accumulation in order to obtain scenarios where “only”
entry wages, initial occupations, or occupational switching changed. This is effectively what
we do in Panels c–f of Figure 1.9.
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Our explanation is consistent with other accounts of rising wage inequality in
Germany. One of the most prominent is based on de-unionization and a decen-
tralization of the wage bargaining process (Dustmann, Ludsteck, et al., 2009;
Dustmann, Fitzenberger, et al., 2014). These phenomena have the strongest
impact in the manufacturing sector, that is, the industry sector that is most
important for the declining Prod-Op-Crafts occupations. We deem it plausible
that demand shifts are a deeper cause for this, as unions and works councils
understand their deteriorating bargaining position due to the threats of substi-
tution by machines or foreign workers.43 Our findings are also consistent with
other work showing that German firms tend to upgrade labor through invest-
ment in skills (Battisti et al., 2017; Dauth et al., 2017).44 These responses may
reflect the institutional environment, which results in relatively cooperative labor
relations in Germany. For example, unions and works councils are represented
on boards of large companies and thereby involved in managerial decisions.
The approach we develop in this paper differences out the unobserved skills
in workers’ chosen occupations. This helps solve the econometric selection
problem without recurring to parametric assumptions on unobservables. It does,
however, come at the cost of not identifying the full population distribution of
skills. In the counterfactual analyses in this paper, we therefore condition on
observed occupation choices. Other papers, by contrast, assume a static full
distribution of skills (e.g., Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Hsieh et al., 2019) to
study the effects of important changes in the U.S. economy on the allocation
of talent and earnings. One promising avenue for further research is to combine
these two approaches, and to obtain micro-identified levels and changes of skills
across occupations. With efforts underway to link direct survey measures of
skills to administrative records, the data requirements will be met in the near
future. Our framework will provide a good starting point to model entire careers.
The result would certainly promise to answer key economic questions and allow
making predictions about future developments such as the further impact of big
data and artificial intelligence.
43Baumgarten and Lehwald (2019) provide evidence for the threat of import competition.
44We find few switches of occupations to be systematically associated with large losses, even
if we fill intermittent spells of non-employment.
1.A. FURTHER DETAILS ON THE DATA AND EMPIRICAL FACTS 45
1.A Further Details on the Data and Empirical Facts
1.A.1 Dataset Construction
We employ the SIAB Scientific Use File for our analyses. The SIAB is a 2% ran-
dom sample of administrative German social security records spanning the years
1975 until 2014.45 It includes employees covered by social security, marginal
part-time employment (since 1999), unemployment insurance benefit recipients,
and individuals who are officially registered as job-seeking or who are participat-
ing in programs of active labor market policies. It excludes the self-employed,
civil servants, individuals performing military service, and those not in the labor
force. In total, it is representative for 80% of the German workforce.
Most notably, it contains an individual’s full employment history, including
a time-consistent occupational classifier (up to 2010), the corresponding wage,
year of birth, place of work, and education. The data is exact to the day as
employers need to notify the employment agency if the employment relationship
changes. Therefore, the data is available in a spell structure making it possible
to observe the same individual at various employers within a year. Those spells
may even overlap as workers can have multiple employment contracts at a time.
We transform the spell structure into a yearly panel by identifying the longest
spell within a given year and deleting all the remaining spells. This procedure
differs from the previous inequality literature employing the SIAB in the German
context. For instance, Dustmann, Ludsteck, et al. (2009) aggregate all the
information from various spells within a year, adding up all the earnings from
multiple employment spells. Since our focus is on occupations, this is impossible
to do as one cannot aggregate multiple categorical occupation information.
Fortunately, the number of workers in our main sample with more than one
spell in a year is negligible (< 1.3%) and so of minor concern.
1.A.1.1 Sociodemographics
Occupations: The detailed 120 occupations (KLDB1988) of our main analysis
can be found in Table 1.4. Some parts of the analysis make use of a grouping
of these 120 occupations into four major classes in the spirit of Acemoglu and
Autor (2011):
1. Managers-Professionals-Technicians (Mgr-Prof-Tech)
2. Sales-Office (Sales-Office)
3. Production-Operators-Craftsmen (Prod-Op-Crafts)
4. Services-Care (Srvc-Care)
45Access to the data is subject to signing a contract with the Research Data Center of the
German Federal Employment Agency. See Ganzer et al. (2017) for an up to date documen-
tation of the data. We carried out all the analyses making use of the templates provided by
Gaudecker (2014).
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Education: The education variable contained in the SIAB suffers from some
inconsistencies and missing values as described in Fitzenberger et al. (2006)
because this information is not irrelevant for social security contributions. We
use Fitzenberger et al.’s imputation to obtain an education variable with three
or five distinct distinct outcomes: low (missing or without any postsecondary
education), medium (apprenticeship training or high school diploma), and high
(university degree).
Table 1.4: Grouping of occupations
Group SIAB occupation
Managers Entrepreneurs, managing directors, divisional managers
Management consultants, organisors until chartered ac-
countants, tax advisers
Members of Parliament, Ministers, elected officials until
association leaders, officials
Professionals Architects, civil engineers
Artistic and assisting occupations (stage, video and au-
dio) until performers, professional sportsmen, auxiliary
artistic occupations
Chemists, chemical engineers until physicists, physics
engineers, mathematicians
Data processing specialists
Economic and social scientists, statisticians until scien-
tists n.e.c.
Electrical engineers
Home wardens, social work teachers
Journalists until librarians, archivists, museum special-
ists
Mechanical, motor engineers
Music teachers, n.e.c. until other teachers
Musicians until scenery/sign painters
Navigating ships officers until air transport occupations
Physicians until Pharmacists
Social workers, care workers until religious care helpers
Soldiers, border guards, police officers until judicial en-
forcers
Survey engineers until other engineers
University teachers, lecturers at higher technical schools
and academies until technical, vocational, factory in-
structors
Technicians Biological specialists until physical and mathematical
specialists
Chemical laboratory assistants until photo laboratory
assistants
Continued on next page
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Table 1.4: Grouping of occupations
Group SIAB occupation
Electrical engineering technicians until building techni-
cians
Foremen, master mechanics
Measurement technicians until remaining manufactur-
ing technicians
Mechanical engineering technicians
Other technicians
Technical draughtspersons
Sales Bank specialists until building society specialists
Commercial agents, travellers until mobile traders
Forwarding business dealers
Health insurance specialists (not social security) until
life, property insurance specialists
Publishing house dealers, booksellers until service-
station attendants
Salespersons
Tourism specialists until cash collectors, cashiers, ticket
sellers, inspectors
Wholesale and retail trade buyers, buyers
Office Cost accountants, valuers until accountants
Office auxiliary workers
Office specialists
Stenographers, shorthand-typists, typists until data
typists
Production Building labourer, general until other building labour-
ers, building assistants, n.e.c.
Ceramics workers until glass processors, glass finishers
Chemical laboratory workers until vulcanisers
Chemical plant operatives
Drillers until borers
Electrical appliance fitters
Electrical appliance, electrical parts assemblers
Engine fitters
Farmers until animal keepers and related occupations
Generator machinists until construction machine atten-
dants
Goods examiners, sorters, n.e.c.
Goods painters, lacquerers until ceramics/glass painters
Iron, metal producers, melters until semi-finished prod-
uct fettlers and other mould casting occupations
Locksmiths, not specified until sheet metal, plastics fit-
ters
Machine attendants, machinists’ helpers until machine
setters (no further specification)
Continued on next page
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Table 1.4: Grouping of occupations
Group SIAB occupation
Metal grinders until other metal-cutting occupations
Metal polishers until metal bonders and other metal
connectors
Metal workers (no further specification)
Miners until shaped brick/concrete block makers
Other assemblers
Packagers, goods receivers, despatchers
Paper, cellulose makers until other paper products mak-
ers
Paviors until road makers
Plant fitters, maintenance fitters until steel structure
fitters, metal shipbuilders
Plastics processors
Sheet metal pressers, drawers, stampers until other
metal moulders (non-cutting deformation)
Sheet metal workers
Special printers, screeners until printer’s assistants
Spinners, fibre preparers until skin processing operatives
Steel smiths until pipe, tubing fitters
Tracklayers until other civil engineering workers
Turners
Type setters, compositors until printers (flat, gravure)
Welders, oxy-acetylene cutters
Wood preparers until basket and wicker products mak-
ers
Operators Assistants (no further specification)
Motor vehicle drivers
Post masters until telephonists
Railway engine drivers until street attendants
Stowers, furniture packers until stores/transport work-
ers
Transportation equipment drivers
Warehouse managers, warehousemen
Craftsmen Agricultural machinery repairers until precision me-
chanics
Bakery goods makers until confectioners (pastry)
Bricklayers until concrete workers
Butchers until fish processing operatives
Carpenters
Carpenters until scaffolders
Cutters until textile finishers
Dental technicians until doll makers, model makers,
taxidermists
Electrical fitters, mechanics
Continued on next page
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Table 1.4: Grouping of occupations
Group SIAB occupation
Gardeners, garden workers until forest workers, forest
cultivators
Motor vehicle repairers
Other mechanics until watch-, clockmakers
Painters, lacquerers (construction)
Plumbers
Roofers
Room equippers until other wood and sports equipment
makers
Stucco workers, plasterers, rough casters until insula-
tors, proofers
Telecommunications mechanics, craftsmen until radio,
sound equipment mechanics
Tile setters until screed, terrazzo layers
Toolmakers until precious metal smiths
Wine coopers until sugar, sweets, ice-cream makers
Service Cashiers
Cooks until ready-to-serve meals, fruit, vegetable pre-
servers, preparers
Doormen, caretakers until domestic and non-domestic
servants
Factory guards, detectives until watchmen, custodians
Hairdressers until other body care occupations
Household cleaners until glass, buildings cleaners
Housekeeping managers until employees by household
cheque procedure
Laundry workers, pressers until textile cleaners, dyers
and dry cleaners
Others attending on guests
Restaurant, inn, bar keepers, hotel proprietors, catering
trade dealers until waiters, stewards
Street cleaners, refuse disposers until machinery, con-
tainer cleaners and related occupations
Care Dietary assistants, pharmaceutical assistants until med-
ical laboratory assistants
Medical receptionists
Non-medical practitioners until masseurs, physiothera-
pists and related occupations
Nursery teachers, child nurses
Nurses, midwives
Nursing assistants
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1.A.1.2 Wages and Wage Growth
Despite being accurately measured as the employer can be punished for incorrect re-
porting, the contained wage variable has two major drawbacks for our analysis.
Wage imputations: First, wages are top coded, amounting to roughly 12% cen-
sored observations for men and 2.4% censored observations for women on average across
years in our main sample. We impute top coded wages using a series of tobit imputa-
tions as in Dustmann, Ludsteck, et al. (2009) or Card et al. (2013), fitted separately
for each year, gender and East-West region. We predict the upper tail of the wage
distribution employing controls for five age groups and five education groups as well as
their interaction and allow the error variance to vary between age and education groups.
Further, we include controls for age (within age groups), a part-time dummy, the mean
wage in other years, the fraction of censored wages in other years as well as a dummy
if the person was only observed once in his life as in Card et al. (2013).46 We use the
predicted values X ′βˆ from the Tobit regressions together with the estimated standard
deviation σˆ to impute the censored wages yc as follows: yc = X ′βˆ+σˆΦ−1[k+u(1−k)],
where u ∼ U [0, 1], k = Φ[(c−X ′βˆ)/σˆ] and c is the main censoring limit.47 Analog to
Jäger and Heining (2019) we scale up daily to yearly wages by multiplying with 365.
We inflate wages to prices as of 2010 and finally smooth wages for every individual
using three year moving averages.48
Wage break 1983/1984: The second major concern with the wage variable is
that the definition of a wage – relevant for social security payments – changed between
1983 and 1984. Prior to 1984, wages did not contain bonuses and one time payments.
Afterwards these variable parts of the wage were included. If one does not correct this
break, it leads to a spurious increase in inequality between those years. We deal with
this break by correcting wages prior to 1984 upwards following Fitzenberger (1999)
and Dustmann, Ludsteck, et al. (2009). Their idea is that a worker’s rank in the
wage distribution between 1984 and 1983 should not have changed much. Additionally,
they control for the fact that different percentiles of the wage distribution should be
differently affected by the break since workers from higher percentiles are likely to receive
higher bonuses. Therefore, they estimate locally weighted regressions, separately for
men and women, of an individual’s wage ratio in 1983/1984 and 1983/1982 on the
rank of a person in the wage distribution. Afterwards, they calculate a correction factor
as the difference between the predicted, smoothed values from the two wage ratio
regressions and multiply wages prior to the break with that factor.
After this, some wages are corrected above the censoring limit. Dustmann, Lud-
steck, et al. (2009) reset these wages back to the censoring limit and impute them in
the same way they imputed wages which were above the limit anyway. This, however,
is very problematic when analyzing wages within high skill occupations. For instance,
by employing this procedure, the amount of censored wages within the Mgr-Prof-Tech
group aged [45, 54] increases up to 66% in 1975. Instead of following that approach,
we do not reset wages back to the censoring limit if they were corrected above the limit
46If this is the case, the mean wage in other years and the fraction of censored wages in
other years is replaced by the sample mean.
47Accessible at http://fdz.iab.de/en/FDZ_Overview_of_Data/working_tools.aspx.
48Not smoothing wages does not change the results but leads to spikes in few small occu-
pations.
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but leave them at their break corrected values. We create individual log wage growth
as the log wage in year t minus the log wage in year t− 1 and set it to missing if the
worker was not observed in t− 1.
1.A.1.3 Sample Selection
The main dataset is restricted to full time working 25 to 54 year old men. We exclude
younger workers so that the vast majority of our sample will have concluded their
formal education by the time they enter our sample. We stop relatively early because
early retirement programs were very common in Germany, particularly in the 1980s and
1990s. Additionally, we drop workers who left the sample for more than 10 years into
non-participation, self employment, or the public sector. Workers without information
on the occupation are dropped from the analysis. Additionally, the years 2011 - 2014
are left out as the employment agency’s official occupational classification changed in
2011. A crosswalk exists in the data but is not 1:1 so that a clear break in employment
and wages by occupation is observable between 2010 and 2011. Furthermore, we drop
all spells of workers who ever worked in East Germany as well as permanently foreign
workers.49 The main sample consists of 5,792,111 worker × year combinations with
428,326 unique workers. Dropping observations with missing information in t−1 results
in 5,217,232 observations. The median worker born in the cohort 1950–1956 (the cohort
we potentially observe from 25 to 54) is observed for 24 years.
1.A.1.4 Sample with Imputed Non-Employment Spells
One of our key robustness checks (Section 1.F.1) concerns the role of unemployment and
out of labor force spells. For this, we relax the exogeneity assumption for unemployment
and out of labor force by imputing the occupation where the worker “would have worked
in had he not become unemployed or left the labor force”.50 We do the imputation by
comparing the (real) wage after a non-employment spell with the wage before the non-
employment spell. We then impute the wage while in non-employment as the lower of
those two wages adjusted for inflation and set the occupation within this time to the
occupation that corresponds to that lower wage.51 The rationale for this procedure is
based on the idea that a worker could always choose the lower paying job but eventually
decides to quit employment if he prefers becoming unemployed. Imputing unemployed
and out of labor force spells results in 6,170,729 observations. Dropping observations
with missing information in t− 1 leaves us with 5,710,542 observations.
1.A.2 Additional Stylized Facts
49That is, workers who are German at some point but foreign at another, are not dropped
from the sample. In robustness checks we include the dropped East Germans and foreigners.
50Between 1996 and 1998, many workers in occupation 102 “Physicians until Pharmacists”
exit the sample and return afterwards as mentioned by Ganzer et al. (2017). We impute those
likely erroneously missing observations by setting the occupation to 102 if a worker was in
102 in 1995 and returned in 1999 or 2000 and linearly interpolate the missing wage using the
observations in 1995 and 1999/2000. We also drop workers in that group with very low wages
between 1988 and 2004 (“Arzt im Praktikum”).
51As we only fill up spells between two employment spells, we therefore treat both unemploy-
ment and permanently leaving the labor force without returning to employment as exogenous
actions.
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Figure 1.10: Selection into and out of occupations, controlling for age and
education
(a) Entrants’ minus incumbents’ wages (b) Leavers’ minus stayers’ wages
Notes: The vertical axis in Panel 1.10a shows the residual wage of an entrant to an occupation relative
to the average wage of incumbents after a regression on age and education dummies. The average
is taken across years 1985 until 2010. The vertical axis in Panel 1.10b shows the residual wage of a
worker leaving an occupation next period relative to the average wage of stayers after a regression on
age and education dummies. The average is taken across years 1985 until 2009 to avoid all workers
being leavers at the sample end. The horizontal axis in both panels shows the change of the log number
of employed workers within an occupation between 1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of the
120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of these detailed
occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed
workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression lines across all occupations
(black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
Figure 1.11: Selection into and out of occupations, occupational switchers only
(a) Entrant from occ. minus incumbents’
wages
(b) Leaver to occ. minus stayers’ wages
Notes: The vertical axis in Panel 1.11a shows the average wage of an entrant to an occupation from
another occupation relative to the average wage of incumbents. The average is taken across years 1985
until 2010. The vertical axis in Panel 1.11b shows the average wage of a worker leaving an occupation
to another occupation next period relative to the average wage of stayers. The average is taken across
years 1985 until 2009 to avoid all workers being leavers at the sample end. The horizontal axis in
both panels shows the change of the log number of employed workers within an occupation between
1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four
groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble
size corresponds to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until
2010. Regression lines across all occupations (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are
weighted by the number of employed workers.
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Figure 1.12: Changes in employment and average wages, 1975-2010
(a) Relative employment (b) Relative Wages
Notes: Panel 1.12a shows the log number of workers employed in occupations over time. Panel 1.12b
shows the log wage of workers employed in occupations over time. Shaded lines in the background
represent the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of
these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. The thickness of a shaded background
line corresponds to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until
2010.
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1.A.3 Constancy of Skill Accumulation
Figure 1.13: Wage growth between age groups
(a) [25, 34] year olds - [44, 54] (b) [35, 44] year olds - [44, 54]
Notes: The figures show a triple difference-in-difference result: how much has wage growth of young
(Figure 1.13a) and middle-aged (Figure 1.13b) workers relative to the wage growth of old workers
changed after 1993 relative to pre 1993? One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations
in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in
Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed workers in an occupation
averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression lines across all occupations (black) and within the
four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
The figure shows a triple difference-in-difference result: how much has wage growth
of young and middle-aged workers relative to the wage growth of old workers changed
after 1993 relative to pre 1993? Ideally, the y coordinates of all points would have been
close to zero. Despite this not being exactly the case, still 80% of the occupations have
absolute differences in growth rates below one percentage point for the 25-34 vs 45-54
comparison; the same holds for 95% of the sample in the 35-44 vs. 45-54 comparison.
Importantly, we cannot detect any systematic pattern and there is no clear relation with
employment growth, neither overall nor within the four occupation groups. There is one
prominent outlier with a very large positive difference. These are medical doctors, who
had very high growth rates between 1998 and 2004, a period when low-paid residencies
were mandatory for their approbation (“Arzt im Praktikum”).
1.B Theory
1.B.1 Proofs and Derivations
1.B.1.1 Derivation of Equation (1.3)
The goal is to come up with an expression involving the quantity that will eventually be
observed—∆wi,t—on the left hand side and a sum of integrals on the right hand side.
The point at which the notation in (1.3) in the main text does not tell the whole story
is that each of these integrals needs to hold constant all wages that are not integrated
over; we make this explicit here. To do so, first restate (1.2), explicitly indicating that
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Ik,i,t is a function of all these potential wages:
dwi,t =
K∑
k=1
Ik
(
w1,i,t, . . . , wk,i,t, . . . , wK,i,t)dwk,i,t (1.15)
There are K! different permutations of integrating over (1.15); all will lead to the
same final result (1.5). We pick one where we start with the potential wage change in
occupation 1, holding all other potential wages fixed at their values in period t− 1:
max (w1,i,t, w2,i,t−1, . . . , wK,i,t−1)−max (w1,i,t−1, w2,i,t−1, . . . , wK,i,t−1)
=
∫ w1,i,t
w1,i,t−1
I1(w1,i,τ , w2,i,t−1, . . . , wK,i,t−1)dw1,i,τ
(1.16)
Now continue with occupation 2, holding occupation 1’s wage fixed at its value in t
and the other occupations’ wages at their values in t− 1:
max (w1,i,t, w2,i,t, w3,i,t−1, . . . , wK,i,t−1)−max (w1,i,t, w2,i,t−1, w3,i,t−1, . . . , wK,i,t−1)
=
∫ w2,i,t
w2,i,t−1
I2(w1,i,t, w2,i,τ , w3,i,t−1, . . . , wK,i,t−1)dw1,i,τ
(1.17)
Continue like this so that the conditioning set for occupation k′ are the potential wages
in t for k ∈ {1, . . . , k′ − 1} and the potential wages in t− 1 for k ∈ {k′ + 1, . . . ,K}:
max (w1,i,t, . . . , wk′,i,t, wk′,i,t, wk′+1,i,t−1, . . . , wK,i,t−1)
−max (w1,i,t, , . . . , wk′−1,i,t, wk′,i,t−1, wk′+1,i,t−1, . . . , wK,i,t−1)
=
∫ wk′,i,t
wk′,i,t−1
Ik′(w1,i,t, . . . , wk′−1,i,t, wk′,i,τ , wk′+1,i,t−1, . . . , wK,i,t−1)dwk′,i,τ .
(1.18)
Consider the left-hand side of these terms when summing the K integrals over
all occupations. All terms except for −max (w1,i,t−1, . . . , wK−1,i,t−1, wK,i,t−1) from
Equation (1.16) and max (w1,i,t, w2,i,t, . . . , wK,i,t), which stems from (1.18) for k′ =
K, drop out. To see this, note that the first term of (1.16) and second term on the
left-hand side of (1.17) are the same with opposite signs; this will be the case for any
pairs k′ and k′ + 1. The two remaining terms are just the observed wage difference
∆wi,t. We thus have:
∆wi,t =
K∑
k=1
∫ wk,i,t
wk,i,t−1
Ik(w1,i,t, . . . , wk−1,i,t, wk,i,τ , wk+1,i,t−1, . . . , wK,i,t−1)dwk,i,τ
(1.19)
The notation of Equation (1.3) in the main text is therefore somewhat imprecise, as
each integral with respect to wk,i,τ in fact holds constant all other wages at their values
in either t − 1 or t. Which of these two values it is depends on the precise order of
the integration—(1.19) is just one of K! possibilities—but this is immaterial for the
approximation (1.5), which is the point of departure for our empirical analysis.
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1.B.1.2 Derivation of Equation (1.5)
Consider the right-hand side of (1.18) and replace the integrand with the linear inter-
polation (1.4):∫ wk′,i,t
wk′,i,t−1
Ik′(w1,i,t, . . . , wk′−1,i,t, wk′,i,τ , wk′+1,i,t−1, . . . , wK,i,t−1)dwk′,i,τ
≈
∫ wk′,i,t
wk′,i,t−1
[
Ik′,i,t−1 +
Ik′,i,t − Ik′,i,t−1
wk′,i,t − wk′,i,t−1 (wk
′,i,τ − wk′,i,t−1)
]
dwk′,i,τ
= Ik′,i,t−1∆wk′,i,t +
Ik′,i,t − Ik′,i,t−1
wk′,i,t − wk′,i,t−1
[
1
2w
2
k′,i,τ − wk′,i,t−1wk′,i,τ
]wk′,i,t
wk′,i,t−1
= Ik′,i,t−1∆wk′,i,t +
1
2(Ik
′,i,t − Ik′,i,t−1)(wk′,i,t − wk′,i,t−1)
= I¯k′,i,t∆wk′,i,t,
(1.20)
where I¯k′,i,t ≡ Ik′,i,t+Ik′,i,t−12 is the worker’s “average” choice of occupation k′ in
the two periods. By the derivation in Section 1.B.1.1, summing up over all k gives
Equation (1.5):
∆wi,t =
K∑
k=1
I¯k,i,t∆wk,i,t
1.B.2 Multidimensional as Opposed to One-Dimensional Skills
The easiest way to reject the one-dimensional skill model is to note that the sector-
specific wage distributions overlap, e.g., that there exist Mgr-Prof-Tech workers who
earn less than some Srvc-Care workers. In the one-dimensional skill model this is
impossible because there is a ranking of skill cutoffs above each of which the worker
moves to a higher-ranked occupation.
Admittedly, however, the focus of our paper is not in levels of skills but changes
of skills and their prices. Therefore, the question is rather whether workers’ skill may
be described without loss of generality as changing one-dimensionally over the career.
This is explored in the following.
1.B.2.1 Theory: Wage Gains When Switching Between Sectors
The multidimensional Roy model postulates wk,i = pik + sk,i as opposed to a one-
dimensional skill model a la Cortes (2016) or Acemoglu and Autor (2011), wk,i =
pik+βksi with si a general skill that is priced differently in different sectors according to
βk. The multidimensional skill change model flexibly states4wk,i = 4pik+4sk,i while
the one-dimensional skill change model has the restriction: 4wk,i = 4pik + βk4si.
This implies that there may be increasing and concave life-cycle profiles of workers
in the one-dimensional skill model, idiosyncrasy among these profiles when different
workers obtain different shocks, and systematic heterogeneity in the data depending on
whether workers switch into more high-skilled sectors (i.e., sectors with a higher skill
return βk) or not. Nonetheless, even in the most general form of this model there are
some quite strong empirical restrictions, which we derive now.
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To simplify for the moment we continue with constant skill prices 4pik = 0 and we
denote a general one-dimensional skill that we condition on of a worker who originates
in sector k by sk,t−1. Notice that for notational brevity we have dropped the individual
index i and that k indexes the chosen occupation at time t− 1, not the (component of
multidimensional) skill in that occupation. Suppose the worker starts in sector k with
skill sk,t−1 and stays there or switches either to sector k′ or k′′ with βk′′ > βk′ > βk. In
order to have non-zero employment in all three sectors, we need that pik > pik′ > pik′′ .
Therefore, k′′ is the highest skill return and skilled sector.52 Define the conditions for
the choices:
• k → k: if pik+βksk,t−1 > pik′+βk′sk,t−1 > pik′′+βk′′sk,t−1 and pik+βksk→k,t >
pik′+βk′sk→k,t > pik′′+βk′′sk→k,t. Wage gain: 4wk→k = βk(sk→k,t−sk,t−1).
• k → k′: if pik + βksk,t−1 > pik′ + βk′sk,t−1 > pik′′ + βk′′sk,t−1 and pik′ +
βk′sk→k′,t > pik + βksk→k′,t plus pik′ + βk′sk→k′,t > pik′′ + βk′′sk→k′,t. Wage
gain: 4wk→k′ = βk′sk→k′,t − βksk,t−1.
• k → k′′: Wage gain: 4wk→k′′ = βk′′sk→k′′,t − βksk,t−1.
Since the skill levels have to be sk→k′′,t > sk→k′,t > sk→k,t for the choices in t to be
optimal and βk′′ > βk′ > βk we have a clear ranking of wage gains that we should
observe in the data: 4wk→k′′ > 4wk→k′ > 4wk→k. This also implies that in this
“general” one-dimensional skill model the exogenous mobility assumption is violated,
since skill changes conditional on sk,t−1 are larger depending on where the worker
moves.
For one origin occupation k (Srvc-Care, say) this is unrestrictive because we can
use the observed gains to rank the sectors, i.e., to infer that βk′′ > βk′ > βk and
pik > pik′ > pik′′ needs to be the case. Using additional origin occupations, k′′ (Mgr-
Prof-Tech) this does become a restriction as the one-dimensional skill model for a
given skill (wage) sk′′,t−1 now prescribes the same ranking in terms of wage gains by
destination:
4wk′′→k′′ = βk′′sk′′→k′′,t − βk′′sk′′,t−1 >
> 4wk′′→k′ = βk′sk′′→k′,t − βk′′sk′′,t−1 >
> 4wk′′→k = βksk′′→k,t − βk′′sk′′,t−1,
since sk′′→k′′,t > sk′′→k′,t > sk′′→k,t for the choices in t to be optimal and βk′′ >
βk′ > βk. Similarly, we expect in the data that 4wk′→k′′ > 4wk′→k′ > 4wk′→k. We
can also condition on the destination sector. Fixing k with skill sk,t we get
4wk→k = βksk,t − βksk→k,t−1 > 4wk′→k = βksk,t − βk′sk′→k,t−1 >
> 4wk′′→k = βksk,t − βk′′sk′′→k,t−1,
since sk→k,t−1 < sk′→k,t−1 < sk′′→k,t−1 for the choices in t − 1 to be optimal and
βk′′ > βk′ > βk. Similarly, 4wk→k′ > 4wk′→k′ > 4wk′′→k′ and 4wk→k′′ >
4wk′→k′′ > 4wk′′→k′′ .
52These considerations directly follow Cortes (2016). He also shows that there exist unique
cutoffs s′ and s′′ determined by indifference that span mutually exclusive and exhaustive
intervals (−∞, s′], (s′, s′′], and (s′′,∞] of skills within which individuals choose work in k, k′,
and k′′, respectively.
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We therefore obtain the following empirical restrictions from the one-dimensional
(general as opposed to specific) skill model:
1. For any given origin sector k′ and skill sk′,t−1, there is a fixed ranking of wage
gains by destination sector. That is, the size ordering of wage gains
{4wk′,1, ...,4wk′→k, ...,4wk′→K} does not depend on k′.
2. For any given destination sector k′ and skill sk′,t, there is a fixed ranking of wage
gains by origin sector. That is, the size ordering of wage gains
{4w1,k′ , ...,4wk→k′ , ...,4wK,k′} does not depend on k′ and it is exactly the
inverse ordering of (1.), the ordering of destination sectors, in the running index
1, ...,K.
We have abstracted from changes of skill prices in this argument. If sectors’ skill
intensities and wage ranks do not invert, i.e., the qualitative ranking βk′′ > βk′ > βk
and pik > pik′ > pik′′ remains stable over time, which is strongly supported in the data,
evolving skill prices do not affect the above results. The reason is again by revealed
preference: conditioning on the same origin sector and skills, in order for his decision
to be optimal, a worker switching into k′′ has to have higher skill gains than a worker
switching into k′. Since the worker switching into k′′ could always switch into k′ and
have higher wage gains than the worker who actually decides to switch into k′, the
former worker’s realized wage gain must be higher than the latter. If sectors’ skill
intensities or wage ranks had inverted in the data, we could always condition on sub-
periods of our sample where they did not do that. Therefore, the empirical restrictions
(1.) and (2.) from the one-dimensional skill model persist for the case of generally
evolving skill prices over time.
A couple more features to notice:
• These restrictions do not depend on whether the skill changes arise from system-
atic accumulation or idiosyncratic shocks. The distribution of shocks does also
not have to be known and can differ conditional on origin or destination sector.
The key assumption that generates the restrictions is that the skill accumulation
or shocks are general (one-dimensional), not sector specific!
• This model does not restrict that workers can learn more in some sectors than
in others, e.g., that skill growth in Mgr-Prof-Tech is on average larger than in
Srvc-Care. It is just that all skill growth is general (one-dimensional), not specific.
• One very helpful feature here is also that we can condition on the wage in the
origin (1.) or destination (2.) sector and thus perfectly fix the worker’s initial
sk′,t−1 or final skill, since skills are indeed the same in each sector!
1.B.2.2 Evidence: Gains from Switching Into or Out of Ten Broad
Occupations
Figure 1.14a shows the rank of unconditional wage gains by each out of ten broad des-
tination occupations. Restriction (1.) of the one-dimensional skill model predicts that
there is a consistent ranking of these wage gains regardless of the origin occupations.
We have already pre-ordered them using some prior knowledge and we see some of this
in the figure, whereby wage gain ranks decline from the top-left of the graph to the
bottom-right. In particular, workers moving into Mgr or Prof occupations tend to have
highly ranked wage gains whereas workers moving into Srvc or Care occupations have
among the lowest wage gains.
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Figure 1.14: Gains from switching
(a) Rank as a destination occupation
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Notes: The ten groups are based on an aggregation of detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF as
described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubbles show the rank (1 is highest, 9 is lowest) of an occupation
in the distribution of average wage gains from switching. Bubble size corresponds to the amount of
switchers. Panel 1.14a shows the rank in (unconditional) wage gains from all occupations when the
one on the x-axis is the destination occupation. Panel 1.14b shows the rank in (unconditional) wage
gains into all occupations when the one on the x-axis is the origin occupation.
However, there is also a substantial amount of heterogeneity in these wage gain
ranks. For example, it really depends on where a worker starts out from whether he
has highly ranked wage gains moving into Sales or Office occupations, ranging from
top gains (bubble at 1) to almost bottom (bubble at 8). Specifically, the highest gains
of switching into Sales are for Prof and Office (bubbles at 1 and 2), while three out
of the four lowest ranked gains are for the Prod, Op, or Crafts occupations. This
makes sense if we think that workers acquire relatively little Sales-relevant skills (e.g.,
communication and persuasion) when working in Prod-Op-Crafts occupations, or if
workers who choose Prod-Op-Crafts were initially endowed with relatively little Sales
skills. In contrast, Tech is a high-gain destination for Prod-Op-Crafts workers (bubbles
at 2 and 3) whereas Sales and Office (bubbles at 4 and 5) have lower gains moving
into Tech. These different rankings of gains can also broadly be seen in our estimated
skill accumulation Table 1.19 below, and they reflect the fact that workers in different
occupations have different specific skills.
Figure 1.14b shows the inverse graph to what we just discussed, that is, the wage
gains by origin occupations. Restriction (2.) of the one-dimensional skill model predicts
that those are also consistently ranked and that the ranking is the inverse of the wage
gains by destination. Indeed, we see that the gains in Figure 1.14b tend to rise from
the bottom left to top right inversely to Figure 1.14a, and they tend to be lowest for
workers moving out of Mgr-Prof-Tech occupations and highest for switchers out of Srvc
and Care. However, we would expect the gains/losses from switching to be consistently
ranked, i.e., movers out of Mgr having always the highest losses for all destination
occupations, professionals always having the second-highest losses, up until workers
leaving Srvc having the highest gains no matter what is the destination occupation.
This is clearly not the case in Figure 1.14b as there is again a substantial amount
of heterogeneity in ranks depending on the destination and in fact in all of the ten
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occupations other than Srvc.53 The gains are also far from perfectly inverted.
Figure 1.15: Gains from switching (residual)
(a) Rank as a destination occupation
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Notes: The ten groups are based on an aggregation of detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF as
described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubbles show the rank (1 is highest, 9 is lowest) of an occupation
in the distribution of average wage gains from switching. Bubble size corresponds to the amount of
switchers. Panel 1.15a shows the rank in residual wage gains from all occupations when the one on
the x-axis is the destination occupation. The residual wage growth holds origin wages constant, i.e.,
the residual from a regression of ∆wi,t between t and t − 1 on a worker’s previous wage in t − 1.
Panel 1.15b shows the rank in residual wage gains into all occupations when the one on the x-axis is
the origin occupation. The residual wage growth holds destination wages constant, i.e., the residual
from a regression of ∆wi,t between t and t− 1 on a worker’s current wage in t.
The results we just discussed are qualitatively the same when controlling for wage
in the origin and destination occupations, respectively in Figure 1.15’s Panels a and b,
as prescribed by the theory in the previous section. The dispersion of gains is in fact
more heterogeneous. That is, conditioning on origin skill brings out even more that
there are differing rankings of destination sectors by origin occupation. Conditioning on
destination skill brings out even more that there are differing rankings of origin sectors
by destination occupation. Both of these results point to skills that are specific for
different origin-destination combinations.
When controlling for age and other observables (not depicted) the results are again
the same. We therefore conclude from this evidence that the one-dimensional skill
(change) model can be a reasonable approximation of wage gains in some circum-
stances but overall it is rejected in the data with its heterogeneity of wage gain ranks.
This matters for our results in the paper because it generates the evidence for direct
occupation switchers in Table 1.1, and more broadly the fact in Figure 1.3 that both
entrants and leavers in any occupation earn less than the respective incumbents and
53For example, the gains of Prof moving into Mgr or Tech (bubbles in Prof column at 7
and 8) are low while the gains of Prod (bubbles at 4 and 5) or Crafts (bubbles at 3 and 5)
moving into those occupations are higher. This is consistent with the one-dimensional skill
model where Prof are highly-ranked occupations, moving from which can hardly constitute an
improvement, whereas Prod and Crafts are rather middle-ranked occupations. However, the
gains of switching from Prof as an origin are rather dispersed; especially moving into Office
(bubble at 2) or Sales (bubble at 4) are quite high. In contrast, Prod (bubbles at 5 and 9)
or Crafts (bubbles at 6 and 7) as an origin occupation have among the lowest gains moving
into Office and Sales. Again, this is consistent with Prof workers having relatively high skills
in Sales and Office compared to, for example, Prod and Crafts workers.
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stayers.
1.B.3 Extensions of the Model
1.B.3.1 Costs of Switching Occupations
Switching occupations, which is often requires moving to a different employer and / or
city, may be associated with pecuniary and non-pecuniary non-wage costs, e.g., financial
expenses and psychological stress of moving house to be close to the new job, which
are potentially as important as wage costs (Dix-Carneiro, 2014; Artuç and McLaren,
2015; Cortes and Gallipoli, 2017).
For simplicity, assume that there is a fixed cost of switching occupations c > 0
which is incurred if and only if a worker is moving to a different occupation. Define the
modified variable entering the decisions of the worker as w∗k′,i,t as:
w∗k′,i,t =
{
wk′,i,t if Ik′,i,t−1 = 1
wk′,i,t − c if Ik′,i,t−1 = 0
(1.21)
That is, a worker switches occupations only if the resulting wage is at least c higher
than in his origin occupation. Equipped with the decision-relevant wage w∗k′,i,t, we
can make the derivations corresponding to Section 1.B.1.1. In particular, workers are
indifferent in terms of w∗k′,i,t at the switch point but realized wages will now discretely
jump at that point by a function of c.
The equivalent of (1.19) is:
∆w∗i,t =
K∑
k=1
∫ w∗k,i,t
w∗
k,i,t−1
Ik(w∗1,i,t−1, . . . , w∗k−1,i,t−1, w∗k,i,τ , w∗k+1,i,t, . . . , w∗K,i,t)dw∗k,i,τ
(1.22)
Linearly approximating the integral, we end up with 4w∗i,t =
∑K
k=1 I¯k,i,t∆w∗k,i,t. This
can be rearranged in terms of realized wages similar to Section 1.B.3.2 below:
4wi,t =
∑
k
I¯k,i,t∆wk,i,t +
∑
k
c¯k,i,t∆Ik,i,t (1.23)
where c¯k,i,t is the notation for i’s average costs incurred in the two periods t and t− 1
because of switching into or out of occupation k. The observed wage difference ∆wi,t
for switchers (i.e., when ∆Ik,i,t 6= 0) will be larger than the difference for the decision
variable ∆w∗i,t.
We deliberately employed the notation that is typically used in measurement error
models in econometrics: We would love to observe w∗i,t, all we see in the data is wi,t.
While there maybe some hope for estimating a basic version with strong restrictions on
c (like it being a constant across all occupations or a fraction of the previous wage),
we view any restrictions that may have empirical bite as too strong. They will likely
vastly differ across regions, urban/rural areas, the “distance” between occupations,
whether the same employer offers different occupations, and individual characteristics
like family composition. There is no chance to observe a meaningful subset of such
factors in our data. We hence treat c as unobservable and it will enter the error term of
the estimation Equation (1.9) much in the same way that uk,i,t does. Of course, it will
not have mean zero anymore. In particular, it will exacerbate the correlation between
the unobservables and the period-t-choice, leading to upward-biased skill accumulation
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coefficients of workers switching occupations but otherwise not affect the estimates.
We extensively examine switching costs in our Monte Carlo simulations, Section 1.C.4
of this Appendix.
1.B.3.2 Non-Pecuniary Benefits
In the discussion of the main text, individuals are myopic and maximize their current
wages. In this section, we show how the model can be reinterpreted to accommodate
non-pecuniary valuations of different occupations. Suppose that the utility of worker i
in occupation k at time t is:
Uk,i,t = wk,i,t + Vk,i,t with (1.24)
Vk,i,t = X ′i,t−1Ψk,t + εk,i,t, (1.25)
where Vk,i,t is occupation k’s amenity value; it may vary across workers. The discussion
here largely follows Böhm (2019). See, for example, Lee and Wolpin (2006) for a
full-fledged structural model that incorporates both, forward-looking behavior and non-
pecuniary amenities.
In particular, the vector Ψk,t contains an intercept as well as occupation-specific
mappings from Xi,t−1 to utility. That is, the non-pecuniary or continuation value of
each occupation k will differ by workers’ characteristics like age or education in practice.
We further let idiosyncratic occupation valuations εk,i,t be mean zero and independent
across individuals. They may be correlated across occupations for a given individual.
Finally, notice already that only relative values Vk,i,t, and thus the parameters Ψk,t
compared to a chosen reference occupation, will be identifiable from workers’ observed
choices and wages.
With Equation (1.24) and utility maximization at hand, we can make the derivations
corresponding to the main text. In particular, the marginal relationship (1.2) holds for
utilities and we arrive at ∆Ui,t =
∑K
k=1
∫ Uk,i,t
Uk,i,t−1
Ik,i,τdUk,i,τ . That is, workers are
still indifferent in utility terms at the switch point. We cannot, however, separately
write ∆wi,t =
∑K
k=1
∫ wk,i,t
wk,i,t−1
Ik,i,τdwk,i,τ (and ∆Vi,t =
∑K
k=1
∫ Vk,i,t
Vk,i,t−1
Ik,i,τdVk,i,τ )
anymore, since wages may indeed discretely jump at the indifference point. This is
because indifference is now determined by utility and it may be the case that, at the
point of switching, wages are strictly higher and amenity/continuation values are strictly
lower in the destination than in the origin occupation, or vice versa.
Linearly approximating the integral again, we arrive at an augmented Equation (1.5)
for the change of utility between two periods:
∆Ui,t = ∆wi,t + ∆Vi,t =
K∑
k=1
I¯k,i,t∆Uk,i,t =
K∑
k=1
I¯k,i,t(∆wk,i,t + ∆Vk,i,t), (1.26)
where Ik,i,t ≡ 1[maxk′=1,...,K{Uk′,i,t} = Uk,i,t] = 1[Uk,i,t ≥ Uk′,i,t ∀ k′ 6= k] is now
the definition of the choice indicator for occupation k.
The intuition here is also parallel to Equation (1.5): if a worker stays in his occu-
pation, his realized utility gain is the change of his potential utility in that occupation.
That is, ∆Ui = ∆Uki if Ik,i,t = Ik,i,t−1 = 1, which is not an approximation. If the
worker switches (e.g., occupations k′ to k, Ik,i,t−1 = 1,Ik,i,t = 1), he obtains part of the
origin occupation’s utility gain (or loss) as well as part of the destination occupation’s
utility gain, set to half-half by the approximation (i.e., ∆Ui,t = 12∆Uk′,i,t +
1
2∆Uk,i,t).
The arguments of the main text why the approximation error is negligible apply.
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We want to solve Equation (1.26) for ∆wi,t, which is observable in the data.
Consider Vi,t =
∑
k Ik,i,tVk,i,t and then write
∆Vi,t =
∑
k
Ik,i,tVk,i,t −
∑
k
Ik,i,t−1Vk,i,t−1
=
∑
k
I¯k,i,t∆Vk,i,t +
∑
k
V¯k,i,t∆Ik,i,t,
with V¯k,i,t ≡ 12 (Vk,i,t−1 + Vk,i,t) and ∆Ik,i,t ≡ Ik,i,t − Ik,i,t−1. Inserting this into
Equation (1.26), the realized wage growth of individual worker i in the generalized Roy
model becomes:
∆wi,t =
∑
k
I¯k,i,t∆pik,t +
∑
k
I¯k,i,t∆sk,i,t −
∑
k
V¯k,i,t∆Ik,i,t . (1.27)
This result firstly has a purely pecuniary part as in Equation (1.5) of the main text: if
a worker stays in his occupation, his wage gain is the potential wage change (i.e., price
growth and skill accumulation) in that occupation. If the worker switches, he obtains
half of the origin’s as well as half of the destination’s potential wage change. Similar
to (1.5), Equation (1.27) accommodates endogenous switches, which in this case may
be due to changes in amenity/continuation values in addition to changes in potential
wages.
The third summand on the right of Equation (1.27) is then the intuitive extension
of a purely pecuniary/static model: with optimal choices, a worker’s observed wage
growth is the change in the potential wage of his chosen occupations minus the utility
gain (loss) from the behavioral response of switching occupations. That is, if a utility-
optimizing worker chooses to switch occupations (e.g., from k′ to k so that ∆Ik,i,t = 1
and ∆Ik′,i,t = −1), we observe lower wage growth than the change in relevant potential
wages when he gains amenities or net present value of future earnings (i.e., V¯k,i,t >
V¯k′,i,t and thus
∑
k V¯k,i,t∆Ik,i,t > 0) via the move. Vice versa, we observe higher wage
growth than the potential wage changes when he moves to a less desirable occupation
in these respects (
∑
k V¯k,i,t∆Ik,i,t < 0).
Notice in Equation (1.27) it is the average non-pecuniary value over both periods
V¯k,i,t that the worker is moving into which matters for wage changes. For a switcher
from k′ to k,∑
k
V¯k,i,t∆Ik,i,t = V¯k,i,t − V¯k′,i,t = 12(Vk,i,t − Vk′,i,t) +
1
2(Vk,i,t−1 − Vk′,i,t−1),
conditional on wage gains associated with average choices, moving into the currently
high-value occupation (i.e., Vk,i,t − Vk′,i,t > 0) is offset with lower wage growth. But
also moving into a occupation that last period carried high value (Vk,i,t−1−Vk′,i,t−1 >
0) is associated with lower wage growth because it implies that the worker was compen-
sated last period for working in the low-value occupation, which now falls away with the
switch. Both of these factors enter equally into the wage Equation (1.27). Hence one
cannot distinguish them empirically and only identify the average value over the two
periods. As is obvious from Equation (1.27), one can also not distinguish between the
amenity and the continuation value considerations but only estimate a joint parameter
V¯k,i,t. Finally, notice when the worker makes no switch, the value considerations do
not come into play at all (i.e.,
∑
k V¯k,i,t∆Ik,i,t = 0) and the changing wage is just the
changing skill price plus skill accumulation.
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We now discuss empirical implementation for different versions of Equation (1.25).
First, if non-pecuniary values are constant such that V¯k,i does not carry a time index,
they will be simply incorporated in the skill accumulation parameters. That is, since∑K
k′=1 I¯k,i,tIk′,i,t−1 · X ′i,t−1Γk′,k in Equation (1.9) is a fully interacted model of all
task choice combinations and worker observables, it absorbs the term
∑
k V¯k,i∆Ik,i,t.
Because of this, also in the time-varying case, average V¯k,i,t parameters can only be
identified relative to their base period values. Our main estimation specification there-
fore already controls for general time-invariant non-pecuniary values as well as forward-
looking considerations of occupation choice (with the interpretation of the parameter
estimates Γˆk′,k adjusted accordingly).
If instead non-pecuniary values are time-varying, we first of all note again that
only V¯k,i,t relative to a reference occupation can be identified. The mechanical reason
is that the ∆Ik,i,t sum to zero over all K, and thus one of them has to be left out
of the estimation due to multicollinearity. The economic intuition is that we can use
choices and wages to identify relative utilities but not their levels. Other than that,
it is straightforward to introduce a full set of task choice changes into estimation
Equation (1.9) and also interact them with worker characteristics. That is, Ψ¯k,t in
augmented regression
∆wi,t =
K∑
k=1
I¯k,i,t ·∆pik,t +
K∑
k′=1
I¯k,i,tIk′,i,t−1 ·X ′i,t−1Γk′,k
−
K∑
k′=1
∆Ik,i,t ·X ′i,t−1Ψ¯k,t + vi,t,
(1.28)
identifies the average between time t and t−1 amenity/continuation values in k relative
to a reference occupation and to the base period by age group.
The reason for why (1.28) is identified, even with time-varying valuations, is the
above-discussed fact that moving into current as well as past Vk,i,t both matter equally
for wage changes. Therefore, this contribution to wage growth is only via the changing
sorting ∆Ik,i,t into average non-pecuniary values, whereas the contribution to wage
growth from changing skill prices and skill accumulation is only via the average sorting
I¯k,i,t. The estimation method is thus robust to both changing potential wages and
non-pecuniary values over time.
Finally, conditional on specification (1.28), an additional (average) error term ε¯k,i,t
in (1.25) does not much affect the estimates, which to some extent parallels the limited
confounding role of idiosyncratic skill shocks in the main text (see Böhm, 2019, for more
detailed discussion of the idiosyncratic non-pecuniary error term). We estimate (1.28) in
Figure 1.47 and report very similar skill price estimates to our main results. For younger
workers, the non-pecuniary values of Mgr-Prof-Tech, Sales-Office, and Srvc-Care have
modestly declined compared to Prod-Op-Crafts over the sample period.
1.B.3.3 Learning About Skills
In the rest of the paper we have assumed that, aside from skill prices, all changes in
individuals’ wages over time are due to systematic skill accumulation and idiosyncratic
skill shocks. In this section, we show that the model’s interpretation can be widened to
include imperfect information about skills and employer learning over time in addition
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to skill accumulation.54
Suppose that, as in the employer learning literature (e.g., Altonji and Pierret, 2001;
Gibbons, Katz, et al., 2005), information about skills is imperfect. Each period an
additional noisy signal of the worker’s productivity arrives; employers form expectations
about skills based on this as well as on all past observable information. Expectations
are rational in the sense that employers’ beliefs are correct on average. Information is
symmetric, employers are competitive, all market participants are risk neutral, and a
spot market for labor exists.
In this setup, workers’ potential log wages in each occupation equal their expected
productivity conditional on all available information:
wk,i,t = pik,t + Et(sk,i,t) ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, (1.29)
where Et indicates that we are conditioning on all the information available in t. We
assume that workers maximize their log incomes by choosing the occupation in which
they earn the highest wage. This yields a modified version of Equation (1.5) for observed
wage growth over time:
∆wi,t =
K∑
k=1
I¯k,i,t∆pik,t +
K∑
k=1
I¯k,i,t∆Et(sk,i,t), (1.30)
where ∆Et(sk,i,t) ≡ Et(sk,i,t) − Et−1(sk,i,t−1) and the linearity in logs allows us to
swap the summation, first differencing, and expectations operators. The analogue to
the skill accumulation Equation (1.7) becomes:
∆Et(sk,i,t) =
K∑
k′=1
Ik′,i,t−1 ·X ′i,t−1Γk′,k + uk,i,t . (1.31)
The only differences lie on the left-hand side—where changes in expected skills replace
changes in actual skills—and in the interpretation of the innovations uk,i,t, which now
represents an update of employers’ expectations about individual i’s skill. These changes
are immaterial for our estimation strategy; our results remain valid under a basic model
of employer learning about skills as an alternative or in addition to systematic skill
accumulation and idiosyncratic skill shocks.
1.B.4 Occupation-Specific Fixed Effects as an Alternative Ap-
proach
In this section, we examine the occupation-specific fixed effects approach for estimat-
ing skill prices as an alternative to our method. We show that under a flexible model
of skill accumulation, this approach requires controlling for workers’ whole history of
occupation-specific experience or, more feasibly, extending the fixed effects to being
occupation-stint specific. A base period or some other restriction on the skill accumu-
lation are needed. With idiosyncratic skill shocks, an endogeneity bias emerges that is
due to the fixed effects themselves. The results from the Monte Carlo simulations in
Section 1.C support our analytical arguments.
54Groes et al. (2014) do it the other way around; they set up their theoretical model as
employer learning but then clarify that it could alternatively be “shocks to workers’ ability” p.
5 Groes et al., 2014.
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Several papers have used fixed effects approaches in order to address worker het-
erogeneity when estimating skill prices (e.g., Cortes, 2016; Cavaglia and Etheridge,
2017).55 To be specific, consider Cortes’ time-varying model for the potential wage of
individual i in occupation k at time t:
wk,i,t = pik,t + sk,i,t = pik,t +X ′i,tΓk + ηk,i. (1.32)
The changing characteristics vector Xi,t can increase skills differentially with age or
experience across occupations according to Γk. In addition, ηk,i are occupation-specific
time-invariant skill levels, which will be introduced into the regression by individual-
occupation specific fixed effects. Cortes (2016) and Cavaglia and Etheridge (2017)
interchangeably call these occupation- or sector-spell fixed effects, which is why we
instead use the term ‘stint’ for a worker’s self-contained stay (i.e., without switches
in between) in a given occupation below. Consistent with (1.32), Cortes’ estimation
equation (8) in our notation is:56
wi,t =
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,tpik,t +
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,tηk,i +
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,t ·X ′i,tΓk + ϕi,t, (1.33)
where we have added the idiosyncratic error term ϕi,t. In the following, we examine
under what conditions estimation of Equation (1.33) may then identify the correct skill
prices.
1.B.4.1 Systematic Skill Accumulation
We start by assuming that, as in Cortes (2016) or Cavaglia and Etheridge (2017), ϕi,t is
simply measurement error and thus not decision-relevant (exogenous mobility assump-
tion of fixed effects approaches discussed in the main text). The skill accumulation
becomes
∆sk,i,t =
K∑
k′=1
Ik′,i,t−1 · Γk′,k, (1.34)
where, compared to Equation (1.7), we omit for now the Xi,t−1-specificity of the skill
accumulation function as another simplifying assumption and thus Γk′,k is a scalar.
Writing this out from when the worker joined the labor market at time ti,0 gives
sk,i,t = ηk,i+
K∑
k′=1
[Ik′,i,t−1+. . .+Ik′,i,ti,0 ]·Γk′,k = ηk,i+
K∑
k′=1
t−1∑
τ=ti,0
Ik′,i,τ ·Γk′,k, (1.35)
for t ≥ ti,0 and ηk,i the initial skill endowments of i in k when he joins the labor
market. Therefore, if we are willing to assume that skill accumulation occurs similarly
in each occupation of origin (Γk′,k = Γk,∀k′, k), this simplifies to sk,i,t = ηk,i + (t −
55In more broadly related settings, Combes et al. (2008) estimate city wage premia, taking
into account sorting across locations. Analyzing variation over the business cycle, Solon et al.
(1994) account for skill selection into the labor market market, while McLaughlin and Bils
(2001) examine skill selection across sectors.
56Similar to us, Cortes (2016) uses ten year age bins in Xi,t−1, allowing for the convexity
of the life-cycle profile parallel to our Equation (1.7).
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ti,0) · Γk and Estimation (1.33) identifies the correct skill prices, initial endowments,
and skill accumulation parameters. In this case, Xi,t = t− ti,0 represents labor market
experience (proxied in Cortes (2016) by age dummies) in the estimation. Notice that
this specification assumes that labor market experience is not occupation-specific, just
that general experience is valued differently in different occupations. In Section 1.B.2
we formally test and reject such a one-dimensional skill model.
The need for a base period or similar restriction: We have argued in the
main text that any approach using panel data needs a base period or other fundamental
restriction of the skill accumulation function. This is the same in Estimation (1.33) and
easiest to see if we simplify it to its essence. First, noting that, because of the individual-
occupation-specific fixed effects ηk,i, the changing skill prices pik,t are fundamentally
identified from wage growth of occupation stayers. Therefore, we can condition on the
respective occupation k:
wk,i,t = pik,t + ηk,i +X ′i,tΓk + ϕi,t (1.36)
Second, fixed effects estimates are asymptotically equivalent to first differences (and
exactly the same in finite samples if T = 2). First-differencing gives the effective
variation that the occupation-specific fixed effects approach identifies from:57
∆wk,i,t = ∆pik,t + Γk + ∆ϕi,t (1.37)
The first thing to note from Equation (1.37) is that the levels of skill prices do not
appear; rather only changes are identified (Cortes, 2016, normalizes skill prices to zero
in 1976). However, the parameters are still fundamentally non-identified without a
further restriction since ∆pik,t and Γk are perfectly multicollinear. Either a base period
where skill prices do not change (i.e., ∆pik,t = 0, ∀k where t ∈ {1, ..., Tbase}) is needed,
as we do in this paper, or a restriction on Γk implicitly made. Stata does does this
automatically when we implement Estimation (1.33) without base period in the Monte
Carlo simulations of Section 1.C.6 below, omitting the skill accumulation parameter
for one of the age groups (i.e., setting it to zero). We prefer explicitly defining a base
period instead.
A generalized skill accumulation specification: Suppose we have used a base
period where skill prices are indeed constant. Does Estimation (1.33) then identify the
parameters in the analysis period? Our evidence strongly suggests that experience is
occupation-specific. The skill accumulation estimates in Table 1.19 indicate this but
also the fact that large wage differences between entrants and incumbents persist when
controlling for general age or experience (Figure 1.10). Section 1.B.2 directly rejects
the one-dimensional model in favor of multi-dimensional skills (changes). A model that
is aligned with the evidence hence allows for this, that is, for example allows for the
fact that previous managerial experience imparts more managerial skills than previous
experience in production jobs. Equation (1.35) becomes sk,i,t = ηk,i+
∑K
k′=1 expk′,i,t ·
Γk′,k, where expk′,i,t ≡
∑t−1
τ=ti,0 Ik′,i,τ is the worker’s occupation k
′ specific experience.
Running regression (1.33) gives an error term ϕi,t =
∑K
k=1 Ik,i,t[
∑K
k′=1 expk′,i,t·Γk′,k−
(t− ti,0) · Γk] in that case which varies with Ik,i,t and is thus systematically related to
57We could make the same argument absorbing the fixed effects, i.e., wk,i,t − w¯k,i =
pik,t − p¯ik + (Xi,t−1 − X¯i)Γk + ϕi,t − ϕ¯i, but Equation (1.37) seems even clearer.
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the regressors. This yields biased estimates even without any unobserved idiosyncratic
skill shocks that lead to endogenous switching or staying in sectors.
The correct fixed effects regression for skill prices is instead
wi,t =
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,tpik,t +
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,tηk,i +
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,t
K∑
k′=1
expk′,i,t · Γk′,k + ϕi,t, (1.38)
that is, it controls for all previous occupation-specific experience separately. While
this is conceptually possible to do, its practical implementation is difficult. It intro-
duces many parameters to be estimated (even more when we realistically allow for
occupation-specific skill accumulation to vary with age; e.g., see general skill accumu-
lation Equation (1.7) and evidence in Figure 1.6) and it requires high-quality panel
data in order to compute the full occupation- and age-specific work experience history
of each individual. Cortes (2016) accounts for the fact that labor market experience is
occupation-specific by introducing controls for occupation-specific tenure into regres-
sion Equation (1.33). In order to deal with the growth in the number of parameters
and the length of the employment history that is required for this approach, he assumes
that tenure only affects the current job and that workers lose all of its effect once they
switch.
We think that occupation-specific tenure is an especially powerful control when at
the same time adding separate individual fixed effects for each occupation stint.58 That
is, to use ηλ(k,i) which differs flexibly for each continuous period λ(k, i) = 1, . . . , Λ(k, i)
in i’s career during which he works in occupation k. Skill accumulation can then be
only occupation-specific and straightforwardly interacted with observable characteristics
such as age or education (again omitted for brevity):
wi,t =
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,tpik,t +
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,tηλ(k,i) +
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,t · expλ(k,i),t · Γk + ϕi,t. (1.39)
Here expλ(k,i),t is the number of years the individual has spent in this occupation stint
at time t, which is effectively tenure (but interacted with age, which is omitted in
Equation (1.39)) conditional on occupation-stint-specific fixed effects. This is in our
view the best specification and close to Cortes (2016)’s arguably most flexible estimation
specification. Cavaglia and Etheridge (2017) also employ this specification throughout
their analysis and we use it for our empirical robustness checks in the SIAB as well as
the Monte Carlo simulations below.
1.B.4.2 Idiosyncratic Skill Shocks
A substantive difference between our proposed method and the fixed effects approach
arises in the presence of idiosyncratic skill shocks and endogenous choice, which are
indicated by the cross-accumulation parameters of switchers (Table 1.19) as well as
higher-than-average skill shocks of occupation incumbents and stayers (Section 1.4.2).
We use a simplified analytical argument here.
With idiosyncratic skill shocks, the right-hand-side of skill change Equation (1.35)
becomes:
sk,i,t = ηk,i +
K∑
k′=1
t−1∑
τ=ti,0
Ik′,i,τ · Γk′,k +
t∑
τ=ti,0+1
uk,i,τ . (1.40)
58In our data, 21% of workers have multiple stints in an occupation during their career.
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The regression error in Equation (1.39), ϕi,t ≡
∑K
k=1 Ik,i,t
∑t
τ=ti,0+1 uk,i,τ , now sys-
tematically depends on the full history of previous idiosyncratic skill shocks, which
influence current choices (i.e., the regressors in Equation (1.39)). One might expect
that the occupation-stint-specific controls in regression (1.39) in principle address this
problem, similar to our differenced approach (1.8). But this is not the case.
To see the argument and the bias most clearly suppose for simplicity that all time-
varying skill parameters are zero (Γk′,k = 0, ∀k′, k). Suppose also that there are only
two sectors, k and a reference occupation k′, and consider first the base period where
we assume that pik,t = pik′,t = const for t = 1, . . . , Tbase. In this case, simplified wage
Equation (1.39) becomes
wi,t = ηλ(k′,i) + Ik,i,tη˜λ(k,i) + uλ(k′,i),t + Ik,i,tu˜λ(k,i),t for t = 1, . . . , Tbase, (1.41)
where η˜k,i ≡ ηλ(k,i) − ηλ(k′,i) and u˜k,i,t ≡ uλ(k,i),t − uλ(k′,i),t are relative skill endow-
ments and skill shocks in occupation k. The regression (1.41) is classically endogeneity-
biased because the error term Ik,i,tu˜λ(k,i),t most likely positively correlates with the re-
gressor Ik,i,tη˜λ(k,i), even for the stayers in an occupation stint which we are identifying
from. This will lead to an overestimation of η˜λ(k,i).
If, in order to account for this correlation along the lines of the main text, we
introduce saturated choice specific controls, estimation Equation (1.41) becomes
wi,t = ηλ(k′,i) + Ik,i,tη˜λ(k,i) + Ik,i,tE(u˜λ(k,i),t|Ik,i,t, Ik,i,t−1) + νi,t,
with νi,t ≡ uλ(k′,i),t+Ik,i,t[u˜λ(k,i),t−E(u˜λ(k,i),t|Ik,i,t, Ik,i,t−1)]. Since we identify from
the wage growth of occupation-stint stayers (for a switcher the fixed effects together
with choice specific controls are not identified), consider E(u˜λ(k,i),t|Ik,i,t = Ik,i,t−1 =
1, η˜λ(k,i),t) = E(u˜λ(k,i),t|η˜λ(k,i),t > 0, η˜λ(k,i),t + u˜λ(k,i),t > 0) for occupation k. So
even if the correct average E(u˜λ(k,i),t|Ik,i,t, Ik,i,t−1) (not conditioned on η˜λ(k,i)) were
identified, the error term in this regression varies systematically with the fixed effect
in the regressor (most likely ∂E(u˜λ(k,i),t|η˜λ(k,i)>0,η˜λ(k,i)+u˜λ(k,i),t>0)∂η˜λ(k,i) < 0). Therefore,
η˜λ(k,i),t identified from occupation k stayers should be downward-biased and also the
Γk in the full estimation Equation (1.39) are not correctly estimated from the outset.
With these (individual-specific) biases from the base period, not only may also the skill
price estimates in the analysis period pik,t, t > Tbase be biased but also will it be hard
to sign the direction of these biases. This is a reflection of the fact that fixed effects
estimations fundamentally require the exogenous mobility assumption. Relying in the
estimation on the wage growth of stayers in an occupation does not in principle alleviate
the resulting biases (see Section 1.4.2, which finds that stayers are strongly self-selected
according to idiosyncratic skill shocks). The Monte Carlo simulations in Section 1.C.6
show, however, that these biases become quantitatively important only with a lot of
switching (i.e., when the dispersion of skill shocks is large).
1.C Monte Carlo Evidence
In this section we provide Monte Carlo evidence for the performance of our and other
estimation methods under various assumptions about the data generating process. We
first describe the data generating process, which we attempt to keep reasonably close
to our sample on the one hand while allowing us to evaluate the impact of key changes
on the other hand. We also highlight some stylized facts in the data—for example on
occupational switching and the distribution of period-by-period wage changes—that
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may help in judging what constitutes reasonable parameter values. We then discuss
the actual simulation results in detail.
1.C.1 Data Generating Process
We generate panel datasets similar in structure to the actual SIAB data and set the
data generating processes’ parameters to the values we will eventually estimate. This
allows us to keep some features disciplined by the data while varying components that
appear critical to the model. We believe this is much more transparent to the reader
than picking arbitrary distributions in a fully stylized setting.
We randomly draw the initial observations of 50,000 individuals from the SIAB as
described in Section 1.A.1. The variables we use include initial wages, occupational
choices, age (25–54) and year (1975–2010). We then use the parameters from our
baseline estimation in Section 1.4 to decompose the initial wage of a worker into a
price and a skill component:
sk,i,ti,0 = wi,ti,0 − pik,ti,0 if i ∈ k, (1.42)
where ti,0 ∈ {1975, . . . , 2010} is the year a worker is first observed.
As the Roy model implies that the initial choice must be optimal in the sense that
wk,i,ti,0 ≥ wk′,i,ti,0∀k′, we have a natural bound for the skills a worker possesses in the
remaining sectors.
sk′,i,ti,0 ≤ sk,i,ti,0 + pik,ti,0 − pik′,ti,0 if i ∈ k. (1.43)
We draw the initial skills separately and independently for every worker in the sample
from a truncated normal distribution with the upper bound given by sk,i,ti,0 +pik,ti,0 −
pik′,ti,0 . We set the location parameter µk,i,ti,0 = sk,i,ti,0 + pik,ti,0 and fix the scaling
parameter σ = 3 across workers.
For the following years of a worker’s career, we then simulate wage growth as the
sum of systematic skill growth and price growth given by Γˆk′,k,∆pˆik,t. On top of that,
we add idiosyncratic skill shocks depending on the specification and finally let workers
choose their preferred sector based on comparative advantage (possibly including costs
of switching and changing non monetary amenities). We repeat this until a worker’s
maximum age of 54 is reached or the sample period ends. We rerun the exercise for 100
Monte Carlo repetitions and estimate price and skill changes on each sample. We then
compute the average price trends and skill accumulation function across repetitions. For
computational reasons, we only use four occupations (i.e., the four broad occupation
groups of the main text). In the subsections from 1.C.3 onward, we report the results
by comparing estimated and true parameter values pˆik,t, pik,t for different Monte Carlo
specifications.
1.C.2 Key facts in the SIAB data
We first document some facts in the SIAB data. While the goal of our Monte Carlo
studies is not to replicate these facts it is useful to keep them in mind in order to judge
what may be reasonable parameter values. For example, if a specification yields consis-
tent parameter estimates but switching between occupations is shut down completely
(as would happen, for example, if switching costs are high and idiosyncratic shocks are
small), this would not constitute a very realistic exercise.
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Figure 1.16: Descriptive statistics in the SIAB data
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(b) Occupation leavers/stayers in t− 1
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(c) Distribution of annual wage growth
0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
0
2
4
6
8
10 = 0.014
= 0.147
3
3 = 2.051
4
4 = 59.408
(d) Evolution of the wage distribution
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
lo
g(
pe
rc
en
til
e)
 ×
 1
00
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 1
98
5
15th pct 50th pct 85th pct
Notes: The amount of stayers in the switching graphs corresponds to the area between the two dashed
lines. The occupations are ordered by the average wage within the occupations across years 1985 until
2010. Entering or leaving an occupation to an occupation with a higher average wage is depicted
by an area above the upper dashed line and vice versa for occupations with a lower average wage.
The wage growth histogram was calculated using 100 equally sized bins between -0.5 and 0.5. Panels
(a) and (b) use the specification with filled-up unemployment and out-of-the-labor-force spells (see
Section 1.A.1.4) for better comparability later on, since unemployment or out-of-the-labor-force do not
form a part of our Monte Carlo exercise.
Figure 1.16a shows the composition of incumbents and entrants into occupation
groups from t to t + 1. The groups are ranked horizontally by their average wages
over the years 1985–2010. They are ranked vertically also by average wages, with the
incumbents in the middle and lower/higher earning occupations from which workers
enter bottom/top, respectively. Figure 1.16b depicts the same thing for stayers and
leavers from t − 1 to t. Entrants into our sample at age 25 (joiners) and leavers
at age 54 (exiters) are coded in gray at the very bottom. Figures 1.16a and 1.16b
use the specification with filled-up unemployment and out-of-the-labor-force spells (see
Section 1.A.1.4) for better comparability later on, since unemployment or out-of-the-
labor-force do not form a part of our Monte Carlo exercise.
Both panels of Figure 1.16 show that a substantial amount of occupation entry and
exit are at the ends of the sample age range. But there is also a large share of Srvc-Care
workers who switch to Prod-Op-Crafts and even more who switch from Prod-Op-Crafts
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into Srvc-Care, which is consistent with a growth of Srvc-Card and decline of Prod-Op-
Crafts over time. There are in addition substantial switches between Sales-Office and
Mgr-Prof-Tech, among others.
The bottom panels of Figure 1.16 depict a histogram of workers’ annual wage
growth and repeat the distribution of key quantiles of the wage distribution for compa-
rability.
1.C.3 Baseline model
This subsection shows the results for a Monte Carlo exercise where wage growth only
stems from price growth or systematic skill growth but not from idiosyncratic shocks.
The primary reason for this specification is to assess the quality of the approximation
in Equation (1.4).
Despite the absence of shocks, Figure 1.17 shows that there are a substantial num-
ber of switchers just because of prices and (cross-) skill accumulation. Unsurprisingly,
other statistics do not match up well (for example, the standard deviation of annual
wage growth is smaller by a factor of 7 than in Figure 1.16c), but that is not the point
in this particular exercise.
Figure 1.18 shows cumulative skill prices and skills in the four occupations, with
estimates depicted in the solid lines and true parameter values as crosses. Clearly, the
proposed method is able to estimate skill price and skills trends from observed wage
changes. Note this is the case for all 100 experiments as no individual lines for specific
experiments are to be seen. The only randomness in these cases comes from the initial
distributions and it should be taken care of by our estimates if the approximation in
Equation (1.4) works well. The graph certainly suggests that it does.
Idiosyncratic skill shocks uk,i,t as in Equation (1.7) introduce an endogeneity bias
to our estimates, which is rising with the standard deviation of the shocks. Figure 1.19
shows information about the amount of switchers and the dispersion of log wage growth
under a scenario where the dispersion of (normally distributed, center 0) skill shocks
is σ = 0.5 · σSIAB∆log(wi,t). Clearly, both the distribution of wage growth as well as the
distribution of switchers is more comparable in Monte Carlo and SIAB data in this
setting.
Figure 1.20 shows that, as predicted in Section 1.3.3, the OLS estimates contain
modest upward bias of stayers’ skill accumulation coefficients, whereas the IV estimates
are almost exactly on target. Also as expected, the cross-accumulation parameters are
generally upward-biased in the OLS (Table 1.7); and in the IV with weak instruments,
they are large in absolute values (Table 1.8). Both sets of skill price estimates track
the evolution of their actual values very closely on average (individual experiments in
the shimmering lines do modestly vary around the truth).
Next, we increase the standard deviation of uk,i,t to 1.5 times the standard deviation
of log wage growth observed in the SIAB data. Figure 1.21 shows that he number of
switches in the Monte Carlo sample increase a lot and it is now much larger than in
the actual SIAB data. Additionally, the simulated distribution of log wage growth and
overall wage inequality are much more dispersed compared to the observed distributions.
So this is clearly an extreme setting, which we create to see whether the bias due to skill
shocks can in some instances become substantial. The OLS estimates in Figure 1.22
show that the bias in the skill accumulation parameters indeed becomes large. However,
skill price changes are only slightly downward biased and not far off their targets (the
bias is a bit larger for Mgr-Prof-Tech).
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In Panels 1.22c and 1.22d, we implement the instrumental variables strategy that
was outlined in the main text in order to deal with the remaining bias due to idiosyncratic
skill shocks. It turns out that IV does indeed estimate the correct skill price changes
even in this extreme case. The skill accumulation parameters are still upward biased,
but less so than in the OLS. Therefore, the instrumental variables estimation is robust
even to rather extreme idiosyncratic skill shocks. It seems that implementing the IV
will be helpful in practice to check whether the (main) OLS estimates might be biased
because of such large shocks.
Finally, we make skill shocks persistent by introducing autocorrelation between
shocks in t and t−x as uk,i,t = 0.3·uk,i,t−1+ηk,i,t. We calibrate σ = 0.5·σSIAB∆log(wi,t).59
When workers switch because of a positive skill shocks, they move into an occupation
where previous skill shocks tend to be positive as well due to the autocorrelation co-
efficient ρ. The results are displayed in Figure 1.24. Again, any bias in the skill price
estimates for both the OLS and IV is minor, while the structural skill accumulation
parameters are unsurprisingly quite off.
1.C.3.1 No Idiosyncratic Skill Shocks
Table 1.5: Parameters
Parameter Value
N 50000
Repetitions 100
Skill shocks in k uniform, (µ, σk) = (0, 0 · σSIAB∆ log(wi))
Stayers accumulation γk,k,a, k′ = k γˆSIABk,k,a
Cross accumulation γk′,k,a, k′ 6= k 13 γˆSIABk′,k,a
ρ in εi,t = ρεi,t−1 + vi,t 0
Switching costs c 0
Amenity trends, t = 1985, ..., 2010 [∆Ψk,t]k=1,...,4 = [0, 0, 0, 0]
59The evidence on the existence and importance of correlated wage shocks seems to be
mixed (e.g., see Gibbons and Waldman, 1999, and the references therein).
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Figure 1.17: Descriptives, no shocks
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(b) Occupation leavers/stayers in t− 1
80
90
100
plvr, switchSrvc Care = 0.057
plvr, switchProd Op Crafts = 0.022
plvr, switchSales Office = 0.021
plvr, switchMgr Prof Tech = 0.003
Mgr-Prof-Tech
Exiter
Sales-Office Prod-Op-Crafts Srvc-Care
Srvc-Care Prod-Op-Crafts Sales-Office Mgr-Prof-Tech
0
10
20
%
 g
o 
in
 t
+
1 
to
 st
at
e 
fro
m
 le
ge
nd
(c) Distribution of annual wage growth
0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
0
2
4
6
8
10 = 0.014
= 0.020
3
3 = 0.799
4
4 = 1.522
(d) Evolution of the wage distribution
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
lo
g(
pe
rc
en
til
e)
 ×
 1
00
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 1
98
5
15th pct 50th pct 85th pct
Notes: The amount of stayers in the switching graphs corresponds to the area between the two dashed
lines. The occupations are ordered by the average wage within the occupations across years 1985 until
2010. Entering or leaving an occupation to an occupation with a higher average wage is depicted by
an area above the upper dashed line and vice versa for occupations with a lower average wage. The
wage growth histogram was calculated using 100 equally sized bins between -0.5 and 0.5. The results
are averages across the 100 Monte Carlo replications.
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Figure 1.18: Estimation results, no shocks
(a) Cumulative prices, saturated OLS (b) Skill accumulation, saturated OLS
Notes: Crosses “x” represent true values used to simulate workers’ wages. Solid lines are averages
across the 100 Monte Carlo replications. Shimmering lines in the background represent individual
Monte Carlo replications.There is no variation in the background to be seen as there is no randomness
included. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9).
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1.C.3.2 Moderately Dispersed Shocks
Table 1.6: Parameters
Parameter Value
N 50000
Repetitions 100
Skill shocks in k observed wage growth distribution, (µ, σk) =
(0, 0.5 · σSIAB∆ log(wi))
Stayers accumulation γk,k,a, k′ = k γˆSIABk,k,a
Cross accumulation γk′,k,a, k′ 6= k 13 γˆSIABk′,k,a
ρ in εi,t = ρεi,t−1 + vi,t 0
Switching costs c 0
Amenity trends, t = 1985, ..., 2010 [∆Ψk,t]k=1,...,4 = [0, 0, 0, 0]
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Figure 1.19: Descriptives, moderate shocks
(a) Occupation entrants/incumb. in t+ 1
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(b) Occupation leavers/stayers in t− 1
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Notes: The amount of stayers in the switching graphs corresponds to the area between the two dashed
lines. The occupations are ordered by the average wage within the occupations across years 1985 until
2010. Entering or leaving an occupation to an occupation with a higher average wage is depicted by
an area above the upper dashed line and vice versa for occupations with a lower average wage. The
wage growth histogram was calculated using 100 equally sized bins between -0.5 and 0.5. The results
are averages across the 100 Monte Carlo replications. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9).
IV estimates as described at the end of Section 1.3.3.
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Figure 1.20: Estimation results, moderate shocks
(a) Cumulative prices, saturated OLS (b) Skill accumulation, saturated OLS
(c) Cumulative prices, IV (d) Skill accumulation, IV
Notes: Crosses “x” represent true values used to simulate workers’ wages. Solid lines are averages
across the 100 Monte Carlo replications. Shimmering lines in the background represent individual
Monte Carlo replications. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9). IV estimates as described at
the end of Section 1.3.3.
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Table 1.7: True and estimated skill accumulation parameters, saturated OLS
Age group
[25, 34] [35, 44] [45, 54]
Previous sector Current sector γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a
Mgr-Prof-Tech Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.051 0.048 0.018 0.016 0.005 0.003
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sales-Office γ 0.069 0.063 0.002 0.009 -0.045 -0.010
σγ 0.009 0.012 0.021
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.031 0.023 -0.032 -0.011 -0.050 -0.022
σγ 0.014 0.014 0.017
Srvc-Care γ -0.093 -0.008 -0.131 -0.036 -0.031 -0.004
σγ 0.061 0.069 0.034
Sales-Office Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.098 0.088 0.030 0.027 0.003 0.009
σγ 0.006 0.009 0.013
Sales-Office γ 0.047 0.044 0.019 0.016 0.004 0.001
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.070 0.056 0.032 0.019 -0.008 -0.008
σγ 0.007 0.007 0.012
Srvc-Care γ -0.042 0.010 -0.125 -0.034 -0.083 -0.024
σγ 0.042 0.067 0.065
Prod-Op-Crafts Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.086 0.075 0.035 0.042 0.012 0.021
σγ 0.004 0.005 0.006
Sales-Office γ 0.037 0.036 0.017 0.022 -0.014 0.000
σγ 0.006 0.006 0.009
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.022 0.020 0.010 0.008 -0.005 -0.007
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Srvc-Care γ -0.056 -0.017 -0.076 -0.014 -0.038 -0.009
σγ 0.022 0.025 0.016
Srvc-Care Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.107 0.099 0.063 0.063 0.047 0.041
σγ 0.011 0.014 0.014
Sales-Office γ 0.092 0.090 0.048 0.048 0.014 0.015
σγ 0.012 0.016 0.026
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.119 0.106 0.085 0.075 0.055 0.037
σγ 0.007 0.008 0.008
Srvc-Care γ 0.023 0.019 0.009 0.005 -0.007 -0.011
σγ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Notes: The table shows the estimated γˆk′,k,a, which is a scalar element of Γk′,k representing skill
accumulation of age group a. The four groups are based on an aggregation of detailed occupations in
the SIAB SUF as described in Appendix Table 1.4. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9).
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Table 1.8: True and estimated skill accumulation parameters, IV
Age group
[25, 34] [35, 44] [45, 54]
Previous sector Current sector γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a
Mgr-Prof-Tech Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.049 0.048 0.016 0.016 0.003 0.003
σγ 0.001 0.000 0.000
Sales-Office γ 0.173 0.063 0.162 0.009 0.152 -0.010
σγ 0.016 0.024 0.038
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.249 0.023 0.210 -0.011 0.192 -0.022
σγ 0.030 0.027 0.030
Srvc-Care γ 0.283 -0.008 0.253 -0.036 0.152 -0.004
σγ 0.141 0.134 0.054
Sales-Office Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.164 0.088 0.132 0.027 0.123 0.009
σγ 0.010 0.017 0.029
Sales-Office γ 0.045 0.044 0.017 0.016 0.002 0.001
σγ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.171 0.056 0.152 0.019 0.154 -0.008
σγ 0.014 0.015 0.025
Srvc-Care γ 0.228 0.010 0.237 -0.034 0.169 -0.024
σγ 0.095 0.134 0.109
Prod-Op-Crafts Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.150 0.075 0.125 0.042 0.105 0.021
σγ 0.013 0.013 0.015
Sales-Office γ 0.133 0.036 0.122 0.022 0.109 0.000
σγ 0.013 0.011 0.019
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.020 0.020 0.009 0.008 -0.006 -0.007
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Srvc-Care γ 0.222 -0.017 0.180 -0.014 0.119 -0.009
σγ 0.071 0.049 0.028
Srvc-Care Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.171 0.099 0.134 0.063 0.108 0.041
σγ 0.041 0.041 0.025
Sales-Office γ 0.159 0.090 0.124 0.048 0.100 0.015
σγ 0.029 0.047 0.061
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.180 0.106 0.147 0.075 0.113 0.037
σγ 0.018 0.018 0.016
Srvc-Care γ 0.020 0.019 0.006 0.005 -0.010 -0.011
σγ 0.002 0.002 0.001
Notes: The table shows the estimated γˆk′,k,a, which is a scalar element of Γk′,k representing skill
accumulation of age group a. The four groups are based on an aggregation of detailed occupations in
the SIAB SUF as described in Appendix Table 1.4. IV estimates as described at the end of Section 1.3.3.
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1.C.3.3 Highly Dispersed Shocks
Table 1.9: Parameters
Parameter Value
N 50000
Repetitions 100
Skill shocks in k observed wage growth distribution, (µ, σk) =
(0, 1.5 · σSIAB∆ log(wi))
Stayers accumulation γk,k,a, k′ = k γˆSIABk,k,a
Cross accumulation γk′,k,a, k′ 6= k 13 γˆSIABk′,k,a
ρ in εi,t = ρεi,t−1 + vi,t 0
Switching costs c 0
Amenity trends, t = 1985, ..., 2010 [∆Ψk,t]k=1,...,4 = [0, 0, 0, 0]
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Figure 1.21: Descriptives, highly dispersed shocks
(a) Occupation entrants/incumb. in t+ 1
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(b) Occupation leavers/stayers in t− 1
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(c) Distribution of annual wage growth
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Notes: The amount of stayers in the switching graphs corresponds to the area between the two dashed
lines. The occupations are ordered by the average wage within the occupations across years 1985 until
2010. Entering or leaving an occupation to an occupation with a higher average wage is depicted by
an area above the upper dashed line and vice versa for occupations with a lower average wage. The
wage growth histogram was calculated using 100 equally sized bins between -0.5 and 0.5. The results
are averages across the 100 Monte Carlo replications.
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Figure 1.22: Estimation results, highly dispersed shocks
(a) Cumulative prices, saturated OLS (b) Skill accumulation, saturated OLS
(c) Cumulative prices, IV (d) Skill accumulation, IV
Notes: Crosses “x” represent true values used to simulate workers’ wages. Solid lines are averages
across the 100 Monte Carlo replications. Shimmering lines in the background represent individual
Monte Carlo replications. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9). IV estimates as described at
the end of Section 1.3.3.
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Table 1.10: True and estimated skill accumulation parameters, saturated OLS
Age group
[25, 34] [35, 44] [45, 54]
Previous sector Current sector γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a
Mgr-Prof-Tech Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.065 0.048 0.031 0.016 0.017 0.003
σγ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Sales-Office γ 0.113 0.063 0.037 0.009 -0.001 -0.010
σγ 0.022 0.023 0.031
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.097 0.023 0.030 -0.011 0.002 -0.022
σγ 0.020 0.019 0.023
Srvc-Care γ 0.038 -0.008 -0.008 -0.036 0.010 -0.004
σγ 0.052 0.053 0.043
Sales-Office Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.130 0.088 0.069 0.027 0.038 0.009
σγ 0.018 0.020 0.026
Sales-Office γ 0.062 0.044 0.032 0.016 0.016 0.001
σγ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.116 0.056 0.073 0.019 0.032 -0.008
σγ 0.018 0.017 0.023
Srvc-Care γ 0.058 0.010 0.010 -0.034 0.021 -0.024
σγ 0.044 0.056 0.060
Prod-Op-Crafts Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.103 0.075 0.052 0.042 0.026 0.021
σγ 0.011 0.013 0.016
Sales-Office γ 0.062 0.036 0.036 0.022 0.008 0.000
σγ 0.015 0.016 0.021
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.035 0.020 0.022 0.008 0.007 -0.007
σγ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Srvc-Care γ 0.008 -0.017 0.000 -0.014 0.002 -0.009
σγ 0.026 0.027 0.026
Srvc-Care Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.154 0.099 0.121 0.063 0.107 0.041
σγ 0.025 0.027 0.028
Sales-Office γ 0.143 0.090 0.116 0.048 0.094 0.015
σγ 0.027 0.033 0.043
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.159 0.106 0.129 0.075 0.101 0.037
σγ 0.016 0.016 0.019
Srvc-Care γ 0.043 0.019 0.029 0.005 0.012 -0.011
σγ 0.002 0.002 0.002
Notes: The table shows the estimated γˆk′,k,a, which is a scalar element of Γk′,k representing skill
accumulation of age group a. The four groups are based on an aggregation of detailed occupations in
the SIAB SUF as described in Appendix Table 1.4. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9).
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Table 1.11: True and estimated skill accumulation parameters, IV
Age group
[25, 34] [35, 44] [45, 54]
Previous sector Current sector γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a
Mgr-Prof-Tech Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.053 0.048 0.020 0.016 0.007 0.003
σγ 0.002 0.002 0.002
Sales-Office γ 0.406 0.063 0.405 0.009 0.403 -0.010
σγ 0.050 0.052 0.068
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.477 0.023 0.442 -0.011 0.437 -0.022
σγ 0.049 0.044 0.051
Srvc-Care γ 0.515 -0.008 0.488 -0.036 0.385 -0.004
σγ 0.143 0.120 0.083
Sales-Office Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.378 0.088 0.371 0.027 0.359 0.009
σγ 0.045 0.048 0.062
Sales-Office γ 0.050 0.044 0.021 0.016 0.007 0.001
σγ 0.002 0.002 0.002
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.417 0.056 0.396 0.019 0.393 -0.008
σγ 0.043 0.041 0.054
Srvc-Care γ 0.470 0.010 0.462 -0.034 0.397 -0.024
σγ 0.119 0.126 0.130
Prod-Op-Crafts Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.353 0.075 0.351 0.042 0.339 0.021
σγ 0.035 0.034 0.041
Sales-Office γ 0.376 0.036 0.368 0.022 0.362 0.000
σγ 0.044 0.039 0.049
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.025 0.020 0.013 0.008 -0.002 -0.007
σγ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Srvc-Care γ 0.435 -0.017 0.414 -0.014 0.371 -0.009
σγ 0.076 0.060 0.056
Srvc-Care Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.363 0.099 0.356 0.063 0.325 0.041
σγ 0.080 0.078 0.068
Sales-Office γ 0.374 0.090 0.360 0.048 0.339 0.015
σγ 0.076 0.092 0.114
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.369 0.106 0.351 0.075 0.324 0.037
σγ 0.045 0.045 0.051
Srvc-Care γ 0.026 0.019 0.012 0.005 -0.004 -0.011
σγ 0.004 0.004 0.004
Notes: The table shows the estimated γˆk′,k,a, which is a scalar element of Γk′,k representing skill
accumulation of age group a. The four groups are based on an aggregation of detailed occupations in
the SIAB SUF as described in Appendix Table 1.4. IV estimates as described at the end of Section 1.3.3.
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1.C.3.4 Persistent Shocks
Table 1.12: Parameters
Parameter Value
N 50000
Repetitions 100
Skill shocks in k observed wage growth distribution, (µ, σk) =
(0, 0.5 · σSIAB∆ log(wi))
Stayers accumulation γk,k,a, k′ = k γˆSIABk,k,a
Cross accumulation γk′,k,a, k′ 6= k 13 γˆSIABk′,k,a
ρ in εi,t = ρεi,t−1 + vi,t 0.3
Switching costs c 0
Amenity trends, t = 1985, ..., 2010 [∆Ψk,t]k=1,...,4 = [0, 0, 0, 0]
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Figure 1.23: Descriptives, persistent shocks
(a) Occupation entrants/incumb. in t+ 1
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(b) Occupation leavers/stayers in t− 1
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Notes: The amount of stayers in the switching graphs corresponds to the area between the two dashed
lines. The occupations are ordered by the average wage within the occupations across years 1985 until
2010. Entering or leaving an occupation to an occupation with a higher average wage is depicted by
an area above the upper dashed line and vice versa for occupations with a lower average wage. The
wage growth histogram was calculated using 100 equally sized bins between -0.5 and 0.5. The results
are averages across the 100 Monte Carlo replications.
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Figure 1.24: Estimation results, persistent shocks
(a) Cumulative prices, saturated OLS (b) Skill accumulation, saturated OLS
(c) Cumulative prices, IV (d) Skill accumulation, IV
Notes: Crosses “x” represent true values used to simulate workers’ wages. Solid lines are averages
across the 100 Monte Carlo replications. Shimmering lines in the background represent individual
Monte Carlo replications. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9). IV estimates as described at
the end of Section 1.3.3.
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1.C.4 Switching Costs
In this section, we make the decision problem depend on non wage switching costs as
a fraction of log wages. We assume that every worker has to pay a (psychic) utility
cost when wanting to switch so that the potential utility amounts to U = w when not
switching and U = (1−c)w when switching. We start with switching costs of c = 0.075.
First, in a model without skill shocks and with switching costs, our approximation (1.4)
continues to work well (Figures 1.25 and 1.26). We have trebled the size of cross-
accumulation parameters in the data generating process here (see Table 1.13), since
otherwise we would hardly observe any switches without skill shocks and given the
switching costs.
The switching cost also reduces the number of switchers under moderate skill shocks
as depicted in Figure 1.27. Figure 1.28 shows that it does not bias our results. In fact,
as skill prices are identified well from wage growth of stayers, switching costs make any
bias of the skill prices less severe. Both OLS and IV therefore work for this scenario
with moderate shocks and moderate switching costs, which we deem a rather realistic
one.
An additional reason for why we think that the scenario with moderate skill shocks
and moderate switching costs is a sensible benchmark are the estimated (cross-) ac-
cumulation parameters. This is a bit subtle: Note that OLS’s upward-bias of the
cross-accumulation parameters (Γˆk′,k for k′ 6= k) is exacerbated here because even
larger idiosyncratic skill shocks are required to overcome the switch costs (Table 1.15).
The IV’s weak instrument problem for the switchers is also more severe (Table 1.16).
The data generating process of the Monte Carlos used a third of the cross-accumulation
values estimated in the SIAB (see Table 1.14). The estimates based on the simulations
with moderate shocks and moderate switching costs re-create these values, i.e., they
overstate the target by a factor of three on average. Therefore, this scenario approxi-
mately “replicates its own bias” in the estimation of the cross-accumulation parameters.
That is, what we pick as data generating process and the estimates that we receive are
consistent with one another.
Finally, we increase the switching costs to c = 0.2 and the standard deviation of
skill shocks to 1.5 times the standard deviation of log wage growth in the SIAB. Once
again, the estimates of the skill prices, and especially in the IV, are quite close to their
true values.
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1.C.4.1 Benchmark: Moderate Switching Costs, No Shocks
Table 1.13: Parameters
Parameter Value
N 50000
Repetitions 100
Skill shocks in k uniform, (µ, σk) = (0, 0 · σSIAB∆ log(wi))
Stayers accumulation γk,k,a, k′ = k γˆSIABk,k,a
Cross accumulation γk′,k,a, k′ 6= k 11 γˆSIABk′,k,a
ρ in εi,t = ρεi,t−1 + vi,t 0
Switching costs c 0.05
Amenity trends, t = 1985, ..., 2010 [∆Ψk,t]k=1,...,4 = [0, 0, 0, 0]
Figure 1.25: Descriptives, moderate switch costs, no shocks
(a) Occupation entrants/incumb. in t+ 1
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(b) Occupation leavers/stayers in t− 1
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(c) Distribution of annual wage growth
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Notes: The amount of stayers in the switching graphs corresponds to the area between the two dashed
lines. The occupations are ordered by the average wage within the occupations across years 1985 until
2010. Entering or leaving an occupation to an occupation with a higher average wage is depicted by
an area above the upper dashed line and vice versa for occupations with a lower average wage. The
wage growth histogram was calculated using 100 equally sized bins between -0.5 and 0.5. The results
are averages across the 100 Monte Carlo replications.
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Figure 1.26: Estimation results, moderate switch costs, no shocks
(a) Cumulative prices, saturated OLS (b) Skill accumulation, saturated OLS
Notes: Crosses “x” represent true values used to simulate workers’ wages. Solid lines are averages
across the 100 Monte Carlo replications. Shimmering lines in the background represent individual
Monte Carlo replications. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9).
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1.C.4.2 Moderate Switching Costs, Moderate Shocks
Table 1.14: Parameters
Parameter Value
N 50000
Repetitions 100
Skill shocks in k observed wage growth distribution, (µ, σk) =
(0, 0.5 · σSIAB∆ log(wi))
Stayers accumulation γk,k,a, k′ = k γˆSIABk,k,a
Cross accumulation γk′,k,a, k′ 6= k 13 γˆSIABk′,k,a
ρ in εi,t = ρεi,t−1 + vi,t 0
Switching costs c 0.05
Amenity trends, t = 1985, ..., 2010 [∆Ψk,t]k=1,...,4 = [0, 0, 0, 0]
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Figure 1.27: Descriptives, moderate switching costs and moderate shocks
(a) Occupation entrants/incumb. in t+ 1
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(b) Occupation leavers/stayers in t− 1
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Notes: The amount of stayers in the switching graphs corresponds to the area between the two dashed
lines. The occupations are ordered by the average wage within the occupations across years 1985 until
2010. Entering or leaving an occupation to an occupation with a higher average wage is depicted by
an area above the upper dashed line and vice versa for occupations with a lower average wage. The
wage growth histogram was calculated using 100 equally sized bins between -0.5 and 0.5. The results
are averages across the 100 Monte Carlo replications.
94 CHAPTER 1. OCCUPATIONS, SKILL PRICES, WAGE INEQUALITY
Figure 1.28: Estimation results, moderate switching costs and moderate shocks
(a) Cumulative prices, saturated OLS (b) Skill accumulation, saturated OLS
(c) Cumulative prices, IV (d) Skill accumulation, IV
Notes: Crosses “x” represent true values used to simulate workers’ wages. Solid lines are averages
across the 100 Monte Carlo replications. Shimmering lines in the background represent individual
Monte Carlo replications. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9). IV estimates as described at
the end of Section 1.3.3.
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Table 1.15: True and estimated skill accumulation parameters, saturated OLS
Age group
[25, 34] [35, 44] [45, 54]
Previous sector Current sector γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a
Mgr-Prof-Tech Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.050 0.048 0.018 0.016 0.004 0.003
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sales-Office γ 0.126 0.063 0.045 0.009 -0.021 -0.010
σγ 0.018 0.022 0.036
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.027 0.023 -0.047 -0.011 -0.069 -0.022
σγ 0.031 0.028 0.034
Srvc-Care γ -0.121 -0.008 -0.160 -0.036 -0.007 -0.004
σγ 0.095 0.107 0.063
Sales-Office Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.176 0.088 0.105 0.027 0.078 0.009
σγ 0.009 0.014 0.019
Sales-Office γ 0.046 0.044 0.018 0.016 0.003 0.001
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.122 0.056 0.087 0.019 0.029 -0.008
σγ 0.018 0.016 0.025
Srvc-Care γ -0.041 0.010 -0.146 -0.034 -0.094 -0.024
σγ 0.072 0.105 0.112
Prod-Op-Crafts Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.173 0.075 0.127 0.042 0.103 0.021
σγ 0.004 0.006 0.007
Sales-Office γ 0.110 0.036 0.093 0.022 0.062 0.000
σγ 0.010 0.010 0.013
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.022 0.020 0.010 0.008 -0.005 -0.007
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Srvc-Care γ -0.038 -0.017 -0.056 -0.014 0.008 -0.009
σγ 0.035 0.040 0.027
Srvc-Care Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.194 0.099 0.159 0.063 0.134 0.041
σγ 0.012 0.015 0.018
Sales-Office γ 0.181 0.090 0.141 0.048 0.100 0.015
σγ 0.014 0.020 0.034
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.201 0.106 0.174 0.075 0.136 0.037
σγ 0.010 0.011 0.014
Srvc-Care γ 0.022 0.019 0.008 0.005 -0.008 -0.011
σγ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Notes: The table shows the estimated γˆk′,k,a, which is a scalar element of Γk′,k representing skill
accumulation of age group a. The four groups are based on an aggregation of detailed occupations in
the SIAB SUF as described in Appendix Table 1.4. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9).
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Table 1.16: True and estimated skill accumulation parameters, IV
Age group
[25, 34] [35, 44] [45, 54]
Previous sector Current sector γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a γˆk′,k,a γtruek′,k,a
Mgr-Prof-Tech Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.048 0.048 0.016 0.016 0.003 0.003
σγ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Sales-Office γ 0.377 0.063 0.393 0.009 0.369 -0.010
σγ 0.102 0.147 0.223
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.496 0.023 0.432 -0.011 0.422 -0.022
σγ 0.123 0.111 0.129
Srvc-Care γ 0.488 -0.008 0.506 -0.036 0.454 -0.004
σγ 0.528 0.496 0.333
Sales-Office Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.301 0.088 0.324 0.027 0.327 0.009
σγ 0.062 0.131 0.250
Sales-Office γ 0.044 0.044 0.016 0.016 0.001 0.001
σγ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.386 0.056 0.387 0.019 0.383 -0.008
σγ 0.095 0.111 0.163
Srvc-Care γ 0.513 0.010 0.476 -0.034 0.100 -0.024
σγ 0.472 0.530 0.838
Prod-Op-Crafts Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.247 0.075 0.288 0.042 0.274 0.021
σγ 0.065 0.090 0.126
Sales-Office γ 0.314 0.036 0.316 0.022 0.311 0.000
σγ 0.131 0.098 0.163
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.020 0.020 0.008 0.008 -0.007 -0.007
σγ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Srvc-Care γ 0.416 -0.017 0.434 -0.014 0.365 -0.009
σγ 0.285 0.236 0.188
Srvc-Care Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.285 0.099 0.214 0.063 0.201 0.041
σγ 0.132 0.171 0.139
Sales-Office γ 0.273 0.090 0.155 0.048 0.042 0.015
σγ 0.104 0.248 0.424
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.279 0.106 0.235 0.075 0.224 0.037
σγ 0.037 0.059 0.089
Srvc-Care γ 0.019 0.019 0.007 0.005 -0.009 -0.011
σγ 0.003 0.004 0.004
Notes: The table shows the estimated γˆk′,k,a, which is a scalar element of Γk′,k representing skill
accumulation of age group a. The four groups are based on an aggregation of detailed occupations in
the SIAB SUF as described in Appendix Table 1.4. IV estimates as described at the end of Section 1.3.3.
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1.C.4.3 High Switching Costs, Highly Dispersed Shocks
Table 1.17: Parameters
Parameter Value
N 50000
Repetitions 100
Skill shocks in k observed wage growth distribution, (µ, σk) =
(0, 1.5 · σSIAB∆ log(wi))
Stayers accumulation γk,k,a, k′ = k γˆSIABk,k,a
Cross accumulation γk′,k,a, k′ 6= k 13 γˆSIABk′,k,a
ρ in εi,t = ρεi,t−1 + vi,t 0
Switching costs c 0.2
Amenity trends, t = 1985, ..., 2010 [∆Ψk,t]k=1,...,4 = [0, 0, 0, 0]
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Figure 1.29: Descriptives, high switching costs and highly dispersed shocks
(a) Occupation entrants/incumb. in t+ 1
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(b) Occupation leavers/stayers in t− 1
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(c) Distribution of annual wage growth
0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
0
2
4
6
8
10 = 0.030
= 0.203
3
3 = 2.073
4
4 = 48.483
(d) Evolution of the wage distribution
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
lo
g(
pe
rc
en
til
e)
 ×
 1
00
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 1
98
5
15th pct 50th pct 85th pct
Notes: The amount of stayers in the switching graphs corresponds to the area between the two dashed
lines. The occupations are ordered by the average wage within the occupations across years 1985 until
2010. Entering or leaving an occupation to an occupation with a higher average wage is depicted by
an area above the upper dashed line and vice versa for occupations with a lower average wage. The
wage growth histogram was calculated using 100 equally sized bins between -0.5 and 0.5. The results
are averages across the 100 Monte Carlo replications.
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Figure 1.30: Estimation results, high switching costs and highly dispersed shocks
(a) Cumulative prices, saturated OLS (b) Skill accumulation, saturated OLS
(c) Cumulative prices, IV (d) Skill accumulation, IV
Notes: Crosses “x” represent true values used to simulate workers’ wages. Solid lines are averages
across the 100 Monte Carlo replications. Shimmering lines in the background represent individual
Monte Carlo replications. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9). IV estimates as described at
the end of Section 1.3.3.
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1.C.5 Changing Amenities
Here, we introduce trends in non-wage amenities to the worker’s decision problem.
These trends make some occupations more attractive over time even when prices did not
change. We implement them so that relative to Prod-Op-Crafts, the other occupations
became less attractive. This makes workers move into Prod-Op-Crafts despite falling
prices. Figure 1.31 shows the descriptives.
Figure 1.32 shows the estimation results. The baseline method is biased as skill
price and amenity values are confounded by each other, making us overpredict the fall
in Srvc-Care prices where amenities fell. The adjustment described in Equation (1.28)
takes care of this.
Table 1.18: Parameters
Parameter Value
N 50000
Repetitions 100
Skill shocks in k observed wage growth distribution, (µ, σk) =
(0, 0.5 · σSIAB∆ log(wi))
Stayers accumulation γk,k,a, k′ = k γˆSIABk,k,a
Cross accumulation γk′,k,a, k′ 6= k 13 γˆSIABk′,k,a
ρ in εi,t = ρεi,t−1 + vi,t 0
Switching costs c 0
Amenity trends, t = 1985, ..., 2010 [∆Ψk,t]k=1,...,4 = [0.02, 0, 0, 0]
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Figure 1.31: Descriptives, trends in amenities
(a) Occupation entrants/incumb. in t+ 1
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(b) Occupation leavers/stayers in t− 1
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(c) Distribution of annual wage growth
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Notes: The amount of stayers in the switching graphs corresponds to the area between the two dashed
lines. The occupations are ordered by the average wage within the occupations across years 1985 until
2010. Entering or leaving an occupation to an occupation with a higher average wage is depicted by
an area above the upper dashed line and vice versa for occupations with a lower average wage. The
wage growth histogram was calculated using 100 equally sized bins between -0.5 and 0.5. The results
are averages across the 100 Monte Carlo replications.
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Figure 1.32: Estimation results, trends in amenities
(a) Cumulative prices, saturated OLS (b) Skill accumulation, saturated OLS
(c) Cumulative prices, OLS + Amenities
correction
(d) Skill accumulation, OLS + Amenities
correction
Notes: Crosses “x” represent true values used to simulate workers’ wages. Solid lines are averages across
the 100 Monte Carlo replications. Shimmering lines in the background represent individual Monte Carlo
replications. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9). Estimates from the extended model which
allows to control for changing amenity values of occupations as described by Equation (1.28). Amenities
are allowed to vary by age group and identified relative to Prod-Op-Crafts.
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1.C.6 Occupation-Specific Fixed Effects
Finally, we compare our estimation method to an alternative approach proposed by
Cortes (2016) who uses occupation-specific fixed effects to estimate changing skill
prices. The top row of Figure 1.33 implements this approach without a base period.
As discussed in Section 1.B.4, one age group within Γˆk is omitted because of perfect
multicollinearity. Therefore, all the estimated parameters have to be interpreted relative
to that age group’s skill accumulation. This is quite complicated since some skill price
changes are loaded on the estimated skill accumulation parameters and vice versa.
Indeed, the top row of Figure 1.34 shows that both ∆pˆik,t and Γˆk substantially deviate
from the truth and in the respective opposite direction for each occupation.
The bottom row of Figure 1.33 implements individuals’ occupation-specific fixed
effects in the way that we recommend, i.e., with a base period, occupation-stint specific
fixed effects, and occupation-specific age profiles. This is very similar to the occupation-
specific tenure profiles that Cortes (2016) uses in one of his key robustness checks (see
again our discussion in Section 1.B.4) plus the base period. Supporting this specifica-
tion, the skill prices and skill accumulation are perfectly identified if there are not any
idiosyncratic skill shocks and therefore exogenous mobility holds.
Next we add moderate skill shocks to the data generating process as detailed in
Table 1.6 above. We run our recommended regression with occupation-stint specific
fixed effects for this sample. Figure 1.34 depicts the results, showing that fixed effects
approach still performs well. Finally, Figure 1.35 shows the estimation results for the
data generating process with large skill shocks from Table 1.9. The prices are now sub-
stantially off for three out of four occupations, and the skill accumulation estimates are
far away from the truth. This was predicted by us in the main text and in Section 1.B.4,
as now endogenous occupation switching and staying becomes quantitatively impor-
tant. It contrasts especially with the IV implementation of our approach in Figure 1.22,
which comes very close to the true skill prices and reasonably close to skill accumulation
even with large shocks.
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Figure 1.33: Estimation results, no shocks as in Table 1.5
(a) Cumulative prices, no base period (b) Skill accumulation, no base period
(c) Cum. prices, occ.-stint fixed effects (d) Skill acc., occ.-stint fixed effects
Notes: Crosses “x” represent true values used to simulate workers’ wages. Solid lines are averages
across the 100 Monte Carlo replications. Shimmering lines in the background represent individual
Monte Carlo replications.There is no variation in the background to be seen as there is no randomness
included. Panels 1.33a and 1.33b show results from fixed effects estimation when no base period is
included as described in Section 1.B.4.1. The remaining two Panels show estimates which are identified
from year specific occupation fixed effects while including a separate worker-occupation fixed effects
for each time the worker revisits an occupation (after a possible break or after return from another
occupation). Additionally, we include controls for age and occupation dependent skill accumulation
following Equation (1.39).
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Figure 1.34: Estimation results, moderate shocks as in Table 1.6
(a) Cum. prices, occ.-stint fixed effects (b) Skill acc., occ.-stint fixed effects
Notes: Crosses “x” represent true values used to simulate workers’ wages. Solid lines are averages
across the 100 Monte Carlo replications. Shimmering lines in the background represent individual
Monte Carlo replications.Estimates are identified from year specific occupation fixed effects while
including a separate worker-occupation fixed effects for each time the worker revisits an occupation
(after a possible break or after return from another occupation). Additionally, we include controls for
age and occupation dependent skill accumulation following Equation (1.39).
Figure 1.35: Estimation results, highly dispersed shocks as in Table 1.9
(a) Cum. prices, occ.-stint fixed effects (b) Skill acc., occ.-stint fixed effects
Notes: Crosses “x” represent true values used to simulate workers’ wages. Solid lines are averages
across the 100 Monte Carlo replications. Shimmering lines in the background represent individual
Monte Carlo replications.Estimates are identified from year specific occupation fixed effects while
including a separate worker-occupation fixed effects for each time the worker revisits an occupation
(after a possible break or after return from another occupation). Additionally, we include controls for
age and occupation dependent skill accumulation following Equation (1.39).
1.D Additional Results for Section 1.4.1
1.D.1 Further Results of OLS Estimation
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Table 1.19: Estimated skill accumulation coefficients (occupation groups, OLS)
Age group
Previous sector Current sector [25, 34] [35, 44] [45, 54]
Mgr-Prof-Tech Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.048 0.016 0.003
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sales-Office γ 0.141 0.012 -0.034
σγ 0.004 0.004 0.005
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.020 -0.048 -0.068
σγ 0.005 0.005 0.006
Srvc-Care γ -0.071 -0.124 -0.016
σγ 0.011 0.012 0.016
Sales-Office Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.221 0.065 0.028
σγ 0.003 0.004 0.005
Sales-Office γ 0.044 0.016 0.001
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.125 0.042 -0.024
σγ 0.004 0.005 0.007
Srvc-Care γ -0.014 -0.117 -0.074
σγ 0.010 0.012 0.015
Prod-Op-Crafts Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.206 0.117 0.073
σγ 0.003 0.003 0.005
Sales-Office γ 0.088 0.059 0.008
σγ 0.003 0.004 0.006
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.020 0.008 -0.007
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Srvc-Care γ -0.071 -0.050 -0.019
σγ 0.004 0.005 0.006
Srvc-Care Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.279 0.184 0.133
σγ 0.009 0.011 0.016
Sales-Office γ 0.250 0.139 0.055
σγ 0.008 0.011 0.015
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.300 0.220 0.123
σγ 0.004 0.006 0.007
Srvc-Care γ 0.019 0.005 -0.011
σγ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Notes: The table shows the estimated γˆk′,k,a, which is a scalar element of Γk′,k representing skill
accumulation of age group a. The four groups are based on an aggregation of detailed occupations in
the SIAB SUF as described in Appendix Table 1.4. OLS estimates as described by Equation (1.9).
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1.D.2 Instrumental Variable Estimates
Figure 1.36: The evolution of skill prices and skill accumulation of stayers
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(b) Stayers’ skill accumulation
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Notes: Panel 1.36a shows changes in skill price IV estimates over time as detailed in Section 1.3.3.
Panel 1.36b shows stayers’ skill accumulation profiles estimated with IV. Shaded lines in the background
represent the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of these
detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. The thickness of a shaded background line
corresponds to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until
2010. The shaded areas around the four lines are 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 1.20: Estimated skill accumulation coefficients (occupation groups, IV)
Age group
Previous sector Current sector [25, 34] [35, 44] [45, 54]
Mgr-Prof-Tech Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.041 0.016 0.005
σγ 0.001 0.000 0.001
Sales-Office γ 0.216 0.194 0.227
σγ 0.058 0.055 0.081
Prod-Op-Crafts γ -0.141 0.056 -0.116
σγ 0.045 0.045 0.065
Srvc-Care γ -0.400 -0.062 -0.051
σγ 0.179 0.138 0.229
Sales-Office Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.397 0.247 0.156
σγ 0.055 0.040 0.061
Sales-Office γ 0.034 0.012 -0.000
σγ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.074 0.101 -0.119
σγ 0.036 0.037 0.075
Srvc-Care γ -0.061 0.067 -0.284
σγ 0.168 0.185 0.291
Prod-Op-Crafts Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.371 0.327 0.117
σγ 0.054 0.055 0.092
Sales-Office γ 0.343 0.337 0.361
σγ 0.071 0.070 0.109
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.010 0.002 -0.011
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Srvc-Care γ 0.372 0.193 -0.114
σγ 0.095 0.107 0.176
Srvc-Care Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.390 0.222 0.327
σγ 0.192 0.129 0.109
Sales-Office γ 0.498 0.619 0.419
σγ 0.185 0.240 0.243
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.198 0.346 0.216
σγ 0.050 0.051 0.077
Srvc-Care γ 0.010 -0.003 -0.018
σγ 0.002 0.001 0.001
Notes: The table shows the estimated γˆk′,k,a, which is a scalar element of Γk′,k representing skill
accumulation of age group a. The four groups are based on an aggregation of detailed occupations in
the SIAB SUF as described in Appendix Table 1.4. IV estimates as described at the end of Section 1.3.3.
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1.E Detailed Analysis of Skill Selection
1.E.1 Derivation of Equation (1.13)
E[sk,i,t|Ik,i,t = 1]− E[sk,i,t−1|Ik,i,t−1 = 1] =
E[sk,i,t|Ik,i,t = 1, Ik,i,t−1 = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[sincumb
k,i,t
]
·P (Ik,i,t−1 = 1|Ik,i,t = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−pent
k,t
+ E[sk,i,t|Ik,i,t = 1, Ik,i,t−1 = 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[sent
k,i,t
]
·P (Ik,i,t−1 = 0|Ik,i,t = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pent
k,t
(1.44)
−
(
E[sk,i,t−1|Ik,i,t−1 = 1, Ik,i,t = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[ssty
k,i,t−1]
·P (Ik,i,t = 1|Ik,i,t−1 = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−plvr
k,t−1
+ E[sk,i,t−1|Ik,i,t−1 = 1, Ik,i,t = 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[slvr
k,i,t−1]
P (Ik,i,t = 0|Ik,i,t−1 = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
plvr
k,t−1
)
First notice that period t − 1 stayers are the same individuals as period t incumbents
and define E[∆sincumbk,i,t ] ≡ E[sincumbk,i,t ] − E[sstyk,i,t−1]. We can now combine the second
and fourth as well as the third and fifth row of (1.44):
E[sk,i,t|Ik,i,t = 1]− E[sk,i,t−1|Ik,i,t−1 = 1] =(
1− plvrk,t−1
) · E[∆sincumbk,i,t ] + (plvrk,t−1 − pentk,t ) · E[sincumbk,i,t ]+
plvrk,t−1 ·
(
E[sentk,i,t]− E[slvrk,i,t−1]
)
+
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
) · E[sentk,i,t].
This decomposes the skill change with marginal selection only of entrants:
E[sk,i,t|Ik,i,t = 1]− E[sk,i,t−1|Ik,i,t−1 = 1] = (1.45)(
1− plvrk,t−1
) · E[∆sincumbk,i,t ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
1. Skill accumulation of t− 1 stayers
+ plvrk,t−1 ·
(
E[sentk,i,t]− E[slvrk,i,t−1]
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2. Churning of leavers: difference entrants in t, leavers after t− 1
+
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
) · (E[sentk,i,t]− E[sincumbk,i,t ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
3. Marginal selection of entrants
The inverse way of factoring out
E[sk,i,t|Ik,i,t = 1]− E[sk,i,t−1|Ik,i,t−1 = 1] =(
1− pentk,t
) · E[∆sincumbk,i,t ]− (pentk,t − plvrk,t−1) · E[sstyk,i,t−1]+
pentk,t ·
(
E[sentk,i,t]− E[slvrk,i,t−1]
)− (plvrk,t−1 − pentk,t ) · E[slvrk,i,t−1],
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yields the decomposition with marginal selection only of leavers:
E[sk,i,t|Ik,i,t = 1]− E[sk,i,t−1|Ik,i,t−1 = 1] = (1.46)(
1− pentk,t−1
) · E[∆sincumbk,i,t ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
1. Skill accumulation of t incumbents
+ pentk,t ·
(
E[sentk,i,t]− E[slvrk,i,t−1]
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2. Churning of entrants: difference entrants in t, leavers after t− 1
+
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
) · (E[slvrk,i,t−1]− E[sstyk,i,t−1])︸ ︷︷ ︸
3. Marginal selection of leavers
Adding (1.45) and (1.46) and dividing by 2 gives Equation (1.13).
Figure 1.8 shows this “average” decomposition with the mean of the respective
1. Skill accumulation, 2. Churning, and 3. Marginal selection effects. In Figure 1.39,
we separately plot marginal selection of entrants (1.45, Panel a) and leavers (1.46,
Panel b). The graphs reveal both to be of the same order of magnitude with marginal
selection for entrants being somewhat steeper.
1.E.2 Skill Changes and the Marginal Selection Effect
This section reports additional details for the skill changes in occupations. First, Fig-
ure 1.37 shows the skill trends implied by average wages minus the estimated skill prices
following Equation (1.12).
Figure 1.37: The evolution of average skill by occupation
Notes: The figure shows estimated skill changes as implied in Equation (1.12). OLS estimates as
described by Equation (1.9). Shaded lines in the background represent the 120 detailed occupations
in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as described
in Appendix Table 1.4. The thickness of a shaded background line corresponds to the number of
employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010. The shaded areas around
the four lines are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.38: Employment changes vs. accumulation and churning separately
(a) Accumulation (b) Churning
Notes: Results correspond to sample averages following Equation (1.13). The horizontal axes in all
panels show the change of the log number of employed workers within an occupation between 1985
and 2010. One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four
groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble
size corresponds to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until
2010. Regression lines across all occupations (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are
weighted by the number of employed workers.
Figure 1.39: Marginal selection of entrants and of leavers
(a) Entrants versus incumbents (b) Leavers versus stayers
Notes: Results from the separate decompositions (1.45) and (1.46). The horizontal axes in all panels
show the change of the log number of employed workers within an occupation between 1985 and 2010.
One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an
aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds
to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression
lines across all occupations (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the
number of employed workers.
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1.E.3 Sources of the Marginal Selection Effect
This section investigates the sources of marginal selection in more detail. The effect
can either be “classic selection” due to differences in skill endowments or it can be due
to (differences in) skill changes of workers after they entered the occupation. These
changes may be estimated skill accumulation but they will also have a deviating com-
ponent which is consistent with workers who experience positive shocks endogenously
staying in their occupation. We alternatively decompose the marginal selection effect
into the contributions of occupation switchers, sample entrants and leavers, and movers
from or into unemployment and out of the labor force.
The main text displays the formula for the average marginal selection effect in
Equation (1.13). Section 1.E.1 in fact derived this by constructing marginal selection
of entrants only
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
)
·
(
E[sentk,i,t]− E[sincumbk,i,t ]
)
in Equation (1.45) and of
leavers only
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
)
·
(
E[slvrk,i,t−1]− E[sstyk,i,t−1]
)
in Equation (1.46). This is
what is separately plotted in Figure 1.39, and shown as separate contributions to the
(average) marginal selection effect in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. In particular, the mean skills
of incumbents are their mean log wages minus the estimated prices, i.e., E[sincumbk,i,t ] =
E[wincumbk,i,t ] − pik,t, and similarly for the skills of entrants E[sentk,i,t]. The mean skills of
stayers are E[sstyk,i,t−1] = E[w
sty
k,i,t−1] − pik,t−1 and similarly for leavers E[slvrk,i,t−1]. Net
entry
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
)
is a constant that everything is multiplied with.
Table 1.1 breaks down the contributions to marginal selection by the origin or
destination of marginal workers. In the top panel, we decompose the weighted mean
skills of entrants into occupation group k:
E[sentk,i,t] =pent,swtk,t E[s
ent,swt
k,i,t ] + p
ent,unem
k,t E[s
ent,unem
k,i,t ] (1.47)
+ pent,olfk,t E[s
ent,olf
k,i,t ] + p
ent,smpl
k,t E[s
ent,smpl
k,i,t ],
where the shares of entrants who are occupation switchers pent,swtk,t , entering from
unemployment pent,unemk,t or out of the labor force during their careers p
ent,olf
k,t , and
new sample entrants pent,smplk,t sum to one. Accordingly, for leavers from k in the
bottom panel of Table 1.1:
E[slvrk,i,t−1] =plvr,swtk,t−1 E[s
lvr,swt
k,i,t−1] + p
lvr,unem
k,t−1 E[s
lvr,unem
k,i,t−1 ] (1.48)
+ plvr,olfk,t−1 E[s
lvr,olf
k,i,t−1] + p
lvr,smpl
k,t−1 E[s
lvr,smpl
k,i,t−1 ]
In the case of direct occupation switchers, the means E[sent,swtk,i,t ] and E[s
lvr,swt
k,i,t−1] are
further decomposed into entrants from and leavers to the four broad occupation groups.
Table 1.2 shows the contributions to marginal selection by the sources of workers’
skills. We employ the longitudinal information in the data to separate workers’ skill
endowment at the most recent entry from their predicted skill accumulation and id-
iosyncratic deviations during the stay in the current occupation. In particular, we write
the skills of a worker i in occupation k as:
sk,i,t = sk,i,tk,i,0 +
t−1∑
τ=tk,i,0
X ′i,τ Γˆk,k +
t∑
τ=tk,i,0+1
uˆk,i,τ , (1.49)
where the first term is the initial “endowment” when the worker entered this occupation
at time tk,i,0, the second term is predicted skill accumulation up to the current period
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t, and the last term are the cumulated estimated skill shocks in k since entry for this
particular worker.60 Notice that, as discussed in Section 1.3.3, the Γˆk,ks are estimated
skill changes. They likely encompass structural accumulation parameters plus average
skill shocks conditional on the choice of staying; especially in the OLS, which is used
in Table 1.2. The estimated shocks uˆk,i,τ are therefore best interpreted simply as
idiosyncratic deviations from the prediction Γˆk,k.
The marginal selection for entering workers only can then be decomposed as
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
) · (E[sentk,i,t]− E[sincumbk,i,t ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
3. marginal selection for entrants
= (1.50)
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
) (
E[sentk,i,t]− E[sincumbk,i,tk,i,0 ]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
differences in endowments
+
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
)E[− t−1∑
τ=tk,i,0
X ′i,τΓk,k|incumb]

︸ ︷︷ ︸
systematic skill accumulation
+
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
)E[− t∑
τ=tk,i,0+1
uk,i,τ |incumb]

︸ ︷︷ ︸
idiosyncratic skill shocks
60Strictly speaking, we do not know levels of skill prices and skills but we can compute
i’s overall accumulation sk,i,t − sk,i,tk,i,0 = wk,i,t − wk,i,tk,i,0 − (pik,t − pik,tk,i,0) and use∑t−1
τ=tk,i,0
X ′i,τ Γˆk,k to back out
∑t
τ=tk,i,0+1
uˆk,i,τ from (1.49). Then, for comparisons of
entrants versus incumbents or leavers versus stayers at a given point in time, levels of skill
prices and thereby level shifters of skills in the population cancel out.
Notice however that the empirical implementation of (1.49) is not invariant to the more
general acceleration/deceleration interpretation of the skill price (∆pˆik,t = ∆pik,t −∆pik,base)
and skill accumulation estimates (Γˆk,k = Γk,k + ∆pik,base for stayers). The reason is that
our calculations then give us sˆk,i,t − sˆk,i,tk,i,0 = sk,i,t − sk,i,tk,i,0 + (t − tk,i,0)∆pik,base
and
∑t−1
τ=tk,i,0
X ′i,τ Γˆk,k =
∑t−1
τ=tk,i,0
X ′i,τΓk,k + (t − tk,i,0)∆pik,base. Because the resulting
(t−tk,i,0)∆pik,base on each side of (1.49) cancel out, the idiosyncratic deviations term remains
nonetheless unaffected.
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and correspondingly for leavers only(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
) · (E[slvrk,i,t−1]− E[sstyk,i,t−1])︸ ︷︷ ︸
3. marginal selection for leavers
= (1.51)
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
) (
E[slvrk,i,tk,i,0 ]− E[sstyk,i,tk,i,0 ]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
differences in endowments
+
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
)E[ t−2∑
τ=tk,i,0
X ′i,τΓk,k|lvr]− E[
t−2∑
τ=tk,i,0
X ′i,τΓk,k|sty]

︸ ︷︷ ︸
differences in systematic skill accumulation
+
(
pentk,t − plvrk,t−1
)E[ t−1∑
τ=tk,i,0+1
uk,i,τ |lvr]− E[
t−1∑
τ=tk,i,0+1
uk,i,τ |sty]

︸ ︷︷ ︸
differences in idiosyncratic skill shocks
.
1.F Robustness of Estimated Price and Skill Changes
Section 1.4 of the main text has estimated the skill accumulation functions and changes
in skill prices for detailed occupations as well as broader groups. We found that skill
prices in fact increased with employment growth in Germany during 1985–2010, contrary
to changes in average wages across occupations, and that marginal selection accounts
for much of the systematic skill changes implied by the estimation. This section shows
that these results are robust to various alternative sample definitions and estimation
specifications.
1.F.1 Alternative Samples
A key robustness check is to allow for endogenous unemployment and exit from the labor
force. In the main estimation we have assumed that coming into and exiting the sample
is exogenous. This is obvious for individuals who reach age 25 or 54 (the borders of
our sample age range) but it might not be an innocuous assumption during the career.
In particular, workers may choose to become unemployed or exit the labor force if they
obtain a sufficiently bad idiosyncratic skill shock or vice versa for a sufficiently good
shock, and if the (time-limited) benefits or other non-labor income they obtain are
sufficiently high. Our model would then be misspecified with unclear effects for the
consistency of our estimates.
In Figure 1.40, we therefore assume that becoming unemployed or leaving the labor
force temporarily is fully endogenous.61 We do this by imputing workers’ wages and
their occupation choices if they are unemployed or out of the labor force for any number
of years between two spells of employment. We impute those by comparing pre and post
non-employment wages and assigning workers the lower of those two wages adjusted for
61The reality is likely somewhere in between these two extremes. We do maintain the
assumption that permanently leaving employment is exogenous because for prime age men
this is quite rare (roughly 1.1% each year as opposed to 2.3% for temporary unemployment)
and likely often due to relatively exogenous factors such as illness/death, moving to East
Germany or abroad, becoming self-employed or civil servant, etc.
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inflation. That is, we assume that workers could well have worked in the lower paying
occupation but chose to become unemployed or exit the labor force for some period of
time instead (further details in Section 1.A.1). On this sample, which is about 10%
larger in size, we then repeat the estimation.
As mentioned in the main text already, the cross-accumulation parameters when
workers switch with intermittent non-employment spells, especially into Prod-Op-Crafts
and Srvc-Care occupations, tend to be lower in Table 1.21 than in Table 1.19 above. The
correlation between wage and employment growth is approximately zero in Figure 1.40,
but it is strongly positive between price and employment growth. A slightly flatter slope
is induced by some fast growing occupations with many entrants from unemployment
or out of the labor force spells whose estimated price growth diminishes when filling
up those non-employment spells.62 Finally, the implied skill changes are again negative
and quite closely related to marginal selection.
We have restricted our main sample to West German men as these can be defined
consistently over the 1975–2010 period and many potentially confounding factors that
may have affected women or foreigners, such as higher labor force participation, declin-
ing workplace discrimination (e.g., Hsieh et al., 2019), and rapidly rising educational
attainment, do not apply. Nonetheless, the entry of women and foreigners as well as
the reunification with the East constituted major supply shifts affecting the German
labor market during our sample period. If women or foreigners were more inclined to
work in Srvc-Care, for example, rising employment and falling wages in these occupa-
tions may be due to changes in labor supply. Also, if women or foreigners tend to earn
less in certain occupations, estimated skill prices may be confounded by the closing
of such gender or racial wage gaps over time. We therefore examine whether general
equilibrium and composition effects due to supply shifts are important by checking if
our estimates differ when we include these groups in our sample.
Figure 1.41 shows that skill prices hardly change when we include everyone, that
is, women (increases sample by circa 69%), foreigners (6%), and individuals working
in East Germany (15%), in the estimation. The implied skill changes and the marginal
selection effect are somewhat steeper than in our main sample but qualitatively the
same. Still more notable, when we estimate our model for prime aged West German
women only, the relationship between occupations’ skill price and employment growth
is even stronger than for prime age men (i.e., 0.19 versus 0.15 slope of the regression
line in Figure 1.42) and skill prices similarly tend to polarize (i.e., rise for the Mgr-Prof-
Tech, Sales-Office, and Srvc-Care occupation groups). The same is true when dropping
all workers whose nationality changes over the life cycle (Figure 1.43).
It is interesting to see that these results are similar despite a substantially different
employment structure, with many more Sales-Office and Srvc-Care occupations among
women than among men (becoming visible in the different bubble sizes). The results
indicate that occupational demand shifts have largely driven the employment and skill
price changes also for women, foreigners, and East Germans; apparently dominating
other forces that may have worked on these demographic groups’ changing labor market
62One example are the “assistants” also discussed in the main text. They constitute a
fairly low earning group with increasing turnover during the sample period. Instead of moving
into that occupation, many workers might prefer to become unemployed or leave the labor
force. Hence, we (increasingly) fill non-employment spells of later entrants to the assistants
occupation up with low wages. This translates into lower price growth compared to the baseline
sample. However, in total, these effects are not strong enough to substantially influence our
estimates.
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outcomes.
Finally, we widen the age range to 20–60 year old males. The results, depicted in
Figure 1.44, are largely similar to our main prime age sample, with somewhat steeper
slopes but also stronger marginal selection. The latter makes sense if labor market
entrants in their early twenties were even less skilled compared to incumbents and
lower-skilled workers were more likely to retire early.
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Figure 1.40: Unemployment and leaving the labor force as a choice, i.e., filled
non-employment spells
(a) Wages (b) Prices
(c) Skills (d) Marginal selection
Notes: Unemployment and out of labor force spells are imputed by comparing the (real) wage after a
non-employment spell with the wage before the non-employment spell. We then fill up the wage while
in non-employment as the lower of those two wages adjusted for inflation and set the occupation within
this time to the occupation that corresponds to that lower wage. See Appendix 1.A.1.4 for the details.
The horizontal axes in all panels show the change of the log number of employed workers within an
occupation between 1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in
the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in
Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed workers in an occupation
averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression lines across all occupations (black) and within the
four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
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Table 1.21: Estimated skill accumulation coefficients (occupation groups, OLS),
filled non-employment spells
Age group
Previous sector Current sector [25, 34] [35, 44] [45, 54]
Mgr-Prof-Tech Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.045 0.015 0.002
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sales-Office γ 0.093 -0.042 -0.135
σγ 0.004 0.004 0.005
Prod-Op-Crafts γ -0.043 -0.167 -0.210
σγ 0.005 0.005 0.006
Srvc-Care γ -0.238 -0.398 -0.401
σγ 0.011 0.011 0.015
Sales-Office Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.246 0.062 0.001
σγ 0.003 0.004 0.005
Sales-Office γ 0.041 0.014 0.000
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.030 -0.050 -0.156
σγ 0.004 0.005 0.006
Srvc-Care γ -0.225 -0.331 -0.279
σγ 0.008 0.010 0.013
Prod-Op-Crafts Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.250 0.161 0.066
σγ 0.003 0.004 0.005
Sales-Office γ 0.047 0.067 -0.028
σγ 0.003 0.004 0.006
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.016 0.007 -0.008
σγ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Srvc-Care γ -0.237 -0.185 -0.144
σγ 0.004 0.004 0.005
Srvc-Care Mgr-Prof-Tech γ 0.405 0.290 0.171
σγ 0.009 0.011 0.016
Sales-Office γ 0.211 0.162 0.049
σγ 0.008 0.010 0.015
Prod-Op-Crafts γ 0.259 0.186 0.106
σγ 0.004 0.005 0.007
Srvc-Care γ 0.013 0.004 -0.010
σγ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Notes: The table shows the estimated γˆk′,k,a for age groups a. k′ is last period’s occupation. k
is the current occupation. Unemployment and out of labor force spells are imputed by comparing
the (real) wage after a non-employment spell with the wage before the non-employment spell. We
then fill up the wage while in non-employment as the lower of those two wages adjusted for inflation
and set the occupation within this time to the occupation that corresponds to that lower wage. See
Appendix 1.A.1.4 for the details.
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Table 1.22: Contributions to marginal selection by origin and destination activ-
ities, filled non-employment spells
Mgr-
Prof-
Tech
Sales-
Office
Prod-
Op-
Crafts
Srvc-
Care
Entrants Switchers from Mgr-Prof-Tech -0.06 0.01 0.00
Switchers from Sales-Office 0.03 0.06 0.02
Switchers from Prod-Op-Crafts 0.24 0.21 0.15
Switchers from Srvc-Care 0.02 0.03 0.08
From unemployment -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
From outside of the labor force 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.00
Sample entrants 0.43 0.55 0.49 0.43
Leavers Switchers to Mgr-Prof-Tech -0.02 0.02 0.03
Switchers to Sales-Office 0.07 0.05 0.04
Switchers to Prod-Op-Crafts 0.14 0.21 0.23
Switchers to Srvc-Care 0.03 0.05 0.06
To unemployment -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
To outside of the labor force 0.24 0.21 0.36 0.26
Sample leavers after age 54 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03
Notes: The numbers represent relative contributions to the marginal selection effect within each broad
occupation group during 1985–2010. Columns sum to one. The explicit decomposition formulas are
in Appendix 1.E.3.
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Table 1.23: Contributions to marginal selection by source of skills, filled non-
employment spells
Mgr-
Prof-
Tech
Sales-
Office
Prod-
Op-
Crafts
Srvc-
Care
Entrants Endowment at the most recent
entry into the occupation group
0.16 0.16 0.16 0.41
Predicted skill accumulation
since the most recent entry
0.41 0.46 0.28 0.07
Deviation of skills from the
prediction since the most recent
entry
0.10 0.05 0.17 0.04
Leavers Endowment at the most recent
entry into the occupation group
0.00 -0.06 0.14 0.29
Predicted skill accumulation
since the most recent entry
0.18 0.25 0.03 0.10
Deviation of skills from the
prediction since the most recent
entry
0.15 0.14 0.22 0.09
Notes: The numbers represent relative contributions to the marginal selection effect within each broad
occupation group during 1985–2010. Columns sum to one. The explicit decomposition formulas are
in Appendix 1.E.3.
1.F. ROBUSTNESS OF ESTIMATED PRICE AND SKILL CHANGES 121
Figure 1.41: Including East Germans, foreigners, and women
(a) Wages (b) Prices
(c) Skills (d) Marginal selection
Notes: The sample additionally includes East Germans, foreigners and women. The horizontal axes
in all panels show the change of the log number of employed workers within an occupation between
1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four
groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble
size corresponds to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until
2010. Regression lines across all occupations (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are
weighted by the number of employed workers.
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Figure 1.42: Women only
(a) Wages (b) Prices
(c) Skills (d) Marginal selection
Notes: The sample is restricted to (full-time working) women. The horizontal axes in all panels show
the change of the log number of employed workers within an occupation between 1985 and 2010. One
bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an
aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds
to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression
lines across all occupations (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the
number of employed workers.
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Figure 1.43: Excluding anybody ever coded as a foreigner
(a) Wages (b) Prices
(c) Skills (d) Marginal selection
Notes: The sample is the same as the baseline sample except that we also drop workers which are
reported to be foreigners at some point in time. This includes, for instance, workers acquiring the
German nationality at some later point in the life cycle. The horizontal axes in all panels show the
change of the log number of employed workers within an occupation between 1985 and 2010. One
bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an
aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds
to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression
lines across all occupations (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the
number of employed workers.
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Figure 1.44: All ages, 20–60 year olds
(a) Wages (b) Prices
(c) Skills (d) Marginal selection
Notes: The sample is restricted to 20–60 year old men. The horizontal axes in all panels show the
change of the log number of employed workers within an occupation between 1985 and 2010. One
bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an
aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds
to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression
lines across all occupations (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the
number of employed workers.
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1.F.2 Alternative Estimation Specifications
This section presents the results from various extensions to our baseline method. Except
for the flat-spot identification approach, all these extensions are applied to the main
sample of prime aged, West German, full-time working men.
Noting that skill accumulation is rather flat for 45–54 year olds (e.g., Figure 1.6),
we then apply Heckman, Lochner, et al. (1998)’s flat spot identification strategy to
this subsample by setting skill accumulation to zero in all occupations. We see in
Panel 1.45a that wage growth is again uncorrelated with employment growth in this
older subsample whereas in Panel 1.45b skill price growth once more increases with
occupations’ size growth. This positive relationship is even stronger than in the full
sample (regression slope of 0.18 compared to 0.15). Marginal selection does not fully
account for the systematic skill changes anymore but still for more than half (also,
the assumption of zero skill changes might not be strictly correct). Nonetheless, these
results indicate that also in samples where dynamic considerations should not be a large
concern, and when skill accumulation is arguably more or less constant, we get similar
results.
In the main estimation, skill accumulation varies by combination of current and
last year’s occupation as well as by age in order to account for the differential life-cycle
wage growth in these dimensions. In Figure 1.46, we also allow for the fact that skill
accumulation may additionally vary by the worker’s education level on top of detailed
occupation and age. Practically, considering skill accumulation Equation (1.7), we add
dummies for high (university or college degree), medium (apprenticeship or Abitur),
and low (without postsecondary) education level to the worker characteristics vector
Xi,t−1 and the according coefficients to the Γk′,k skill accumulation parameter matrix.
Skill accumulation is faster for highly educated workers in almost every occupation.
Nonetheless, the elasticity of skill price changes with respect to employment growth is
only slightly lower than the baseline elasticity, and the other results are also similar.
The next specification allows for changing relative average occupation-specific
amenities by age group over time as described in Section 1.B.3. In particular, we
implement Equation (1.28), adding the change in choices ∆Ik,i,t between two periods
as a regressor (interacted with Xi,t−1) to the estimation. We perform this exercise
for the four broad occupations only because of the extensive data requirements. Fig-
ure 1.47 plots the resulting skill prices and skill accumulation coefficients of the four
broad occupation groups, showing that they are hardly affected by this augmented esti-
mation model compared to the main text. In addition, we can also identify the changes
of amenities themselves in this specification. Panels 1.47d to 1.47f show the amenities
relative to the omitted Prod-Op-Crafts and the base period by age group. We see that
for 45–55 year olds these are about zero and pretty stable over time. For young 25–34
olds we do see declining amenities (i.e., rising estimation coefficient on ∆Ik,i,t), first for
Mgr-Prof-Tech and Sales-Office after the mid-1990s and then for Srvc-Care in the early
2000s. The middle-aged workers are somewhere in between old and young ages with
possibly a slight decline of amenities in the other three occupation groups compared to
Prod-Op-Crafts toward the end of the sample period.
Finally, in Figure 1.48 we also compare our results to the alternative estimation
method using fixed effects due to Cortes (2016). As discussed in Appendix 1.B.4,
in order not to control for worker’s entire labor market history, we implement it with
individual fixed effects for each occupation stint (as do Cavaglia and Etheridge, 2017).
With large idiosyncratic skill shocks, there can be some bias in the fixed effects approach,
which is illustrated in the Monte Carlo simulations of Appendix 1.C.6. Nonetheless, it
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should be supportive of our empirical results that this alternative estimation method
yields qualitatively similar findings. For example, the elasticity of skill price changes
with respect to employment changes is 0.11 compared to the slope in our baseline
method of 0.15.
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Figure 1.45: Flat spot identification using workers aged 45–54 years
(a) Wages (b) Prices
(c) Skills (d) Marginal selection
Notes: The sample is restricted to 45–54 year old men. Skill accumulation is set to zero across
occupations. The horizontal axes in all panels show the change of the log number of employed
workers within an occupation between 1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed
occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as
described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed workers in an
occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression lines across all occupations (black) and
within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
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Figure 1.46: Education-specific skill accumulation
(a) Wages (b) Prices
(c) Skills (d) Marginal selection
Notes: The speed of skill accumulation described by Equation (1.7) is allowed to vary with worker’s
education by including dummies for three education levels (low (missing or without any postsecondary
education), medium (apprenticeship training or high school diploma), and high (university degree)).
The horizontal axes in all panels show the change of the log number of employed workers within an
occupation between 1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in
the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in
Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed workers in an occupation
averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression lines across all occupations (black) and within the
four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
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Figure 1.47: Accounting for non-pecuniary benefits
(a) Prices
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(b) Skills
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(c) Skill accumulation
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(d) Amenity estimates, 25–34 year olds
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(e) Amenity estimates, 35–44 year olds
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
Av
g.
 a
m
en
ity
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 P
ro
d-
Op
-C
ra
fts
Mgr-Prof-Tech Sales-Office Srvc-Care
(f) Amenity estimates, 45–54 year olds
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Notes: Panels 1.47d to 1.47f present the results the three age groups contained in the main sample.
Estimates from the extended model which allows to control for changing amenity values of occupations
as described by Equation (1.28). Amenities are allowed to vary by age group and identified relative to
Prod-Op-Crafts.
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Figure 1.48: Stint fixed effects estimation
(a) Wages (b) Prices
(c) Skills (d) Marginal selection
Notes: Estimates are identified from year specific occupation fixed effects while including a separate
worker-occupation fixed effects for each time the worker revisits an occupation (after a possible break
or after return from another occupation). Additionally, we include controls for age and occupation
dependent skill accumulation following Equation (1.39). The horizontal axes in all panels show the
change of the log number of employed workers within an occupation between 1985 and 2010. One
bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an
aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds
to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression
lines across all occupations (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the
number of employed workers.
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1.F.3 Task Measures and Changes in Occupations’ Employment,
Wages, Prices, and Skills
Our data on tasks that workers typically perform on the job comes from the Quali-
fication and Career Surveys (QCS), which are conducted by the Federal Institute for
Vocational Education and Training (BIBB) and have previously been used to study task
intensities (see for instance Spitz-Oener (2006), Antonczyk et al. (2009), Black and
Spitz-Oener (2010), or Gathmann and Schönberg (2010)). The QCS are representative
cross-sectional surveys with roughly 20000–35000 respondents in each wave. There are
six waves available, which were conducted in 1979, 1985/86, 1991/92, 1998/99, 2006
and 2012. The surveys contain detailed questions about tasks that are required in the
workers’ occupations, such as how often they repair objects or how often they have to
persuade co-workers. We classify each question as representing either analytical, inter-
active, routine, or manual tasks and assign a value of 0, 13 or 1, depending on whether
the answer is ’never’, ’sometimes’, or ’frequently’ (or 0/1 for yes/no questions). Since
the questions are not always comparable across waves, we pool all waves to compute
task intensities by averaging over all responses. Note that the intensities are constructed
in a way so that the four dimensions do not sum to 1, which follows the approach in
Spitz-Oener (2006). There are two types of variation in responses that lead to variation
in absolute task intensities across occupations. First, at the “extensive margin” fewer
or more workers can reply that they engage in a task that is asked for in a specific
question at all. As an example, consider the simple case with two questions about
analytical tasks and individuals in one occupation doing both tasks and individuals in
the other occupation only one. Second, at the “intensive margin”, individuals in the
occupation could more or less often reply that they engage ‘sometimes’ in a task, as
opposed to ‘frequently’.
1.G Further Details on Wage Inequality
This section provides more details of the analyses of the wage distribution. We begin
with the inequality between occupations from Section 1.5.1. Then we turn to further
analyses and robustness checks for the effect of the full estimated model on various
wage percentiles and overall inequality.
1.G.1 Derivations and Further Results on the Attenuating Effect
of Selection
We start by deriving the Decomposition (1.14) of the main text. Note that
σ(w¯k,t, w¯k,1985) = cov(w¯k,t, w¯k,1985), σ2(w¯k,t) = σ(w¯k,t, w¯k,t), and by the linear ad-
ditivity of the covariance operator:
σ2(∆w¯k,t) = σ2(w¯k,t − w¯k,1985) = σ2(w¯k,t) + σ2(w¯k,1985)− 2 · σ(w¯k,t, w¯k,1985)
Rearranging this give the terms under the braces in Equation (1.14):
∆σ2(w¯k,t) = σ2(∆w¯k,t)− 2 · σ2(w¯k,1985) + 2 · σ(w¯k,t, w¯k,1985)
= σ2(∆w¯k,t)− 2 · σ2(w¯k,1985) + 2 · σ(w¯k,1985 + ∆w¯k,t, w¯k,1985)
= σ2(∆w¯k,t) + 2 · σ(∆w¯k,t, w¯k,1985)
(1.52)
132 CHAPTER 1. OCCUPATIONS, SKILL PRICES, WAGE INEQUALITY
Figure 1.49: Correlation of employment changes with task measures
(a) Analytical (b) Interactive
(c) Routine (d) Manual
Notes: The vertical axes in all panels show the change of the log number of employed workers within
an occupation between 1985 and 2010. Task measures were computed using the Qualifications and
Career Surveys. In the QCS surveys, workers are asked what tasks they perform in their job, e.g.
“how often do you repair stuff”. They provide answers on a scale: “never, sometimes, often”. We
assign numerical values {0, 13 , 1} to these categories, respectively. We group all the questions into the
four categories mentioned in the headers and average over occupations implying that the four task
categories do not need to sum up to one as some occupations might be more intense in overall tasks
than others. The six different QCS waves were pooled together as the questions are hardly comparable
between waves. One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four
groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble
size corresponds to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until
2010. Regression lines across all occupations (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are
weighted by the number of employed workers.
Finally, inserting the sum of skill prices and average skills for the average wages
(i.e.,w¯k,t = pik,t + s¯k,t):
∆σ2(w¯k,t) = σ2(∆pik,t + ∆s¯k,t) + 2 · σ(∆pik,t + ∆s¯k,t, w¯k,1985)
= σ2(∆pik,t) + σ2(∆s¯k,t) + 2 · σ(∆pik,t,∆s¯k,t)
+ 2 · σ(∆pik,t, w¯k,1985) + 2 · σ(∆s¯k,t, w¯k,1985)
, (1.53)
where s¯k,t is the average skill in occupation k at time t.
The second panel of Table 1.24 restates the results of this decomposition, in the
actual data and for the counterfactuals with price changes only, reweighting of the de-
mographic structure, and the combination of the two. This is all the same as in the main
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Figure 1.50: Correlation of wage changes with task measures
(a) Analytical (b) Interactive
(c) Routine (d) Manual
Notes: The vertical axes in all panels show the change of the average log wage within an occupation
between 1985 and 2010. Task measures were computed using the Qualifications and Career Surveys.
In the QCS surveys, workers are asked what tasks they perform in their job, e.g. “how often do
you repair stuff”. They provide answers on a scale: “never, sometimes, often”. We assign numerical
values {0, 13 , 1} to these categories, respectively. We group all the questions into the four categories
mentioned in the headers and average over occupations implying that the four task categories do not
need to sum up to one as some occupations might be more intense in overall tasks than others. The
six different QCS waves were pooled together as the questions are hardly comparable between waves.
One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an
aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds
to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression
lines across all occupations (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the
number of employed workers.
text, other than that—at the very right of the table—we add another counterfactual
where also the occupation distribution is used for the reweighting. That counterfac-
tual is not much different from the one before where only age, foreigner status, and
education are reweighted; as we have also mentioned in the main text.
Within-occupation wage inequality may also be affected by selection into occupa-
tions due to changing skill prices. If, for instance, rising prices attract workers of lower
skill than the incumbents, inequality will increase within growing sectors. If occupations
with high inequality grow, then within inequality will rise overall. Conversely, within
inequality might decrease in shrinking occupations with declining skill prices because
their low skilled workers may leave. The bottom panel of Table 1.24 also shows a
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Figure 1.51: Correlation of skill price changes with task measures
(a) Analytical (b) Interactive
(c) Routine (d) Manual
Notes: The vertical axes in all panels show the change of skill prices between 1985 and 2010. OLS
estimates as described by Equation (1.9). Task measures were computed using the Qualifications and
Career Surveys. In the QCS surveys, workers are asked what tasks they perform in their job, e.g.
“how often do you repair stuff”. They provide answers on a scale: “never, sometimes, often”. We
assign numerical values {0, 13 , 1} to these categories, respectively. We group all the questions into the
four categories mentioned in the headers and average over occupations implying that the four task
categories do not need to sum up to one as some occupations might be more intense in overall tasks
than others. The six different QCS waves were pooled together as the questions are hardly comparable
between waves. One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four
groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble
size corresponds to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until
2010. Regression lines across all occupations (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are
weighted by the number of employed workers.
decomposition of wage inequality within occupations.
Denote w˜k,i,t as the difference between an individual’s wage and the average wage
within his occupation. Given that skill prices are the same for a fixed occupation, this
residual wage difference is the same as the residual skill difference: w˜k,i,t = s˜k,i,t =
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Figure 1.52: Correlation of skill changes with task measures
(a) Analytical (b) Interactive
(c) Routine (d) Manual
Notes: The vertical axes in all panels show the change of skills between 1985 and 2010 estimated as
the residual between price and wage changes as shown in Equation (1.12). OLS estimates as described
by Equation (1.9). Task measures were computed using the Qualifications and Career Surveys. In
the QCS surveys, workers are asked what tasks they perform in their job, e.g. “how often do you
repair stuff”. They provide answers on a scale: “never, sometimes, often”. We assign numerical
values {0, 13 , 1} to these categories, respectively. We group all the questions into the four categories
mentioned in the headers and average over occupations implying that the four task categories do not
need to sum up to one as some occupations might be more intense in overall tasks than others. The
six different QCS waves were pooled together as the questions are hardly comparable between waves.
One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an
aggregation of these detailed occupations as described in Appendix Table 1.4. Bubble size corresponds
to the number of employed workers in an occupation averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Regression
lines across all occupations (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the
number of employed workers.
sk,i,t − s¯k,t. The average within-occupation variance of log wages becomes:
σ2(w˜k,i,t) = σ2(s˜k,i,t) =
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
s˜2k,i,t =
K∑
k=1
pk,t︷ ︸︸ ︷
Nk,t
Nt
·
σ2k,t︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
Nk,t
∑
i∈k
s˜2k,i,t =
K∑
k=1
pk,tσ
2
k,t,
(1.54)
where pk,t is occupation k’s share of total employment at time t and σ2k,t is the variance
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of wages or skills within the occupation. The change of the average within variance is:
∆σ2(w˜k,i,t) = ∆σ2(s˜k,i,t) =
K∑
k=1
(
pk,tσ
2
k,t − pk,1985σ2k,1985
)
=
K∑
k=1
∆σ2k,tpk,1985 +
K∑
k=1
∆pk,tσ2k,1985 +
K∑
k=1
∆σ2k,t∆pk,t
(1.55)
Therefore, the rise of within-occupation inequality can be decomposed into terms
linked to the changing employment structure and ‘pure’ increases of the variance of log
wages in occupations at fixed sizes. In addition, the last summand of Equation (1.55) is
actually the covariance of changing within inequality with changing employment share.
That is, how much the variance of skills in occupations rises for growing occupations,
which is related to the declining (rising) skills in growing (shrinking) occupations dis-
cussed in Section 1.4. This relationship generates 0.56 (i.e., 1.34− 0.78) log points of
the increase in within inequality in the second column, bottom panel of Table 1.24.
The other component related to the changing employment structure is the grow-
ing size of sectors with high initial within inequality. These are often relatively large
occupations inside the rising Mgr-Prof-Tech, Sales-Office, and Srvc-Care groups, which
is partly due to the German KLDB occupation classification as it is more detailed in
production and crafts related occupations than in managerial, office, or service type oc-
cupations (see Table 1.4). The effect of this is the second summand in Equation (1.55)
and it makes up another 0.59 log points of the increase in within-occupation inequality
in Table 1.24. Clearly the largest part of the rising within variance is the first sum-
mand in Equation (1.55). However, also here the employment structure played a role
because larger occupations, which as we said are often in Mgr-Prof-Tech, Sales-Office,
and Srvc-Care occupations, had higher increases of within inequality.
The remaining columns in the bottom panel of Table 1.24 again show and decom-
pose the effect of the reweighting counterfactuals (notice that the skill prices vary only
across occupations and thus have no effect on inequality within). We see that this has
an overall modest effect but that additionally reweighting the occupation composition
at the very right of the table does raise that effect, since it almost perfectly matches
the growth of occupations with large inequality within (i.e., 0.59 in the actual and 0.63
in that counterfactual).
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Table 1.24: Between-within occupation variance of observed log wages, experiments
Level 1985 Difference 2010 - 1985
Observed Observed Prices only Rew.
age,
foreign
+ prices Rew.
age,
for-
eign,
educa-
tion
+ prices Rew.
age,
for-
eign,
educa-
tion,
occu-
pation
+ prices
Overall σ2(wi,t) 14.28 12.41 5.13 0.45 5.70 2.41 9.56 2.70 8.44
Between σ2(w¯k,t) 5.03 5.25 5.13 0.34 5.59 1.74 8.88 1.60 7.34
2 · σ(∆pik,t, w¯k,1985) 3.23 3.23 0.00 3.23 0.00 3.23 0.00 3.23
σ2(∆pik,t) 1.76 1.89 0.00 1.92 0.00 2.36 0.00 1.79
2 · σ(∆s¯k,t, w¯k,1985) -0.53 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.53 0.53 0.59 0.59
σ2(∆s¯k,t) 3.02 0.00 0.07 0.07 1.21 1.21 1.00 1.00
2 · σ(∆pik,t,∆s¯k,t) -2.24 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.55 0.00 0.73
Within σ2(wi,t − w¯k,t) 9.25 7.16 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.68 0.68 1.10 1.10∑
k
∆σ2k,t∆p>0k,t 1.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.05∑
k
∆σ2k,t∆p≤0k,t -0.78 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07∑
k
∆pk,tσ2k,1985 0.59 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.28 0.28 0.63 0.63∑
k
∆σ2k,tpk,1985 6.02 -0.00 0.13 0.13 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.49
Notes: The levels in 1985 are 14.3 (overall), 5.0 (between), and 9.3 (within). Based on specification with 120 occupations. w¯k,t refers to the average wage in occupation
k in year t. Values × 100. The experiments are: Prices only: Take average wages in 1985 and add price changes to simulate 2010’s wages. Rew. age, foreign: Take
wages in 1985 and reweigh them according to 2010’s age and foreign worker distribution with weights computed following DiNardo et al. (1996) to simulate 2010’s
wages. + prices: add price changes on top.
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1.G.2 Additional Results for the Scenarios from the Full Model
Here, we first provide the explicit formulas for the scenarios in Figure 1.9. We then
describe some features of the table and figures in this section. These include the
levels of the percentiles and the variance in the data and under the model prediction
(Table 1.25). They also include two different sample/data preparation specifications
(Figures 1.53 and 1.54), and a permutation of the order in which we add the components
of the model (Figure 1.55).
The first scenario in Figure 1.9c reports the trend of inequality that would prevail
if only the wage distribution at age 25 (or an older age for later entrants) had shifted,
with changes in skill prices as well as skill accumulation or occupation-switching over
the life-cycle turned off. That is,
wˆInitial occupation and wage throughouti,t = wi,ti,0 , (1.56)
where ti,0 ≤ t denotes the year when worker i joins the labor market.
The next scenario adds skill accumulation to these initial wages. In particular, Fig-
ure 1.9d shows the inequality due to changing initial occupation distribution (measured
by Ik,i,ti,0), age structure of employment (Xi,τ−1), and associated changes of skill
accumulation over time (Γˆk,k):
wˆInitial occupation + skill accumulationi,t = wi,ti,0 +
t∑
τ=ti,0+1
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,ti,0Ii,τ−1 ·X ′i,τ−1Γˆk,k,
(1.57)
where the worker joined the labor market at time ti,0 ≤ t, never switches (i.e., Ik,i,ti,0
does not change with τ), and Ii,τ−1 indicates whether the worker was employed in
τ − 1. That is, we assume that skills stagnate during non-employment spells. Also,
workers who are currently unemployed or out of the labor force do not enter any of the
scenarios.
The scenario in Figure 1.9e includes occupation switching, but leaves out the skill
changes associated with switching. The wage in this scenario becomes:
wˆ
Observed occ. + skill acc.; ∆sk,l = 0
i,t = wi,ti,0 +
t∑
τ=ti,0+1
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,τ−1 ·X ′i,τ−1Γˆk,k (1.58)
Here notably Ik′,i,τ−1 can be zero for all K occupations if the worker was unemployed
or out of the labor force in the respective period. We do assign workers who return from
non-employment one Γˆk,k for their previous occupation, however. In the scenarios with
the gains from switching immediately below we assign Γˆk′,k for their previous k′ and
current k occupation combination. Either of this does not make a material difference
for the results and, for ease of notation, it is not explicitly indicated in the formulas.
The next scenario adds the skill changes associated with switching in Figure 1.9f.
The wage in this scenario becomes:
wˆObserved occ. + skill accumulationi,t = wi,ti,0+
t∑
τ=ti,0+1
K∑
k=1
K∑
k′=1
Ik,i,τ
(
Ik′,i,τ−1 ·X ′i,τ−1Γˆk′,k
)
(1.59)
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Finally, we add our estimated skill prices in Figure 1.9b. The wage in the full
empirical model becomes:
wˆModeli,t = wi,ti,0 +
K∑
k=1
Ik,i,t
t∑
τ=ti,0+1
∆pˆik,τ (1.60)
+
t∑
τ=ti,0+1
K∑
k=1
K∑
k′=1
Ik,i,τ
(
Ik′,i,τ−1 ·X ′i,τ−1Γˆk′,k
)
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As detailed in the main text, we consider two different specifications in this section.
First, to partly abstract from the supply shock of increased migration after 1990, we
exclude anybody ever excluded as a foreigner. Second, we fill non-employment spells to
see how periods in unemployment or outside of the labor force impact the scenarios. For
the latter, all notes related to these spells in the formulas (1.56)–(1.60) are irrelevant
here.
Since Figure 1.9 showed the evolution of the three percentiles under consideration
normalized to zero in 1985, we display their 1985 levels in Table 1.25 along with the
variance. Across all scenarios, the model fits the levels well. None of the values deviates
by more than 1.5/100 from the actual value. This is quite remarkable given that the
estimation of the model targets average occupational wages for demographic groups.
The predictions for the differences between the endpoints of our study period are also
broadly in line with the data.
Figure 1.53 shows the same scenarios as Figure 1.9 in the main text when excluding
anybody who was ever coded as a foreigner from the sample. The most important
fact to note is that in Panel c, the decline in the 15th percentile is not nearly as
pronounced as in Figure 1.9c. In the experiment where unemployment is a choice
(Figure 1.54), the same broad conclusions hold as in the main text. Some differences
are noteworthy, however. Already in the data, the 15th percentile decreases much
more than in Figure 1.9a, the pattern is similar but much less pronounced for the
higher percentiles. In this specification, price changes hurt both the median and the
15th percentile; the latter actually slightly loses from switching (Panels e → f). This
highlights that we overestimate the gains from switching at the lower end because
occupation changes involving wage losses often go via an unemployment spell.
Finally, note that the sequencing of the experiments in Figure 1.9 is arbitrary. In
fact, the sequencing only matters with respect to when occupation switching is added
because, conditional on occupation choice, all other components enter separately and
do not interact. In Figure 1.55, we add prices immediately to the initial wages and
add occupation switching as late as possible. Interestingly, all three percentiles would
have evolved in almost the same way until the mid-nineties and they opened up only
afterwards. Adding skill accumulation then yields the more familiar pattern, which is
opened up further by switches.
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Table 1.25: Levels of wage percentiles and the variance for model and sample
specifications
Anybody ever coded Filled
Main sample as foreign excluded non-employment spells
Level 1985 Diff. 2010-85 Level 1985 Diff. 2010-85 Level 1985 Diff. 2010-85
High Data 1080.71 24.03 1081.42 25.09 1079.12 23.27
log(p85) Model prediction 1082.38 26.86 1082.73 28.21 1080.00 23.27
Median Data 1042.88 11.55 1043.14 13.89 1041.27 9.75
log(p50) Model prediction 1044.48 11.63 1044.78 13.42 1041.65 5.96
Low Data 1017.07 -5.13 1017.78 -1.52 1013.23 -10.53
log(p15) Model prediction 1015.95 -2.23 1016.36 0.43 1011.46 -11.51
Variance Data 14.28 12.41 14.20 11.21 16.48 15.59
σ2(wi,t) Model prediction 14.66 12.11 14.63 10.91 16.41 15.22
Notes: The table shows observed levels of the 85th, 50th and 15th log wage distribution percentiles as
well as the variance of log wages in 1985 and changes between 2010 and 1985. All values × 100. In
addition, the table shows model predictions of levels and changes according to Equation (1.60). The
first two columns show the results for the baseline sample. Columns three and four present the results
when we also drop workers which are reported to be foreigners at some point in time. This includes,
for instance, workers acquiring the German nationality at some later point in the life cycle. For the last
two columns, unemployment and out of labor force spells are imputed by comparing the (real) wage
after a non-employment spell with the wage before the non-employment spell. We then fill up the wage
while in non-employment as the lower of those two wages adjusted for inflation and set the occupation
within this time to the occupation that corresponds to that lower wage. See Appendix 1.A.1.4 for the
details.
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Figure 1.53: Wage inequality scenarios, anybody ever coded as foreign excluded
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(c) Initial occupation and wage throughout
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(d) Initial occupation + skill accumulation
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(e) Observed occ. + skill acc.; ∆sk,l = 0
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(f) Observed occ. + skill accumulation
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Notes: Panel a: observed wages. Panel b: simulated life-cycle trajectories based on our full model:
starting from the initial wage and occupational choice, add all skill accumulation and price change
estimates using occupational choices observed in the data. Panel c: workers keep their initial wage
throughout the life cycle. Panel d: workers stay in their initial job throughout the life-cycle; in each
period, we add the skills they would have accumulated in that job (i.e., ∆sk0,k0,t). Panel e: use
observed switches, setting direct gains from switching to zero, i.e., ∆sk,l = 0 ∀ k 6= l. Price changes
are zero as well, so the difference to Panel d comes purely from differential skill accumulation in
occupations. Panel f: as in Panel e, but adding the direct gains from switching. The only difference
to the full model in Panel b are the price changes, which continue to be zero. In all scenarios, we treat
unemployment or out-of-the-labor force spells as follows: When such a spell is observed in the data,
simulated workers do not enter the inequality statistics. Furthermore, we assume no depreciation and
upon re-entry into paid work add—where relevant—the ∆sk,l,t with l being the occupation before
the spell. The sample is the same as the baseline sample except that we also drop workers which are
reported to be foreigners at some point in time. This includes, for instance, workers acquiring the
German nationality at some later point in the life cycle.
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Figure 1.54: Wage inequality scenarios, filled non-employment spells
(a) Observed
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
lo
g(
pe
rc
en
til
e)
 ×
 1
00
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 1
98
5
15th pct 50th pct 85th pct
(b) Model
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(c) Initial occupation and wage throughout
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
lo
g(
pe
rc
en
til
e)
 ×
 1
00
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 1
98
5
15th pct 50th pct 85th pct
(d) Initial occupation + skill accumulation
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(e) Observed occ. + skill acc.; ∆sk,l = 0
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(f) Observed occ. + skill accumulation
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
lo
g(
pe
rc
en
til
e)
 ×
 1
00
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 1
98
5
15th pct 50th pct 85th pct
Notes: Panel a: observed wages. Panel b: simulated life-cycle trajectories based on our full model:
Starting from the initial wage and occupational choice, add all skill accumulation and price change
estimates using occupational choices observed in the data. Panel c: workers keep their initial wage
throughout the life cycle. Panel d: workers stay in their initial job throughout the life-cycle; in each
period, we add the skills they would have accumulated in that job (i.e., ∆sk0,k0,t). Panel e: use
observed switches, setting direct gains from switching to zero, i.e., ∆sk,l = 0 ∀ k 6= l. Price changes
are zero as well, so the difference to Panel d comes purely from differential skill accumulation in
occupations. Panel f: as in Panel e, but adding the direct gains from switching. The only difference
to the full model in Panel b are the price changes, which continue to be zero. Unemployment and out
of labor force spells are imputed by comparing the (real) wage after a non-employment spell with the
wage before the non-employment spell. We then fill up the wage while in non-employment as the lower
of those two wages adjusted for inflation and set the occupation within this time to the occupation
that corresponds to that lower wage. See Appendix 1.A.1.4 for the details.
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Figure 1.55: Wage inequality scenarios, order prices→ accumulation→ switch-
ing
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(b) Model
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(c) Initial occupation and wage throughout
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(d) Initial occupation + prices
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(e) Initial occ. + prices + skill acc.
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(f) Observed occ. + prices + skill acc.,
∆sk,l = 0
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Notes: Panel a: observed wages. Panel b: simulated life-cycle trajectories based on our full model:
starting from the initial wage and occupational choice, add all skill accumulation and price change
estimates using occupational choices observed in the data. Panel c: workers keep their initial wage
throughout the life cycle. Panel d: workers stay in their initial job throughout the life-cycle; in
each period, we add the price changes estimates in that job (i.e., ∆pik0,t). Panel e: in addition to
Panel d, add differential skill accumulation in occupations. Panel f: as in Panel e, but take observed
occupational choices as opposed to initial choices. In all scenarios, we treat unemployment or out-of-
the-labor force spells as follows: when such a spell is observed in the data, simulated workers do not
enter the inequality statistics. Furthermore, we assume no depreciation and upon re-entry into paid
work add—where relevant—the ∆sk,l,t with l being the occupation before the spell.
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1.G.3 Effect of Skill Accumulation on Wage Percentiles
This section analyzes the reasons for skill accumulation’s substantial effect on the
change of lower-half inequality, also in comparison to its modest effect on the upper-
half. To do this, we rewrite the overall skill accumulation as a function of average
skill accumulation within detailed worker cells times the frequency of these cells. In
particular, for every percentile of the wage distribution in a given year, we compute the
average skill accumulation in each worker cell defined by age and initial occupation.
Then we average over these cells by their shares in the respective percentiles. That is,
we compute the average skill accumulation in each percentile had workers stayed in the
occupation of when they first joined the labor market as:
avgt =
120∑
k=1
54∑
a=25
P t(a, k) · acck,a,t with (1.61)
acck,a,t =
1
Nk,a,t
t∑
τ=ti,0+1
∑
i{k,a,t}
Ik,i,ti,0Ii,τ−1 ·X ′i,τ−1Γˆk,k, (1.62)
where in the second equation
∑
i{k,a,t} is a shorthand for summing over all workers of
age a in year t whose initial occupation was k, and Nk,a,t is the total number of such
workers. As before, ti,0 ≤ t denotes the year when worker i joins the labor market. In
Equation (1.61) we then weigh by the relative cell sizes Pt(a, k) to obtain the average
skill accumulation in the respective wage percentile.63
Figure 1.56: Skills accumulated during working life by percentile of wage distri-
bution
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Notes: Estimates for average skill accumulation obtained in the population by year and percentile in
the wage distribution following Equations 1.61, 1.62 and 1.63.
The black solid line in Figure 1.56 depicts this average skill accumulation across
the percentiles of the 2010 wage distribution. We can see that skill accumulation’s
63An index for the specific wage percentile is omitted, since this is always conditioned on
anyway.
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contribution to log wages is substantially higher at the median than at the bottom of
the distribution, and much higher at the top of the distribution. The gray solid line
depicts the corresponding skill accumulation for the year 1985, which is substantially
flatter in its lower half but comparably steep as the 2010 skill accumulation between
the 50th and the 85th percentile. The difference between the two lines is the effect
of the accumulation (i.e., Equation (1.57) compared to the scenario with only initial
wages changing in Equation (1.56)).
Using Equations (1.61)–(1.62), we now decompose the difference between the 2010
and 1985 skill accumulation effect into its parts with a particular focus on the lower
half. One obvious component of this is supposed to be the changing occupation struc-
ture. Using Bayes’ law, we compute the accumulation that would have prevailed if
(conditionally) the age structure and within-cell accumulation changed over time but
the (initial) occupation structure had stayed the same as in 1985:
avg2010(occup = 1985) =
120∑
k=1
54∑
a=25
P 1985(k) · P 2010(a|k) · acck,a,2010 (1.63)
The pink dashed line depicts this skill accumulation, showing that it actually does not
explain any of the increase in lower-half inequality. The reason for this rather surprising
result is that the occupation structure actually did not shift decidedly toward higher-
accumulation occupations at the median. Figure 1.57 depicts the corresponding graph
in the scenario at hand, i.e., with workers’ initial occupations in the distribution of
wages only due to entry and skill accumulation. We see that there are the same share
of high-accumulation occupations at the median in 1985 as in 2010.64
The next potential component of the skill accumulation effect is the shifting age
structure in the different parts of the wage distribution. That is, we change the uncon-
ditional age distribution at each percentile to its 1985 value but hold the accumulation
and the conditional occupation structure at their 2010 values:
avg2010(age = 1985) =
120∑
k=1
54∑
a=25
P 1985(a) · P 2010(k|a) · acck,a,2010 (1.64)
The yellow dashed line in Figure 1.56 shows that this strikingly explains more than
half of the accumulation effect. In particular, the many experienced workers at the
2010 median, already mentioned in the main text, have accumulated a lot of skills over
their careers. Figure 1.57 illustrates this even more clearly in the scenario at hand: the
share of 45–54 (but also 35–44) year old Prod-Op-Crafts workers at the median is very
large in 2010 and much higher than in 1985. Hence, if we down-weigh the share of
these workers to 1985 and hold everything else constant, as we do in Equation (1.64),
skill accumulation at the median is substantially lower. Therefore, the large baby
boomer birth cohorts, who still started their careers in Prod-Op-Crafts occupations,65
64Admittedly, this may also partially be a reflection of data limitations here, since we need
to approximate initial occupations in 1985 by their 1975 occupations for workers who joined
the labor market before that (see also discussion further below). That is, some (middle-aged
or older) ‘blue’ Mgr-Prof-Tech or ‘Sales-Office’ workers in 1985 may have started in the ‘red’
or ‘green’ occupations before 1975. This would also explain the higher share of ‘blue’ initial
occupations at the top quintile of the Figure 1.57 wage distribution in 1985 than in 2010 and
the concurrent stronger 85th percentile increase in the pink 1985 occupation structure series
of Figure 1.56.
65The baby boom in Germany started later than in the U.S., with cohorts comprising birth
years 1955–69, i.e., 41–55 year olds in 2010.
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Figure 1.57: Shares in the wage distribution by quintile
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(b) 2010
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Notes: Each rectangle is proportional to the share of workers in the respective occupation × age bin.
Wage quintiles were computed with wages computed as in Equation (1.57), i.e. wage growth only
occurring because of skill accumulation.
are substantially raising median wages at the end of our analysis period. Bottom wage
earners in 2010 are in contrast much younger, and therefore skill accumulation due to
demographic change raises lower-half wage inequality in this point in time.
The last factor that may have changed between 1985 and 2010 is the skill accu-
mulation within worker-cells, which we analyze by computing:
avg2010(accum = 1985) =
120∑
k=1
54∑
a=25
P 2010(a, k) · acck,a,1985. (1.65)
This counterfactual represents a specific version of changing worker employment biogra-
phies: since we condition on a fixed initial occupation and age, it can only differ when
workers on average have more or less gap years of not working or different ages at labor
market entry in 1985 than in 2010. In Equation (1.62) above, the former corresponds to
differences in the number of Ii,τ−1 = 0 instances (e.g., due to unemployment) and the
latter to differences in the total number of years t− ti,0 over which skill accumulation
is summed for a given age.
The differences in labor market entry ages are hard to measure in our data because
we have to impute them for workers who joined the labor market before the beginning
of our sample in 1975, that is, who already appear in the 1975 data aged older than 25.
We do this by computing, for every occupation, the average entry age across all years
from 1976 onward and assign this as the entry age together with their 1975 occupation
to every worker who appears in the sample older than 25 in that year. We then
impute the wage at labor market entry by subtracting the respective skill accumulation
coefficients back to that entry age. This imputation, which affects our computed 1985
(but not 2010) skill accumulation,66 may generate a bias. We assess this possibility by
pretending we only observed 2010 workers’ labor market histories after 2001 (i.e., as
in 1985, everything longer than nine years ago is unobserved) and then conducting the
66Given that workers exit the sample at age 54, after the year 2003 nobody is imputed
anymore.
148 CHAPTER 1. OCCUPATIONS, SKILL PRICES, WAGE INEQUALITY
same imputation.67
Since the red dashed line is below the solid black line, Figure 1.56 shows that the
imputation does indeed underestimate the skill accumulation in 2010, especially at and
above the median. Therefore, part of our measured skill accumulation effect on lower-
half inequality between 2010 and 1985 may be due to this data issue. Nonetheless, if
we apply our calculation (1.64) on top of the imputed labor market biographies in 2010,
age structure differences between the beginning and the end of the analysis period still
have a substantial effect on 50–15 inequality. In fact, the combination of imputation
and age structure (green dotted line) is almost exactly the same as the actual 1985 skill
accumulation in the lower half of the wage distribution.
Finally, we examine the effect of potentially more intermittent prior labor market
attachment at either end of the analysis period. That is, similar to Section 1.F.1 we
fill up gaps in employment biographies (e.g., due to unemployment) during the nine
years leading up to 1985 and 2010, respectively. The dotted blue line shows the results
and that actually this has no discernible effect on skill accumulation in addition to the
imputation and the age structure effect. In unreported analyses, we found that labor
market biographies were indeed somewhat more intermittent leading up to 2010 than
1985, but this only affected the very bottom of the wage distribution (below the 5th
percentile) and turns out quantitatively unimportant here.
To summarize the overall result, had we plotted
avg2010(age = 1985, accum = 1985) =
120∑
k=1
54∑
a=25
P 1985(a) · P 2010(k|a) · acck,a,1985
(1.66)
into the Figure 1.56, it would have almost exactly overlapped with the green dotted
line. This implies that the workforce’s changing age structure was the main driver of
rising lower-half inequality. There is in fact no role for the occupation distribution at
labor market entry conditional on the age structure (i.e., replacing P 2010(k|a) with its
1985 value does not matter for the lower half). Replacing acck,a,1985 with a version of
acck,a,2010 in which initial occupations and wages are imputed as in 1985 also gives the
same result (which is the green dotted line). On top of that, filling labor market biogra-
phies during the preceding nine years also does not matter (blue dotted line). Therefore,
some of the lower-half inequality effect may or may not be attributed to changing initial
wages instead of skill accumulation, but the economically and quantitatively important
part is accounted for by aging of the workforce.
67Conversely, we have also not imputed at all and taken the first observed wage as the
initial one, which actually decreased 50–15 differences in 1985 and thus modestly raised the
increase of lower-half inequality in the wˆei,t scenario (i.e., lowered the part that changing skill
accumulation accounts for).
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Chapter 2
Changing Returns to
Occupational Skill and
Women’s Wages
2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the importance of changing returns to occupational
skill and declining occupational segregation for the reduction in wage inequality
between men and women. During the last three decades, wage inequality has
increased in almost all developed countries (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). This
increase has taken place within as well as between observable groups defined by
variables such as education, occupation, region or industry. The major exception
to the rule – some authors even argue, paradoxical exception to the rule (Blau
and Kahn, 1997; Card and DiNardo, 2002) – has been the convergence of male
and female wages over time (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2016; Blau and Kahn,
2017).
Many possible explanations for the declining gender wage gap exist and
have been raised in the literature such as rising female labor market experi-
ence (Olivetti, 2006), positive selection of women into the labor force (Mulligan
and Rubinstein, 2008), gender biased shifts in labor demand (Heathcote et al.,
2010), structural change (Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017), or declining discrimina-
tion (Hsieh et al., 2019). Apart from that, another very popular explanation
is concerned with returns to skill having changed in a women benefiting way,
despite these changing skill returns might have raised overall inequality (Altonji
and Blank, 1999).
The idea for this goes back to Goldin (1990) who hypothesized that women
have a comparative advantage in tasks that require “brains” rather than “brawns”.
If changes in labor demand (for instance, due to technical change) induced an
increase in the price paid for brain skills, then wage inequality between men and
women should decline; although inequality within male and female samples is
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likely to rise.1
In line with this demand side driven view, this paper investigates the impor-
tance of changes in occupational demand and supply for the declining gender
wage gap between men and women. Using German administrative panel data
with consistent and accurate information on workers’ detailed occupations and
their wages, I find that almost all of the decline in the gender wage gap be-
tween 1985 and 2010 can be explained by a convergence in occupational choices
between men and women as well as changing occupational wages.
The reason for this is that men and women have worked (Weisskoff, 1972)
and still do work (Cortes and Pan, 2018) in very different occupations. This
segregation leads to two potential sources of convergence between men’s and
women’s wages. These sources are commonly referred to as the “wage structure
effect” and the “composition effect” in the literature (Blau and Kahn, 2017):
a change in the wage structure benefits women’s relative wages if wages are
increasing in occupations which make up a great share of female employment.
In turn, a change in employment composition reduces the wage gap if the relative
number of women in high wage occupations increases.
So far, these two hypothesized effects have been analyzed in isolation from
each other. However, recent research suggests that changes in occupational
employment growth might have a direct, attenuating effect on occupational
wage growth (and thereby the wage structure effect). The reason for this is
that workers self select into occupations depending on skill prices (Cortes, 2016;
Böhm et al., 2019; Hsieh et al., 2019). Hence, contingent on the magnitude of
workers’ selection response, the wage structure effect might not reflect the causal
influence of changing skill prices on changes in gender wage inequality. For
instance, the selection response in the model of Hsieh et al. (2019) exactly offsets
a change in skill prices so that wage and employment growth are completely
uncorrelated. US data are consistent with this theoretical prediction. The same
finding holds for Germany (Böhm et al., 2019). When ignoring this, the result
might be an overestimation of the composition effect and an underestimation
of the wage structure effect. This is because wages do not move as much
as predicted by changing skill prices alone, that is, in absence of worker self
selection.
Nevertheless, to identify the influence of the wage structure and composition
effect, most existing work has typically relied on simple regression models for es-
timating occupational wage premia in a base period and then asked:2 how would
the wage gap have changed if only employment but not wages had changed?
In turn, estimates for the wage structure effect are derived from holding em-
ployment shares constant and only letting average wages change over time. For
instance, following the Juhn et al. (1993) approach, Bacolod and Blum (2010)
1See Welch (2000) for a formalization of this argument.
2This approach goes back to a larger literature on estimating changes in wage differentials
(see Smith and Welch, 1989; Juhn et al., 1991, 1993).
2.1. INTRODUCTION 157
find that rising wages in cognitive and social occupations can explain 20% of
the decline in the US gender wage gap. The bulk of the remaining convergence
is explained by the changing composition of female work. Weinberg (2000) and
Borghans et al. (2014) confirm this finding for the US and complement it with
evidence for the UK and Germany. Black and Spitz-Oener (2010) employ data
on tasks which workers execute on the job and estimate that about half of the
declining gap can be traced back to an increase in the non-routine component
of work.
To repeat the argument from above: what connects these approaches in
identifying changes of skill prices from time series variation in wages is the
implicit assumption that the quality of the average worker within an occupation
must not change in response to shifting skill prices.3 In a first step, I follow
this approach and decompose the change in the gender wage gap into a wage
structure effect, a composition effect and a residual. Overall, I find that the
gender wage gap within a sample of full time working 25–54 year old workers
declined from being as high as 44 log points in 1985 to 36 log points in 2010.
Roughly 35% of that decline are explained by changes in average occupational
wages: women have worked and still do work in occupations in which average
wages increased relatively more than in occupations in which many men work
(such as manufacturing). In turn, nearly 65% of the decline can be attributed to
changing employment patterns: women moved into high wage, professional and
managerial occupations previously dominated by men (Ngai and Petrongolo,
2017). In fact, cohort analyses show that the proportion of women at labor
market entry in managerial occupations increased dramatically over time, rising
from 40% for women born between 1945–1955 to 68% for those born after
1965.
In the next step, I then move beyond equating changes in skill prices with
changes in average occupational wages. I take (quality adjusted) skill price
change estimates from earlier work in Böhm et al. (2019). They identify the
part of average wage growth which is due to changing skill prices by employing
long term panel data which allow them to hold constant occupation specific
changes in worker quality. Using these skill price estimates, I decompose the
wage structure effect further into a price effect and a skill selection effect.
Importantly, the skill price estimates come from a sample of prime age men as
the underlying (static) occupational choice model is less likely to be misspecified
for men because forward looking behavior might play a less prominent role for
men compared to women (Adda et al., 2017). Hence, I implicitly assume that
men and women do not work in segmented labor markets but instead are paid
the same price for a unit of skilled labor as it would be the case in a competitive
3Contrary to relying on time series variation in occupational wages, Beaudry and Lewis
(2014) exploit variation in wage gaps together with variation in PC adoption across local
labor markets. They find that the gender wage gap decreased more in areas with higher PC
adoption. They interpret this result as being driven by higher increases in cognitive skill prices
paid within areas that experienced more abundant PC adoption.
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labor market without discrimination.4
The exercise shows that the raw wage structure effect indeed underestimates
the contribution of changing skill prices on the convergence of male and female
wages. In fact, the results suggest that changing skill prices contributed roughly
13 percentage points more to the decline in the gender wage gap than changes
in average wages alone. The main reason for that is a large increase in female
labor force participation during the late 1980s. By definition, this rise brought a
lot of inexperienced, low wage, low skill women into work. The increasing female
participation rate initially counteracted skill price movements which were essen-
tially beneficial for women’s wages. Further, the results suggest that women not
only benefited from rising prices paid for tasks women perform more often than
men (such as service and care), but they also benefited from declining prices
paid for tasks men are engaged in more often than women (mostly manufactur-
ing occupations). Interestingly, a similar result was found by Yamaguchi (2018)
who used an alternative approach to estimate the influence of skill prices on the
declining gender wage gap in US panel data (also in terms of timing).
In the last step, I investigate the importance of changing returns to occupa-
tional skill and changing employment patterns for the proportion of women at
different parts of the combined male and female wage distribution. The observed
proportion of women at the 85th percentile of the wage distribution increased
from 12 percentage points in 1985 to 20 points in 2010. In contrast, the pro-
portion of women at the 15th percentile was 61 percentage points in 1985. This
share decreased to 50 points over time. Hence, gender wage inequality declined
in both the upper and lower part of the wage distribution.
Using a reweighting approach by following DiNardo et al. (1996), I estimate
how large the share of women by percentile would have been if, ceteris paribus,
skill prices had not changed or the distribution of occupational employment had
not changed over time (or both). In summary, if skill prices and employment had
not changed over the years, the share of women at the 85th percentile would
have increased by 50% less. Similarly, the share of women at the 15th percentile
would have fallen by 55% less. Therefore, changes in prices and occupational
employment induced a decline in gender wage inequality in both the upper and
lower part of the wage distribution.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents
the data and evidence on the declining wage gap. Section 2.3 decomposes the
wage gap into wage structure, skill price and composition effects. Section 2.4
concludes.
4See Hsieh et al. (2019) for a setup which explicitly allows for discrimination having changed
over time within a Roy model framework.
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2.2 Male and Female Wage and Employment Patterns
2.2.1 Data
Data comes from the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB)
Scientific Use File provided by the IAB Institute at the German Federal Em-
ployment Agency. The SIAB is a 2% random sample of administrative social
security records from 1975 to 2014. It is representative of 80% of the German
workforce and includes employees covered by social security, marginal part-time
employment, benefit receipts, officially registered as job-seeking or participating
in programs of active labor market policy. It excludes the self-employed, civil
servants, and individuals performing military service. Most notably, it contains
individuals’ full employment histories including detailed data for workers’ oc-
cupations along with socio-demographics such as age, gender, or the level of
education. The contained wage measure corresponds to the daily gross wage.
I prepare the data along the lines of Böhm et al. (2019). I transfer the spell
structure into a yearly panel by deleting all spells except for the longest spell
within a year. I impute wages above the social security limit, and restrict the
main sample to 25 to 54 year old Germans working full-time in former West
Germany between 1975 and 2010.
The SIAB Scientific Use File contains information on 120 different occupa-
tions on which the decompositions are based. For some parts of the analyses, I
categorize these detailed occupations into 10 broader groups broadly following
Acemoglu and Autor (2011): managers, professionals, technicians, sales, of-
fice, production, operators, craftsmen, service and care occupations with man-
agers, professionals, and technicians being high wage, analytical occupations. In
contrast service and care occupations represent low wage, manual occupations
whereas production, operators and craftsmen consist of middle wage, routine
and manual occupations. Sales and office lie in between high and middle wage
occupations. See Böhm et al. (2019) for the mapping.
In robustness checks, I relax the data restrictions to also include part-time
workers. Unfortunately, the data do not contain any information on the exact
number of hours so that I cannot construct hourly wages. Instead, the wage of
a part-time worker will also refer to the daily wage and, hence, be lower than
a full time wage because of differences in working hours. Although most of
the existing literature about changes in the gender wage gap also restricts the
analyses to full time working men and women (e.g., Bacolod and Blum, 2010;
Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010; Blau and Kahn, 2017; Yamaguchi, 2018), I view
the inclusion of part time workers as a crucial validity check because, contrary
to the US, working part-time has been very prevalent for women in Germany
and has even increased over time. In fact, data from the OECD (2019) show
that the share of women aged 25–54 in part-time work increased from 35% in
1990 to 39% in 2010. In contrast, the proportion of women working part-time
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in the US decreased from 15% to 13% over time.5
2.2.2 Trends in Gender Wage Inequality and Employment Gaps
Germany has one of the highest and most persistent gender wage gaps among
developed countries (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2016). Panel A in Table 2.1 shows
the level and evolution of the gap for full time-working 25–54 year old men and
women over time in the SIAB data. The difference in average log wages between
the sexes was 44.24 log points in 1985. This gap declined by 8.42 log points
until 2010 with most of the convergence in wages taking place until 1993. This
timing is similar to the US (e.g., Figure 4, p. 414 in Olivetti and Petrongolo,
2016).
Table 2.1: Gender gaps in wages and occupational employment
Level Difference
1985 1993 - 1985 2001 - 1993 2010 - 2001 2010 - 1985
Panel A
Observed wage gap 44.24 -4.66 -2.41 -1.34 -8.42
Pred. gap, occupation × year 20.45 -3.73 -3.13 -1.50 -8.37
Pred. gap, occupation 19.09 -2.37 -2.30 -1.37 -6.05
Panel B
Duncan index 61.05 -1.51 -3.08 -1.81 -6.40
Occupation mix effect -1.06 -1.46 -0.76 -3.28
Panel C
Proportion of women
Mgr 17.23 6.56 4.86 2.21 13.62
Prof 20.88 5.47 1.48 2.97 9.91
Tech 10.45 4.40 0.08 0.40 4.88
Sales 43.41 4.59 -1.10 -1.28 2.21
Office 64.99 3.15 -3.31 -2.75 -2.91
Prod 16.79 -0.27 -1.73 -3.28 -5.29
Op 9.16 1.61 1.03 1.19 3.84
Crafts 10.48 -0.40 -0.98 -0.98 -2.35
Srvc 58.12 -0.79 -5.19 -3.39 -9.37
Care 85.20 1.14 -1.96 -0.20 -1.02
Notes: Panel A shows log wages of men minus log wages of women for three different wage measures:
observed wages, predicted wages from a regression of wages on 120 occupation dummies interacted
with year dummies as well as predictions from a regression of wages on occupation dummies only.
Panel B shows the Duncan index computed as in Equation (2.1). Occupation mix effect refers to
the change in the Duncan index attributable to economy wide changes in occupation sizes, see Blau,
Brummund, et al. (2013) for the details. Panel C shows the proportion of women within professions:
Mgr: managers; Prof: professions; Tech: technicians; Prod: production; Op: Operators; Crafts:
craftsmen; Srvc: services. Classification of detailed occupations follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011),
see Böhm et al. (2019) for the exact mapping. Values ×100. Full-time working 25-54 year old West
German men and women.
When I replace individual wages with average occupational wages by means
of the prediction from a regression of log wages on occupation times year dum-
5The proportion of prime age men working part-time is quite low in both countries although
having slightly increased between 1990 and 2010 from 2% to 6% (Germany) and from 3% to
4% (US).
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mies, the resulting wage gap amounts to 20.45 log points in 1985. Hence,
compared to the overall gap, 46% of the gender wage gap in 1985 can be ex-
plained by differences in the occupational structure between men and women.
This already shows the importance of occupations for gender wage inequality.
What is even more noteworthy, however, is the relevance of changes in the
occupation structure for the change in the gender wage gap.
The last column of Table 2.1 shows changes between 1985 and 2010. To
repeat, the observed log wage gap shrunk by 8.42 log points. In turn, the de-
crease in the wage gap predicted by changing occupational employment as well
as changing occupational wages amounts to 8.37 points coming very close to
the observed decline. This implies that the overwhelming majority of the closing
of the gap can be attributed to either converging occupational employment of
men and women (composition effect) or to relative wage increases of occupa-
tions which are important for female employment (wage structure effect). As
a first pass, to distinguish the influence of the wage structure effect from the
composition effect, Table 2.1 also shows the change in the wage gap predicted
by a regression of wages on occupation dummies alone. The result of that exer-
cise is informative about the influence of changes in occupational segregation,
i.e. the composition effect. The predicted decline in the wage gap amounts to
6.05 log points which is substantial compared to the overall decrease.
In turn, the difference between the two predicted declines is informative
about the wage structure effect. The comparably small magnitude of 8.37 -
6.05 = 2.32 log points might, however, underestimate the influence of changing
skill prices as workers in occupations are a self selected group. Section 2.3
makes this more formal. Before that, I will provide some more information on
differences in employment between the sexes as well as information on how wage
and employment gaps evolve over the life cycle.
Panel B of Table 2.1 shows level and changes of a segregation index originally
proposed by Duncan and Duncan (1955). The index ranges between zero and
one:
Duncan index = 12
∑
k
|Pt(k|m)− Pt(k|f)| (2.1)
Pt(k|g) denotes the share of employment in occupation k at time t for gender
g. This index is zero if the share of men and women in every occupation equals
the share of men and women in the overall working population and hence there
is no segregation. In turn, the Duncan index is one if men and women work in
completely distinct occupations.
In 1985, the Duncan index amounted to 61%.6 The interpretation of this
number is that 61% of men or women would have to switch occupations for the
occupational employment distribution to be the same across sexes. Until 2010,
6Cortes and Pan (2018, Fig. 18.1, p.427) compute an index of roughly 56% in 1985 for
the US with a continuous decline to 51% in 2009.
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the index decreased by 6%. There are two possible reasons for this decrease
in segregation as noted by Fuchs (1975) and Blau, Brummund, et al. (2013).
First, the aggregate size of previously large, male dominated occupations might
have declined over time. In fact, when holding the proportion of women within
occupations constant, I find that roughly 3% out of 6% are attributable to this
aggregate change in occupation structure. This is mainly because of shrinking
manufacturing occupations with large shares of men. Second, the proportion of
women increased in occupations which once exhibited small female proportions.
Panel C in Table 2.1 shows that this primarily happened within high wage
managerial and professional occupations in which the share of women increased
by roughly 14 and 10 percentage points. In addition, the proportion of women
in service occupations declined over time so that more than 50% of (full-time)
service workers today are men compared to only 42% in 1985.
Table 2.2: Wage and employment gaps when including part-time workers
Level Difference
1985 1993 - 1985 2001 - 1993 2010 - 2001 2010 - 1985
Panel A
Observed wage gap 59.09 -4.48 -3.57 0.27 -7.79
Pred. gap, occupation × year 31.59 -3.82 -3.98 -0.38 -8.17
Pred. gap, occupation 30.41 -3.04 -3.08 -1.69 -7.81
Panel B
Duncan index 63.58 -1.95 -3.19 -1.65 -6.79
Occupation mix effect -1.56 -1.61 -1.18 -4.36
Panel C
Proportion of women
Mgr 19.22 7.21 5.59 3.75 16.55
Prof 26.63 6.04 3.96 5.07 15.07
Tech 12.58 5.13 0.95 1.16 7.24
Sales 53.26 4.67 -0.58 0.81 4.90
Office 71.78 2.87 -2.81 -1.14 -1.08
Prod 19.17 -0.36 -1.84 -2.78 -4.97
Op 15.74 1.41 0.05 1.20 2.66
Crafts 12.49 -0.80 -0.99 -0.60 -2.38
Srvc 71.78 -1.48 -3.86 -1.73 -7.07
Care 88.05 1.77 -0.93 0.39 1.22
Notes: Panel A shows log wages of men minus log wages of women for three different wage measures:
observed wages, predicted wages from a regression of wages on 120 occupation dummies interacted
with year dummies as well as predictions from a regression of wages on occupation dummies only.
Panel B shows the Duncan index computed as in Equation (2.1). Occupation mix effect refers to
the change in the Duncan index attributable to economy wide changes in occupation sizes, see Blau,
Brummund, et al. (2013) for the details. Panel C shows the proportion of women within professions:
Mgr: managers; Prof: professions; Tech: technicians; Prod: production; Op: Operators; Crafts:
craftsmen; Srvc: services. Classification of detailed occupations follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011),
see Böhm et al. (2019) for the exact mapping. Values ×100. Full-time and part-time working 25-54
year old German men and women. The wage of a part-time worker is not adjusted for hours. Instead,
the wage refers to a working day as is also the case for full-time workers.
As the number of part time workers has increased a lot in Germany over
the last decades, Table 2.2 repeats the exercise including part-time workers. As
the SIAB data do not contain any information on the exact number of hours, I
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cannot adjust wages for working times. Instead, the wage of a part-time worker
also refers to the daily wage. Therefore, it will also be lower than the wage of
full time workers because of lower hours worked (see Section 2.2.1).
The level of the wage gap becomes substantially larger when including part-
time workers. It rises from a baseline of 44 log points to 59 log points in 1985
since working part time is much more common for women. The part of the
gap explained by differences in occupations becomes disproportionately larger
as well, however, increasing to 32 log points compared to 20 log points in the
full-time sample. Additionally, both the change in the observed gap as well as
the change in the predicted gap are very similar to the decline of the wage gap
when excluding part-time workers. Hence, not only for the subsample of full-
time workers, changes in occupational demand and supply seem to have reduced
the gender wage gap; but these changes also seem to have been important for
the relative wage changes of part-time working women.
2.2.3 Life Cycle Employment and Wage Profiles
The average gender wage gap masks substantial heterogeneity between cohorts
as well as over the life cycle. Figure 2.1a shows the evolution of the wage gap
by age for several cohorts.7 Starting at low levels ranging between 10 and 26
log points at age 25, the wage gap roughly doubles for every given cohort in
the sample with the highest gaps observed between ages 35–40; a point in the
life cycle where average male wages are between 41 and 54 log points higher
than average female wages. The shape of the life cycle profiles seems not to
have changed much between the cohorts except for the intercept continuously
declining. Hence, most of the decline in the wage gap is due to between cohort
effects whereas most of the level of the wage gap is best explained by sources
happening within cohorts.8
Figure 2.1b plots the predicted wage gap for different cohorts from a regres-
sion of log wages on occupation times year dummies as shown in Table 2.1. The
shape of the wage gap profiles becomes rather flat. This implies that changes in
the occupational structure (over time) are not very informative about the rising
wage gap over the life cycle. For instance, women always might have switched
to lower ranked occupations after giving birth; but this behavior was the same
in 1985 as it was in 2010 (similar to the findings in Kleven et al., 2018). Nev-
ertheless, the predicted values match the observed decline in the intercepts and
therefore the overall decline of the wage gap very well.
One important reason for this has been the changing female occupation
distribution – at least at the start of women’s working life cycle. Figure 2.2
7See Appendix Figure 2.4 for the results including part-time workers.
8Notice that this is fully consistent with Kleven et al. (2018, p. 1) who find that the child
penalty has not changed over time despite diminishing gender inequality: “we provide a simple
explanation for the persistence of gender inequality: the effects of children on the careers of
women relative to men are large and have not fallen over time”.
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Figure 2.1: Wage gap by cohort
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(b) Pred. by occupation × year dummies
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Notes: Figure 2.1a shows log wages of men minus log wages of women by cohort and age. Figure 2.1b
repeats this but uses the predictions from a regression of log wages on occupation times year dummies
to calculate the wage gap. Full-time working 25-54 year old West German men and women.
shows the proportions of women in two high wage occupation groups, managers
and professionals, for different cohorts. There is a striking rise in the share
of women at the beginning of a cohort’s life cycle over time. Whereas the
share of women in managerial occupations was 40% for the 1945–1955 born,
this proportion increased up to 68% for the cohorts born after 1965. A similar
increase, though smaller, is observable for professional occupations. As cohorts
age, however, the proportion of women drops significantly to around 15 – 25%.
In part, this reflects decreasing female labor participation in fertile ages: the
overall proportion of full-time working women shrinks from around 46% at age
25 to 30% after age 35. Nevertheless, the decrease of the proportion of women
is much stronger in managerial and professional occupations compared to other
occupations (for related findings see also Kleven et al., 2018). For comparison,
Appendix Figure 2.5 shows the remaining broad profession groups which feature
much less distinct declines.
In summary, most of the decline of the wage gap has taken place between
cohorts as the occupational structure of more recent cohorts is very different
from the structure of older cohorts.
2.2.4 Distinguishing Changes in Average Wages from Changing
Skill Prices
In the next section, I will decompose the changing wage gap into changes in
the returns to skill, changes in skill selection, and changes in employment. In
this section, I will highlight why it might be important to explicitly distinguish
changes in average wages and changes in skill prices from each other.
Several authors starting with Goldin (1990), Welch (2000), and Weinberg
(2000) have noted that advances in technology over the last few decades should
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Figure 2.2: Proportion of women in professions by cohort
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(b) Professional occupations
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Notes: Classification of detailed occupations follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011), see Böhm et al.
(2019) for the exact mapping. Full-time working 25-54 year old West German men and women.
have been beneficial for female labor market outcomes. For instance, Welch
(2000, p. 1) argues: “In any case, if women are relatively intensive in intellectual
skills and the value of such skills increase, then women’s wages will increase
relative to men’s”.
To estimate the impact of changing returns to skill on the change of the
gender wage gap ∆[w¯mt − w¯ft ], with ∆ denoting changes between t and t− x,
most of the recent literature has typically decomposed changes in the gap into
a part explained by the changing employment composition of men and women
(or other observables), a part explained by differential changes in wage returns
to occupations, and a residual part describing differences in male and female
wages within occupations:
∆[w¯mt − w¯ft ] = ∆[ ¯ˆwmt − ¯ˆwft ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
between occupations
+ ∆[¯ˆemt − ¯ˆeft ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
within occupations
(2.2)
=
K∑
k=1
∆ ¯ˆwk,t[pmk,t − pfk,t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
wage structure effect
+
K∑
k=1
¯ˆwk,t−x[∆pmk,t −∆pfk,t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
composition effect
(2.3)
+ ∆[¯ˆemt − ¯ˆeft ]
The wage structure effect holds constant occupational employment shares pgk,t =
P (k|g, t) of men and women over time, and so estimates how the overall gap
would have changed, had only average wages ¯ˆwk,t changed. In contrast, the
composition effect holds constant average wages at a given time point to com-
pute how the gap would have changed, had only the distribution of men and
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women across occupations changed.9
Typically, the literature has found modest results for the wage structure ef-
fect and large composition effects. For instance, Bacolod and Blum (2010) find
that only 20% percent of the narrowing US gender wage gap can be explained
by changing wage returns. The opposite is true for work by Yamaguchi (2018),
however, who finds that changes in the returns to motor skills were most impor-
tant for the decline in the US wage gap. The main reason for the difference is
that Yamaguchi (2018) allows average wages to also change because of chang-
ing skills motivated by Roy (1951): if the price paid for a task increases, workers
will self select into performing more of that task; even if they are endowed with
less skills in that task than in their origin occupation. Hence, wage returns might
not necessarily reflect how skill prices change over time depending on workers’
selection response. Therefore, estimates of the impact of changing skill prices
may be heavily biased when (selection confounded) changes in average wages
are used as a proxy for changes in skill prices.
Figure 2.3: Correlating employment, wage, and skill price changes
(a) Average wage changes (b) Skill price changes
Notes: The vertical axis in Figure 2.3a shows the change in average log wages between 1985 and
2010. The vertical axis in Figure 2.3b shows the change in selection corrected skill prices between
1985 and 2010. Results are taken from Böhm et al. (2019). The horizontal axes depict the change in
log employment between 1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of the 120 detailed occupations
in the SIAB SUF. The four groups show an aggregation of these detailed occupations. Classification of
detailed occupations follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011), see Böhm et al. (2019) for the exact mapping.
Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed men and women in an occupation averaged across
years 1985 until 2010. The regression line is weighted by bubble size. Full-time working 25-54 year old
West German men and women.
In line with that, Böhm et al. (2019) show that occupational wage and
employment changes are essentially uncorrelated for both men and women in
Germany. This raises serious doubts about the equivalence between changes in
9Notice that the point in time (i.e., t or t − x), at which wages or employment are held
constant, is arbitrary in these types of decompositions. For that, in practice, I follow Neumark
(1988) and use an average decomposition where I take both t − x and t as base years and
then average the results from the two decompositions. This does not substantially affect the
magnitude of the estimates.
2.3. IMPACT OF CHANGING SKILL RETURNS ON THE GENDERWAGE GAP167
skill prices and changes in average wages. Figure 2.3a shows that the coefficient
from a regression of average wage changes between 1985 and 2010 on log
employment changes is β = −0.02 with a p-value of 0.35. This non-correlation
might be due to large selection effects taking place in the labor market which
offset changing skill returns within a Roy model setup (see also Hsieh et al.,
2019).
In fact, when holding constant the skill distribution over time, selection cor-
rected skill prices ∆pˆik,t and employment are highly correlated. The regression
coefficient is β = 0.09 (p− value < 0.01).10
According to the Roy framework in Böhm et al. (2019), the difference be-
tween average wage changes and skill price changes is attributed to changes in
average skills ∆¯ˆsk,t which counteract the changing skill prices because of worker
self selection:
∆ ¯ˆwk,t = ∆pˆik,t + ∆¯ˆsk,t (2.4)
Hence, it might be very important to distinguish wage changes that occur be-
cause of changing skill prices from wage changes which appear because of a
changing skill selection for the estimation of the wage structure effect. For
instance, such an exercise is informative about the question: did the gap close
because workers became more skilled over time in occupations important for
female employment; or did the gap close because of rising returns to skill within
occupations important for female employment? Only the latter effect would be
informative about the role of demand changes for the declining gender wage
gap. The next section investigates this in more detail.
2.3 Impact of Changing Skill Returns on the Gender
Wage Gap
The previous section showed that most of the decline in the German gender
wage gap is explained by changes in the occupational structure between men
and women. One the one hand, the proportion of women employed in high wage
occupations increased substantially over time. On the other hand, changes in
average wages were also beneficial for women’s wages compared to men. The lit-
erature has attributed a changing occupational wage structure to shifts in labor
demand moving away from male dominated occupations which require physical
strength and so are less suited for women (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). How-
ever, changes in average wages not only reflect the influence of changing skill
prices; but they also reflect how the quality of workers within these occupations
10The variation in the data causing the positive relationship between employment and skill
price growth comes from growing occupations having accelerating individual wage growth
relative to a base period. A difference between average individual wage growth and changes
in average wages partly arises because of the mechanically large number of workers entering
growing occupations as well as low wages of these entrants relative to incumbents.
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changes due to supply effects (Roy, 1951). This section explicitly separates
these two explanatory approaches to get a more comprehensive estimate for the
influence of changing skill prices on the declining gender wage gap.
2.3.1 Decomposition of the Average Gender Wage Gap
In the Roy type framework of Böhm et al. (2019), average wages either change
because of changing skill prices or because of changing skills workers possess.
This allows me to rewrite the wage structure effect of Equation (2.4) as:
K∑
k=1
∆ ¯ˆwk,t[pmk,t − pfk,t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
wage structure effect
=
K∑
k=1
∆pˆi>0k,t [pmk,t − pfk,t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
growing prices
+
K∑
k=1
∆pˆi≤0k,t [p
m
k,t − pfk,t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
declining prices
(2.5)
+
K∑
k=1
∆¯ˆsk,t[pmk,t − pfk,t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
skill changes
Table 2.3 shows the results of this decomposition. As already noted before, the
between occupation gap declined by 8.37 log points between 1985 and 2010.
Roughly 65% of this between effect can be explained by changes in occupational
employment whereas 35% can be attributed to changes in average occupational
wages.
However, the overall wage structure effect differs from the effect due to
changing skill prices; and therefore differs from the causal effect of changing
skill prices. In fact, decreasing prices in some occupations contributed the
greatest part to the decline inducing the gender wage gap to decrease by minus
three log points. The main cause for this are declining prices in crafts and
production occupations. See Appendix Table 2.5 which breaks up the impact
of changing prices by broad profession group. Rising prices, in turn, contributed
another one log point to the decline mostly because of growing prices in sales
and office occupations with large proportions of women. Hence, the causal
effect of changing skill prices on the the decline in the gender wage gap was
13% larger than the raw wage structure effect.
The reason for this is that changing skills of men and women increased
the gender wage gap in the aggregate thereby mitigating the wage structure
effect. Improving male skills in production and crafts occupations were mostly
responsible for this effect (see Appendix Table 2.5). This is in line with the
strong positive selection effects in declining occupations found by Böhm et al.
(2019).11
11Appendix Table 2.6 repeats the analysis including part-time workers. The inclusion does
not change the results qualitatively but the skill change estimate rises up to an overall effect of
3.44 log points between 1985 and 2010. The reason for this is the increasing number of female
part-time workers with lower wages than full time workers. Notice that the decomposition
attributes these lower wages to lower skills although differences in wages between part-time
and full-time workers also reflect differences in hours because the wage measure in the SIAB
refers to the daily, not hourly, wage.
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Table 2.3: Effect of changing skill prices on gender wage inequality
Level Difference
1985 1993 - 1985 2001 - 1993 2010 - 2001 2010 - 1985
Panel A
Observed gap 44.24 -4.66 -2.41 -1.34 -8.42
Pred. gap, occupation × year 20.45 -3.73 -3.13 -1.50 -8.37
Panel B
Wage structure effect -1.44 -0.97 -0.55 -2.96
Growing prices -1.47 0.23 0.21 -1.03
Declining prices -3.49 0.35 0.14 -3.01
Skill changes 3.52 -1.54 -0.89 1.08
Composition effect -2.29 -2.17 -0.95 -5.41
Panel C
Within occupation gap 23.79 -0.93 0.72 0.16 -0.06
∆pmk,t > ∆p
f
k,t -1.38 -0.67 -0.75 -2.80
∆pmk,t ≤ ∆pfk,t 0.45 1.39 0.91 2.74
Notes: Panel A shows log wages of men minus log wages of women for two different wage measures:
observed wages and predicted wages from a regression of wages on 120 occupation dummies interacted
with year dummies, i.e. the between occupation gap in Equation (2.2). Panel B shows the separate
parts of Equation (2.5) as well as the composition effect described in Equation (2.4). Panel C presents
the results from decomposing the change in the within occupation gap following Equation (2.6). Values
×100. Full-time working 25-54 year old West German men and women.
The long term effects mask variation between different episodes, however,
with the largest effects taking place between 1985 and 1993. In fact, changes
in skill prices were only beneficial for women’s relative wages in that period but
became small and even harmful for a decline in the wage gap afterwards. The
opposite is true for skill changes which raised the wage gap between 1985 and
1993. This is also the time in which female labor force participation increased
most. In fact, the share of women in the labor force rose by 3 percentage
points during that episode. Hence, an explanation for the declining relative
female skills could be the comparably large amount of new female labor market
entrants with little experience.
Interestingly, similar timing results were found by Yamaguchi (2018, Table
12, p. 62) for the US: the return to motor skills declined up to 2000 inducing
male and female wages to converge on average. After 2000, motor skill returns
stayed roughly constant with no further effect on the gender wage gap. In
contrast, changes in women’s cognitive skills only had a small impact on the
gap during 1980 – 1990 but induced a convergence of male and female wages
after 2000.
In the last step, I decompose changes in the within wage gap (i.e., the
unexplained part) further. I distinguish occupations in which male occupation
shares Pt(k|m) increased more than female occupation shares Pt(k|f). This
separates occupations which became more important for male employment over
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time from occupations which became more important for female employment:
∆[¯ˆemt − ¯ˆeft ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
within gap
=
K∑
k=1
∆[¯ˆemt − ¯ˆeft ]1(∆pmk,t > ∆pfk,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
becoming more important for men
(2.6)
+
K∑
k=1
∆[¯ˆemt − ¯ˆeft ]1(∆pmk,t ≤ ∆pfk,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
becoming more important for women
Interestingly, the small overall residual effect of -0.06 log points hides that there
have been converging wages between the sexes within occupations that became
more important for male relative to female employment (∆pmk,t > ∆p
f
k,t). This
effect is substantial contributing -2.80 log points to the declining gap and, hence,
comparable in magnitude to the overall wage structure effect. In contrast, how-
ever, male and female wages diverged by 2.74 log points within occupations
which became more important for female employment over time. The bottom
panel in Appendix Table 2.5 shows that male and female wages especially di-
verged in professional occupations contributing 1.44 log points to a growing
gender wage gap whereas wages converged most within producing occupations
leading to a decline of the wage gap by 2.29 log points. A possible explanation
for this could be skill selection effects similar to the findings in Böhm et al.
(2019). If many more women than men enter an occupation over time, they
are likely to be less skilled than the incumbents partly because entrants are
typically younger and therefore less skilled. The opposite effect might be true
for occupations in which female employment declined more over time than male
employment, with only the most skilled women remaining.
2.3.2 Proportion of Women Along the Wage Distribution
The influence of changing skill prices and changing occupational employment
might be very different along the wage distribution. Whereas changing prices
may be important for the decline in the average wage gap, the gap at the top or
bottom of the wage distribution might be completely unaffected; for instance,
because the distribution of occupational employment is very different at low and
high wage percentiles; with workers in professional and managerial occupations
at the top and workers in producing occupations located at middle and low
percentiles (see Appendix Figure 2.6). For this reason, Table 2.4 decomposes
the proportion of women at different percentiles of the combined male and
female wage distribution into skill price and composition effects.
In total, the share of women in the full-time working labor force aged 25–
54 increased from 30.4% in 1985 to 33.42% in 2010. Essentially, all of this
rise took place during 1985–1993. The share of women differs strongly across
different parts of the wage distribution, however. Whereas only 11.85% of
workers at the 85th percentile were women in 1985, the proportion was 60.87%
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Table 2.4: Decomposition of proportion of women by percentile
Level Difference
1985 1993 - 1985 2001 - 1993 2010 - 2001 2010 - 1985
Proportion of women in sample 30.40 3.37 -0.48 0.13 3.02
Panel A
Proportion of women at 85th percentile 11.85 5.60 1.88 0.83 8.30
Scenarios relative to observed proportion
∆pˆik,t = 0 -2.57 0.48 0.48 -1.61
∆¯ˆsk,t = 0 0.67 0.22 0.68 1.57
Rewgt. occupations -0.71 0.61 -0.87 -0.97
Rewgt. occupations + ∆pˆik,t = 0 -2.62 -2.01 -0.01 -4.64
Panel B
Proportion of women at 50th percentile 20.10 4.96 1.90 3.83 10.68
Scenarios relative to observed proportion
∆pˆik,t = 0 0.76 -0.40 -1.16 -0.80
∆¯ˆsk,t = 0 -0.23 1.95 -3.29 -1.58
Rewgt. occupations -1.87 -0.81 0.62 -2.06
Rewgt. occupations + ∆pˆik,t = 0 0.33 -1.29 -1.10 -2.07
Panel C
Proportion of women at 15th percentile 60.87 -3.95 -4.49 -2.65 -11.10
Scenarios relative to observed proportion
∆pˆik,t = 0 5.31 -2.92 -0.70 1.70
∆¯ˆsk,t = 0 3.35 -3.53 -1.94 -2.12
Rewgt. occupations 3.96 1.44 -3.12 2.28
Rewgt. occupations + ∆pˆik,t = 0 8.06 -0.37 -1.13 6.55
Notes: The panels show the proportion of women in 0.5% bins around the 85th, 50th, and 15th per-
centile of the combined male and female wage distribution. The scenarios show counterfactual changes
in proportions of women by percentile relative to the observed change. Hence, adding the observed
change to the relative counterfactual numbers gives the counterfactual change in the proportion of
women by percentile. The scenarios are as follows: pˆik,t = 0: subtract price growth between t and 1985
from wages observed in t; ¯ˆsk,t = 0: subtract average occupational skill growth between t and 1985
from wages observed in t; Rewgt. occupations: reweight occupations in t to match the occupation
structure of 1985; Rewgt. occupations + pˆik,t = 0: reweight occupations in t to match the occupation
structure of 1985, additionally subtract price growth between t and 1985 from wages observed in t.
Values ×100. Full-time working 25-54 year old West German men and women.
at the 15th percentile. Hence, women were both underrepresented at the top
as well as overrepresented at the bottom of the wage distribution; compared
to their overall representation in the work force. Over time, male and female
wages converged because of both a rising share of women at the 85th percentile
amounting to 20.15% in 2010 as well as a declining share at the 15th percentile
resulting in a proportion of 49.77% in 2010. The share of women at the median
was 20.10% in 1985 and increased over time up to 30.78%; so that by 2010, the
representation of women at the median was almost equal to the representation
of women in the overall sample.
To investigate the importance of changing prices on the change in female
proportions by percentile, I perform the following exercise: take wages in year
t and subtract the estimated change in skill prices between 1985 and t. Then,
recalculate the proportion of women in this counterfactual wage distribution.
The results show that without skill prices having changed and everything
else equal, the share of women at the 85th percentile in 2010 would have been
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1.61 percentage points lower than observed as well as 1.7 percentage points
higher at the 15th percentile.12 This shows that changing prices led to less
gender inequality across the distribution although the effects are modest. The
women benefiting price changes were partly offset by changing skills as shown
before for changes in the average gender wage gap. The scenario ¯ˆsk,t = 0
shows the results when deducting average skill growth in occupation k between
1985 and t from wages observed in t. In fact, if skills had not changed, the
proportion of women at the 85th percentile would have been 1.57 percentage
points higher than observed. Roughly 40% of this dampening effect took place
during 1985–1993 consistent with the large increase of inexperienced women
into the labor force during that time. In line, the share of women at the 15th
percentile would have declined by 2.12 percentage points more than observed if
skills had not changed. Changing skills therefore contributed to a rise in gender
wage inequality in all parts of the wage distribution. Hence, this effect has
partly offset the women benefiting skill price changes.
Next, I investigate the influence of changing occupational employment for
the proportion of women along the wage distribution. For that, I reweight
observations following DiNardo et al. (1996) to estimate how the shares of
women by percentile would have looked like if the occupational distribution of
both men and women had not changed over time. The proportion of women
would have been lower at the 85th percentile (0.97 percentage points) and higher
at the 15th percentile (2.28 percentage points) if occupational employment
patterns had not changed. This is mainly because women increasingly started
to move into high wage occupations over time.
Last, I combine the experiments on skill price changes and employment
changes by reweighting the skill price deducted wages to match the 1985 em-
ployment composition of men and women. This exercise shows that the propor-
tion of women at the 85th percentile would have been 4.64 percentage points
lower in 2010 whereas the share at the 15th percentile would have been 6.55
percentage points higher. Compared to an overall increase of the female share
of 8.30 percentage points at the 85th percentile and a decrease of 11.10 points
at the 15th percentile, the influence of the combination of changing employment
and changing skill prices seems substantial, therefore. In summary, if skill prices
and employment had not changed over the years, the proportion of women at
the 85th percentile would have risen by 50% less compared to the observed in-
crease. In line with that, the share of women at the 15th percentile would have
declined by 55% less. Hence, changing skill prices and changing occupational
employment patterns led to a decrease in gender wage inequality in both the
upper and lower part of the wage distribution.
12Of course, a different evolution of skill prices would also have induced a different selection
of men and women into the labor force and into occupations. In this paper, I abstract from
that possibility. See Hsieh et al. (2019) for a structural approach which incorporates general
equilibrium responses.
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2.4 Conclusion
Starting in the 1980s, gender wage inequality has decreased in almost all de-
veloped countries (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2016; Blau and Kahn, 2017). This
paper has revisited the old question as to what extent changes in returns to oc-
cupational skill as well as changes in the occupational employment distribution
were responsible for declining inequality between men and women.
In a first step, I found that almost the complete decrease of the gender wage
gap can be attributed to changes in both occupational wages and the movement
of women into high wage, managerial, and professional occupations. A simple
decomposition into wage and composition effects showed that roughly 35% of
the declining wage gap are explained by changing average occupational wages;
with the remaining 65% being explained by changing employment patterns be-
tween the genders.
In the next step, I then made use of estimates for selection corrected skill
price changes which hold constant the shifting skill composition by occupa-
tion over time. This accounts for the fact that the skill of the average worker
in an occupation is endogenous to changing skill prices (Böhm et al., 2019);
and hence, changes in average wages (wage structure effect) do not reflect the
causal influence of changing prices on movements in the gender wage gap. De-
composing the wage structure effect further by means of these quality adjusted
wages showed that women’s wages profited both from declining prices in manu-
facturing occupations (employing large shares of the male workforce) as well as
rising prices in sales and office occupations which are important for the female
employment distribution.
Overall, changes in average skill by gender contributed to an increase of the
wage gap during the last half of the 1980s and early 1990s. The main reason for
that is the large rise in female labor force participation during that time, coming
in hand with many inexperienced women entering the labor market. Changes
in skill prices, in contrast, were beneficial for women’s relative wages in the late
1980s. This trend reversed after mid 1990 in line with the findings of Yamaguchi
(2018). In summary, I found that the effect attributed to changes in average
wages is smaller than the causal effect that can be explained by changing skill
prices. Therefore, the response of workers’ skills to changing skill returns might
have been the reason for the small (or even negative) wage structure effects in
much of the previous literature concerned with explanations for why the gender
wage gap declined (e.g., Blau and Kahn, 1997; Bacolod and Blum, 2010).
After having shown the importance of changes in skill returns as well as male
and female occupational choices, an interesting topic for future research would
be the question about why women increasingly started to move into professional
and managerial occupations over time. Reasons for this could be occupation
dependent changes in demand for female work and expanding possibilities to
work part-time (Heathcote et al., 2010), lower frictions with respect to oc-
cupational choice including discrimination (Hsieh et al., 2019), or supply side
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changes that made it possible for women to work longer hours; for instance,
because of changes in fertility over time (Bailey et al., 2012; Cortés and Pan,
2019; Wasserman, 2019). In addition, investigating why male and female wages
converged in only some (mostly low paying) but not all occupations would be
important to understand why the level of gender wage inequality is still large
and persistent with convergence having ceased since the early 2000s (Goldin,
2014; Goldin and Katz, 2016). The finding that gender inequality increased in
occupations which became more important for female employment than male
employment is suggestive that selection effects might also be important in that
respect.
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Table 2.5: Gender wage gap decomposition by professions
Level Difference
1985 1993 - 1985 2001 - 1993 2010 - 2001 2010 - 1985
Observed gap 44.24 -4.66 -2.41 -1.34 -8.42
Pred. gap, occupation × year 20.45 -3.73 -3.13 -1.50 -8.37
Price structure -4.96 0.57 0.35 -4.04
Mgr 0.10 -0.05 -0.02 0.03
Prof 1.25 -0.06 -0.21 0.97
Tech -0.16 0.02 0.01 -0.13
Sales -0.69 0.05 0.03 -0.62
Office -3.76 0.27 0.20 -3.29
Prod -0.67 0.00 0.02 -0.65
Op -0.54 0.02 0.03 -0.49
Crafts -1.73 0.20 0.13 -1.41
Srvc 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.09
Care 1.19 0.08 0.18 1.45
Skill structure 3.52 -1.54 -0.89 1.08
Mgr 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.24
Prof -1.04 0.31 0.52 -0.21
Tech 0.73 0.15 -0.07 0.81
Sales -0.20 -0.27 0.10 -0.37
Office 0.79 -1.18 -0.52 -0.91
Prod 2.07 0.10 -0.07 2.09
Op 1.35 -0.53 -0.98 -0.17
Crafts 3.21 -0.50 -0.77 1.94
Srvc -0.82 0.26 0.45 -0.11
Care -2.66 0.06 0.38 -2.23
Composition effect -2.29 -2.17 -0.95 -5.41
Mgr -5.01 -6.26 -2.31 -13.58
Prof -5.35 -3.68 -12.61 -21.64
Tech -7.43 -3.34 -2.93 -13.70
Sales -7.10 1.98 6.73 1.61
Office 4.65 15.64 16.02 36.31
Prod 12.89 -1.20 4.33 16.02
Op -2.01 1.38 0.82 0.19
Crafts 7.37 -12.56 -9.35 -14.54
Srvc 16.09 12.86 11.60 40.55
Care -16.39 -7.00 -13.25 -36.64
Within occupation gap 23.79 -0.93 0.72 0.16 -0.06
Mgr 0.03 0.20 0.46 0.69
Prof 0.48 0.48 0.48 1.44
Tech 0.11 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05
Sales 0.05 0.03 -0.12 -0.04
Office -0.64 0.62 0.76 0.75
Prod -0.74 -0.55 -0.99 -2.29
Op 0.13 0.11 -0.01 0.22
Crafts -0.14 -0.18 -0.32 -0.64
Srvc -0.27 -0.11 -0.03 -0.41
Care 0.06 0.18 0.03 0.27
Notes: The panels show the results from Equation (2.2) and Equation (2.5) split by profession. Mgr:
managers; Prof: professions; Tech: technicians; Prod: production; Op: Operators; Crafts: craftsmen;
Srvc: services. Classification of detailed occupations follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011), see Böhm
et al. (2019) for the exact mapping. Values ×100. Full-time working 25-54 year old West German
men and women.
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Table 2.6: Average gender wage gap decomposition including part-time workers
Level Difference
1985 1993 - 1985 2001 - 1993 2010 - 2001 2010 - 1985
Panel A
Observed gap 59.09 -4.48 -3.57 0.27 -7.79
Pred. gap, occupation × year 31.59 -3.82 -3.98 -0.38 -8.17
Panel B
Wage structure effect -0.79 -1.05 1.08 -0.76
Growing prices -1.43 0.23 0.23 -0.98
Declining prices -4.06 0.50 0.34 -3.22
Skill changes 4.70 -1.78 0.52 3.44
Composition effect -3.03 -2.93 -1.46 -7.41
Panel C
Within occupation gap 27.51 -0.67 0.40 0.65 0.38
∆pmk,t > ∆p
f
k,t -1.44 -0.83 -0.60 -2.86
∆pmk,t ≤ ∆pfk,t 0.77 1.23 1.24 3.24
Notes: Panel A shows log wages of men minus log wages of women for two different wage measures:
observed wages and predicted wages from a regression of wages on 120 occupation dummies interacted
with year dummies, i.e. the between occupation gap in Equation (2.2). Panel B shows the separate
parts of Equation (2.5) as well as the composition effect described in Equation (2.4). Panel C presents
the results from decomposing the change in the within occupation gap following Equation (2.6). Values
×100. Full-time and part-time working 25-54 year old German men and women. The wage of a part-
time worker is not adjusted for hours. Instead, the wage refers to a working day as is also the case for
full-time workers.
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Figure 2.4: Wage gap by cohort including part-time workers
(a) Observed
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(b) Pred. by occupation × year dummies
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Notes: Figure 2.4a shows log wages of men minus log wages of women by cohort and age. Figure 2.4b
repeats this but uses the predictions from a regression of log wages on occupation times year dummies
to calculate the wage gap. Full-time and part-time working 25-54 year old German men and women.
The wage of a part-time worker is not adjusted for hours. Instead, the wage refers to a working day
as is also the case for full-time workers.
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Figure 2.5: Proportion of women in professions by cohort
(a) Technicians
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(b) Sales
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(c) Office
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(d) Production
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Notes: Classification of detailed occupations follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011), see Böhm et al.
(2019) for the exact mapping. Full-time working 25-54 year old West German men and women.
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Figure 2.5: Proportion of women in professions by cohort
(e) Operators
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(f) Craftsmen
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(g) Service
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(h) Care
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Notes: Classification of detailed occupations follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011), see Böhm et al.
(2019) for the exact mapping. Full-time working 25-54 year old West German men and women.
Figure 2.6: Profession × gender combinations along the wage distribution
(a) 1985
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(b) 2010
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Notes: Each rectangle is proportional to the share of workers in the respective occupation times gender
bin. Wage distribution refers to the combined male and female wage distribution. Mgr: managers;
Prof: professions; Tech: technicians; Prod: production; Op: Operators; Crafts: craftsmen; Srvc:
services. Classification of detailed occupations follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011), see Böhm et al.
(2019) for the exact mapping. Full-time working 25-54 year old West German men and women.
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Chapter 3
Locational Choice and Spatial
Wage Inequality
3.1 Introduction
Inequality in developed countries has increased substantially over the last decades
(Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). One important factor contributing to this trend
are increasing spatial disparities between booming and declining areas like San
Francisco and Detroit in the US or Munich and Essen in Germany (Blanchard
and Katz, 1992; Moretti, 2012; Dauth, Findeisen, Moretti, et al., 2019). In fact,
these growing disparities have led many countries to implement “place based
policies” aimed at reducing regional wage inequality (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008;
Kline and Moretti, 2014). The reasons for why wages and employment in some
areas are rising while shrinking in others are not yet fully understood, however.
Germany is no exception with respect to large heterogeneity in wage and
employment growth across space. While real wages of prime age men in Ger-
many rose by around 10 log points between 1985 and 2010 on average, this
wage growth was very unevenly distributed geographically.1 Figure 3.1a shows
average log wages of 182 distinct German local labor markets relative to 1985.
Wages in Southern German local labor markets increased by up to 28 log points
but much less so in northern regions – irrespective of being rural or urban. On
average, southern wages grew by roughly 16 log points and by only 7 log points
in the north. The same pattern is to be found in Figure 3.1b with respect to
changes in regional employment. Employment increased in Southern Germany
and decreased in the north.
1One may view it also as a consequence of these diverging trends that the German gov-
ernment has appointed a commission on “equitable living conditions” in 2018. The aim of
this commission is to provide recommendations for achieving spatial convergence in factors
ranging from local debt and employment opportunities to infrastructure, public services and
social cohesion. The federal state of Bavaria has even made it the state’s obligation to ensure
equitable living standards across rural and urban places by incorporating that obligation into
its constitution.
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Figure 3.1: Changes in employment and wages across West German regions
(a) Wage changes over time (b) Employment changes over time
Notes: Figure 3.1a shows the change in average log wages within local labor markets over time.
Figure 3.1b shows the change in log employment. Shaded lines in the background represent 182 West
German detailed local labor markets. The four groups show a classification of local labor markets into
northern and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located
in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban
is based on BBSR (2014). The thickness of a shaded background line corresponds to the number of
employed workers in a local labor market averaged across years 1985 until 2010.
There exist many potential explanations for this but the simultaneous rise
in southern wages and employment suggests that demand for workers’ skills
increased relatively more in the south than in the north. Another potential
explanation would be that worker quality rose in Southern Germany; or more
generally, that worker quality rose within regions where employment increased.
This paper attempts to separate these two competing explanations with the aim
to get a more comprehensive answer to the question: are increasing geographical
differences driven by spatial changes in the demand for skill or the supply of skill?
For that, I estimate how regional wage premia paid for a unit of skill have
changed over time in detailed local labor markets by exploiting administrative
panel data with high quality information on workers’ location choices. Impor-
tantly, the employed estimation method allows workers with heterogeneous skills
to self select into local labor markets depending on where they can make the
highest wages and profit from other, non-wage aspects which might influence
their utility in a generalized Roy model framework (Roy, 1951; Dahl, 2002).
This accounts for the fact that differential changes in wages across local labor
markets can either be the result of changes in wage premia paid to all workers
within a local labor market, or be the result of changes in the quality of local
workers.
I adopt a method which originally focused on estimating returns to occupa-
tional skills in the face of worker self selection (Böhm et al., 2019). Therefore, I
exploit accelerations and decelerations of individual workers’ wage growth over
time and by region together with workers’ location decisions to estimate changes
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in local wage premia.2 Intuitively, the estimated wage premium within a region
is rising if workers’ individual wage growth accelerated over time and is declin-
ing vice versa. The estimating equation is derived from an explicit model of
locational choice based on workers’ comparative advantage which allows for a
structural interpretation of the estimates. This is in contrast to more common
fixed effect models (Abowd et al., 1999; Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon, 2008;
Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and Rouxe, 2012; Dauth, Findeisen, Moretti, et
al., 2019). Importantly, identification in the employed method does not rely on
the exogenous mobility assumption (made explicit in Combes, Duranton, and
Gobillon, 2008) and so is largely robust to workers switching location because
of idiosyncratic error realizations. Apart from that, one can easily control for
differences in life cycle skill accumulation profiles across regions (see also the
discussion about the importance of this in Glaeser, 1999; Wheeler, 2006; De la
Roca and Puga, 2017).
By exploiting the conditional wage growth of regional movers, I am also able
to control and estimate how other, non-wage aspects like local amenities have
differentially changed over time. The idea for this is that (conditional) average
wage growth associated with switching from a southern region to a northern
region should be relatively high if amenities in the north are low. Wage growth
then serves as a compensating differential (Rosen, 1986; Roback, 1988; Sorkin,
2018).
I find that local labor markets with growing employment did not feature
rising wage premia. This conflicts with the fact that wages in growing regions
increased more than in regions where employment declined. It suggests that the
simultaneous rise in southern wages and employment is rather due to sorting
of high skilled workers into the south than due to increasing southern demand.
In fact, the residual between growth in average wages and changes in (quality
adjusted) wage premia is informative about changes in worker quality within the
model framework. I find that the quality of workers rose more in regions with
growing employment, i.e. Southern Germany. Put differently, this suggests that
regions with expanding employment exhibit positive skill selection.3
There exist several potential explanations for the positive correlation be-
tween worker quality changes and employment growth which are independent
of the model. First, shifts in observables such as the occupation, education and
industry structure might have been different between rising and deteriorating re-
gions (Findeisen and Südekum, 2008). Second, increases in employment density
might have raised agglomeration economies making workers and firms become
2See Wheaton (1979) and Blanchard and Katz (1992) for early papers which attempt to
identify the role of regional supply and demand shocks from local employment growth and
wages.
3This is in strong contrast to the findings in Böhm et al. (2019) regarding occupational
growth. Böhm et al. (2019) find that occupational wage and employment growth are uncor-
related because of selection effects in Germany. This is similar to findings for the US by Hsieh
et al. (2019).
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more productive in booming regions (Duranton and Puga, 2004). Third, skilled
workers could increasingly sort into high amenity places (Diamond, 2016). I
cannot completely separate these (non-exhaustive) explanations. Instead, I will
focus on the importance of changes in the occupation, education and industry
structure as well as local amenities in greater depth.
I find that regions, in which worker quality improved, also experienced dis-
proportionate increases in the amount of workers employed in managerial, pro-
fessional and technical (high wage, high skill) occupations. Further, growth in
high-skill service and machine building industries as well as growth in the number
of university graduates was larger in these regions. In contrast, worker quality
declined in markets with rising production and manufacturing employment.
To quantify the magnitude of changes in the industry, education and oc-
cupation structure for the correlation between worker quality and employment
changes, I perform a reweighting exercise following DiNardo et al. (1996). I
reweight observations in 1985 by assigning higher weights to occupation-region
(as well as industry-occupation-region and education-region) cells if the number
of workers within such a cell increased over time. Using these weights, I recal-
culate the elasticities between worker quality changes and employment changes.
I find that the elasticities drop substantially when reweighting with occupation
and industry but much less so for education. This underscores the importance of
spatially uneven occupational and industrial change for geographic differences in
wage growth (Duranton, 2007; Findeisen and Südekum, 2008; Südekum, 2008;
Amior and Manning, 2018).
Furthermore, I find that regions with high estimated amenity values have
experienced positive worker quality growth. This is consistent with skilled work-
ers increasingly sorting into areas with high living standards (Diamond, 2016).
As the amenity estimates are somewhat noisy because they are identified from
movers’ wage growth, I additionally collected data on an amenity index reflecting
amenities such as sunshine duration, restaurant and physician density as well as
data on crime rates and the number of students per school. The amenity index
alone is highly predictive of worker quality changes. In line with that, worker
quality also increased in areas with low crime rates as a proxy for disamenities.
When taking all model independent explanatory variables together (i.e. occu-
pation, industry, education and amenity proxies), 59% of the spatial variation
in quality changes can be explained by these observables which is sizable.
In the last step, I use the estimates of changes in wage premia and worker
quality to shed light on the rise in spatial wage inequality: I investigate the
importance of changing worker quality and changing wage premia for the rising
density wage premium; a measure which reflects inequality between rural and
urban places and so is important for overall spatial inequality.
I find that dense areas experienced a larger increase in worker quality con-
sistent with the rising density premium. However, improving worker quality was
completely offset by declining wage premia in heavily populated areas. Instead,
the reason for the rise in the density premium is due to a decline in employment
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of the formerly densest places (industrial places like the Ruhr area) and a con-
temporaneous increase in the density of formerly less populated places (mainly
in rural Bavaria). Together with changes in average wages being unrelated to
1985’s market densities, this has boosted the density wage premium overall.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the related
literature. Section 3.3 shows facts of regional wage dispersion in Germany, and
presents first evidence on workers’ spatial self selection patterns. In Section 3.4,
I lay out the employed method and give some evidence on the appropriateness
of the required identifying assumptions. I describe the results on how wage
premia and worker quality have changed across German local labor markets
in Section 3.5. I also evaluate possible determinants of spatial differences in
worker quality changes in that section. Section 3.6 analyzes reasons for the
rising density wage premium. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Connection to the Existing Literature
This paper is related to several strands in the urban economics literature. First
and foremost, it is related to the literature about spatial sorting of skill across
places and the urban wage premium (Berry and Glaeser, 2005; Moretti, 2013;
Eeckhout et al., 2014; Dauth, Findeisen, Moretti, et al., 2019).
The closest paper in that part of the literature is work by Combes, Duranton,
and Gobillon (2008) who investigate the importance of worker sorting on spatial
wage disparities. Using French panel data from administrative records, they find
that the elasticity of wages with respect to density drops substantially when
including worker fixed effects. They interpret this finding as evidence of sorting
of more skilled workers into denser areas.4
Three major points distinguish their work from this paper. First, Combes,
Duranton, and Gobillon (2008) do not exploit the dynamics of sorting over time.
Instead, they are interested in absolute wage differences between more or less
dense places. Second, their approach requires much stricter assumptions on the
determinants of location decisions. Importantly, they assume that moving deci-
sions must not be based on realizations of idiosyncratic error draws. Although,
the approach taken in this paper strictly needs this assumption as well, Böhm
et al. (2019) show in Monte Carlo analyses that their method is much more
robust to the violation of exogenous mobility. Third, Combes, Duranton, and
Gobillon (2008) remain largely agnostic about the mechanism for the sorting
effect as they do not derive their estimation strategy from an explicit model de-
scribing workers’ decisions. Despite that, they acknowledge that self selection
of workers based on their comparative advantage may be a reason for higher
4In follow up work, Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and Rouxe (2012) then estimate full
distributions of skill in local labor markets and find that dense places are not only more skilled
on average but are also characterized by a higher dispersion of skill consistent with Eeckhout
et al. (2014).
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wages in denser places.
The second part of the literature this paper contributes to, deals with the
importance of dynamic skill accumulation effects for differences in wages be-
tween urban and rural workers (Glaeser, 1999; D’Costa and Overman, 2014).
For example, in contrast to Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008), De la Roca
and Puga (2017) find that workers in cities do not have higher unobserved abil-
ity than other workers initially, but instead accumulate skills at a faster rate
through learning by working in dense places. Workers take the accumulated
skills with them when leaving to less dense places. De la Roca and Puga (2017)
argue that the sorting effect found by Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008)
is rather due to the higher skill accumulation present in cities which leads to
biased fixed effects estimates. Complementary to their work, this paper also
accounts for the importance of spatial differences in skill accumulation. I find
that, indeed, denser places exhibit much steeper skill accumulation profiles.
Third, this paper adds to the literature on the importance of local amenities
for location decisions, urban growth and inequality (Rosen, 1986; Roback, 1988;
Glaeser, Kolko, et al., 2001). For instance, Diamond (2016) investigates the
changing sorting pattern of college and non-college workers in the US based on
wages, housing prices as well as local amenities. She finds that college workers
increasingly concentrate because of differential changes in local demand. This
sorting comes at the cost of higher increases in local rents in skilled areas,
however. In turn, these high rent places also have high amenities to compensate
and attract high skilled workers. In the estimation, I account for the fact that
workers’ location decisions not only depend on potential wages but also depend
on local prices and amenities. In a final step, I exploit correlations between
the estimated amenity values (as well as externally collected amenity data) and
worker quality estimates.
The last part of the related literature deals with the role of spatial changes
in the occupation and industry structure for local employment and wage growth
(Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Duranton, 2007; Dustmann and Glitz, 2015; Amior
and Manning, 2018). With respect to the German case, for instance, Findeisen
and Südekum (2008) evaluate the importance of changes in the local industry
structure as well as human capital for urban growth. In line with them, I also
find that regions, which were able to “reinvent” themselves by adopting to a
changing occupation-industry structure, exhibited rises in worker quality. This
highlights the importance of structural change taking place unevenly across
space (Autor, 2019).
3.3 Spatial Changes in Wages and Employment
3.3.1 Data
For all of the analyses, I make use of the Sample of Integrated Labor Market
Biographies (SIAB) Regional File provided by the IAB Institute at the German
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Federal Employment Agency. The SIAB is a 2% random sample of administra-
tive social security records from 1975 to 2014. It is representative of 80% of the
German workforce and includes employees covered by social security, marginal
part-time employment, benefit receipts, officially registered as job-seeking or
participating in programs of active labor market policy. The SIAB excludes the
self-employed, civil servants, and individuals performing military service. Most
notably, it contains individuals’ full employment histories including detailed data
on wages, place of work, occupation and industry along with socio-demographics
such as age, gender, and the level of education.
Place of work corresponds to the political district (Landkreis) a plant is
located in.5 I map every district (in former West Germany) into one of 182
local labor markets and drop all observations within East German districts. The
classification of local labor markets is based on commuting flows of workers as
described in Kropp and Schwengler (2011) and Dauth, Findeisen, Moretti, et al.
(2019).6 I further aggregate these 182 local labor markets into four categories:
urban - south, urban - north, rural - south, and rural - north. The assignment of
regions to rural and urban markets is based on a classification of BBSR (2014).
Southern regions are located in the federal states of Baden-Wuerttemberg and
Bavaria. Appendix A.1 provides more information on the spatial distribution of
this classification.
I prepare the data in the exact same way as Böhm et al. (2019). Importantly,
I transfer the spell structure into a yearly panel by deleting all spells except for
the longest spell within a year. I stochastically impute wages above the social
security limit (as in Card et al., 2013), and restrict the sample to 25 to 54 year
old German men working full-time in former West Germany between 1975 and
2010.
For some parts of the analysis, I rely on aggregations of detailed occupations,
industries and education. See Appendix A for the details. Appendix A also
contains information on collected amenity data and local price indices.
3.3.2 The Geography of Wage and Employment Changes Across
Germany
German wage inequality has increased a lot during the last few decades (e.g.,
Dustmann, Ludsteck, et al., 2009). An important contributing factor are rising
wage differentials across space (Moretti, 2013; Dauth, Findeisen, Moretti, et
al., 2019). What are the drivers of these increasing spatial differences? Are
5Theoretically, a move between districts can therefore also reflect the move of a plant. This
is very rare in practice, however.
6The number of 182 local labor markets differs from the 204 markets which Dauth, Find-
eisen, Moretti, et al. (2019) use in their main analysis because some rather sparsely populated
districts are aggregated further due to data anonymization in the Scientific Use File I exploit.
Hence, where the mapping is not one to one, I further aggregate these local labor markets
into larger markets. See Ganzer et al. (2017, Table A.9) for the exact aggregation of districts
because of anonymization in the SIAB Scientific Use File.
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they the result of demand having declined in previous industrial clusters like the
Ruhr area; but having increased in Southern Germany where many high tech
firms operate (Findeisen and Südekum, 2008)? Or are these spatial changes
the result of high skilled workers increasingly moving to high amenity areas
(Diamond, 2016)?
Figure 3.2: Relation between employment growth and wage growth
(a) Employment changes and wage changes (b) Average wage changes, 1985 – 2010
Notes: The vertical axis in Figure 3.2a shows the change in average log wages between 1985 and
2010. The horizontal axis depicts the change in log employment between 1985 and 2010. One bubble
represents one of 182 West German local labor markets aggregated from political districts as suggested
by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed workers in a
market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The four groups show a classification of local labor
markets into northern and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas
are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into rural
and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression lines across all areas (black) and within the four broad
groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers. Figure 3.2b plots the change in
average log wages between 1985 and 2010 across Germany. East Germany is left out of the analysis.
Figure 3.2a shows that regional wage and employment changes have been
strongly correlated in West Germany. Rising employment was accompanied by
rising wages: a region with 10% more employment growth experienced 1.4%
more wage growth on average. Geographically, wages primarily grew in Southern
Germany (see Figure 3.2b) and stayed largely constant or even declined in the
north.
There are two distinct explanations for the positive correlation between wage
and employment growth. First, this positive correlation seemingly suggests that
regions with rising employment experienced increases in demand for skill leading
to employment and wage gains. This assessment, however, crucially relies on
the composition of worker quality not having changed over time in response
to the change in demand. This brings me to the second possible explanation:
if the quality of the average worker in a growing region increased much more
than the quality of the average worker in a region with declining employment,
changing supply of skill would be the more important factor for growing wage
disparities.
To separate these explanations, the next section presents a method for es-
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timating how wage premia, paid for a unit of skill, have changed over time and
across space. Crucially, the method will account for the possibility that workers
might self select into regions thereby altering the skill composition (Combes,
Duranton, and Gobillon, 2008, p. 15, footnote 27); and that life cycle skill ac-
cumulation might be different across regions, for instance, because urban places
facilitate learning (Glaeser, 1999; De la Roca and Puga, 2017).
But before that, I will briefly summarize evidence that the positive correlation
between wage and employment growth is rather due to a changing skill com-
position than due to spatial differences in altering wage premia. Appendix B
presents four stylizes facts. It shows correlations between local employment
growth and (1) changes in occupational employment shares, (2) changes in
industrial employment shares, (3) changes in education shares as well as (4) rel-
ative wages of regional entrants.7 These correlations are informative about the
observable types of attracted workers (e.g., high or low skilled) and the types of
jobs workers in growing regions increasingly perform (e.g., service or high-tech).
In total, these stylized facts suggest that growing regions were able to attract
workers of comparably high quality as well as jobs performed in occupations and
industries located in the upper part of the wage distribution.
In fact, the share of workers in managerial, professional and technical (high
wage, high skill) occupations increased much more in growing than in declining
regions (see Appendix B.1). The opposite is true for service and care (low
wage, low skill) occupations whose share decreased in regions with growing
employment. The geography of changes in the share of managerial, professional,
and technical occupation is striking. Despite the number of workers in that
group increased by roughly six percentage points between 1985 and 2010 overall,
this rise almost exclusively took place in Southern Germany.
A similar result applies to changes in industrial employment shares (see Ap-
pendix B.2). I aggregate industries following Bárány and Siegel (2018) into
manufacturing, high-skill services and low-skill services. In addition, I distin-
guish the machine building sector from the remaining manufacturing sectors
because of Germany’s large and increasing number of firms engaged in machine
engineering (Findeisen and Südekum, 2008). In fact, wages within machine
building are the highest across industries and have even increased much more
over time than in high-skill services (21 log points compared to 8 log points). On
average, the share of workers employed in machine engineering firms increased in
growing local labor markets and declined vice versa. In contrast, both high- and
low-skill services primarily grew in regions with declining employment. There-
fore, not only the share of workers employed in high paying occupations rose
within expanding regions over time; but also the share of workers employed in
high paying machine building firms. Similar to the shares of high wage, man-
agerial, professional and technical occupations, most of the local labor markets
with increasing machine building shares were located in rather rural Southern
7Appendix B also shows maps which plot the variation of these variables across space.
192 CHAPTER 3. SPATIAL WAGE INEQUALITY
Germany. This region underwent a dramatic transformation process. It was
formerly “dominated by traditional industries but then developed rapidly over
the 1970s and 1980s to become one of Germany’s leading high-tech states”
(Findeisen and Südekum, 2008, p. 15).
Contrary to that, there is no relation between employment growth and
changes in the share of university graduates (see Appendix B.3). Indeed, nei-
ther the share of university graduates nor the shares of medium or low educated
workers increased differentially between growing and declining regions. The
main reason is that growth in the proportion of university graduates primarily
took place within cities which did not become denser over time. I will come
back to this interesting observation in Section 3.6.
Last, Appendix B.4 shows average wages of entrants to local labor markets
relative to the wages of incumbents. This exercise is informative about the
pattern of market entrants’ quality across space. An entrant can be anybody
who is newly observed in the local labor market in the current period, joining the
labor force for the first time, switching from a different region, or entering from
unemployment or outside of the labor force. Clearly, under that definition, all
relative entry wages are well below zero. This is not surprising because entrants
typically have less experience than incumbents and their matching might be
worse. What is more surprising, however, is the positive relationship between
entry wages and employment growth: the more employment within a local
labor market is growing, the higher are relative entry wages. This finding is
consistent with the hypothesis that entrants to regions with rising employment
are of comparably high quality which is reflected in their comparably high wages.
8 Appendix B.4 further shows that the positive relationship still holds when
controlling for age, education or occupation.
Nevertheless, the positive correlation does not appear when defining an en-
trant as a mover joining the region from another local labor market only. Under
that definition, the positive correlation falls close to, or even below zero.9 In
fact, the correlation between employment growth and relative entry wages is
mainly driven by labor market entrants. One reason for that might be that
schooling systems of growing regions in Southern Germany are comparably bet-
ter (Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and Rouxe, 2012).10 Another explanation
could be that most of the sorting of workers happens right after their gradua-
tion from school or university.
In summary, with the exception of changes in education shares, regions with
8Böhm et al. (2019) find the exact opposite with respect to occupational employment
growth: the more an occupation is growing, the lower are the wages of entrants to that
occupation relative to the wages of incumbents.
9Notice that this might also provide evidence against the hypothesis that growing regions
need to pay higher wages to attract workers because of search frictions. If that were true,
relative entry wages of movers should also be positively correlated with local employment
growth.
10Consistently, the ratio of students per school is lower in growing regions. I will come back
to this later.
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growing employment seem to have experienced comparably positive changes
in their occupation and industry structure as well as seem to have attracted
entrants of relatively high quality. This already suggests that worker quality
might have improved in regions with growing employment. The next sections
will investigate this in detail.
3.4 Estimating Local Wage Premia and Amenities
This section shows how to estimate changes in location specific wage premia
paid for a unit of skill as well as changes in local amenities within a generalized
Roy model setting (Roy, 1951; Dahl, 2002). The method applies an insight from
Böhm et al. (2019) on the relation between wage growth of individual workers
and their location choices in panel data allowing for worker self selection because
of changing wage premia and changing amenities at the same time. The method
leads to an estimation strategy which is feasible also for a large set of local labor
markets.
3.4.1 Model
Worker i at time t faces the problem of choosing in what potential local labor
market l = 1, . . . , L to work in. The worker is assumed to choose the region in
which his (log) utility would be highest:
ui,t = max{u1,i,t, . . . , uL,i,t} =
L∑
l=1
Il,i,tul,i,t (3.1)
The realized utility of a worker depends on the chosen location Il,i,t ≡ 1[ul,i,t ≥
uj,i,t ∀j 6= l]. This choice, in turn, hinges on latent (real) wages wl,i,t the
worker can potentially earn in the different regions as well as non monetary
local amenities vl,i,t in a linear and additive way.11 This rationalizes that not all
workers move to the best paying regions immediately but weigh up wages and
amenities (Rosen, 1986; Roback, 1988):
ul,i,t = wl,i,t + vl,i,t (3.2)
Potential wages wl,i,t depend on the worker’s individual skill si,t common across
regions and their contemporaneous return in the local market pil,t. Hence, for
a given unit of skill, the worker might obtain a very different wage premium
depending on where he chooses to work. Variation in wage premia might exist
in spatial equilibrium because, for instance, demand in some places might be
11Note that log additivity implies that latent utilities in non-log terms are defined as: Ul,i,t =
Wl,i,tVl,i,t. This implies that wages and amenities are complements for a worker so that an
amenity is valued the more, the higher the wage is. This might reflect that workers can only
enjoy amenities if their wage is sufficiently high.
194 CHAPTER 3. SPATIAL WAGE INEQUALITY
higher than in other places (Bound and Holzer, 2000). In addition, potential real
wages depend on a time constant price index rl which describes differences in
price levels across areas.12 The choice model therefore reflects workers balancing
wages, amenities and local prices in equilibrium as is common in the urban
economics literature (Glaeser, 2008).
Furthermore, latent amenities hinge on the (overall) local amenity value
of a region ψl,t as well as an idiosyncratic evaluation of a region εvl,i,t. This
specification rationalizes, for instance, workers switching out of regions with
highest wage premia and highest amenities and into low return, low amenity
regions for idiosyncratic reasons:
wl,i,t = pil,t + si,t − rl (3.3)
vl,i,t = ψl,t + εvl,i,t (3.4)
The main aim of this paper is to estimate how local wage premia pil,t have
evolved over time across different local labor markets as well as how amenities
ψl,t have changed across regions. Böhm et al. (2019) show how one can estimate
these parameters in panel data with information on workers’ individual wage
growth as well their decision in what market to work in.13 Building upon their
insight and letting ∆ denote changes between periods t− 1 and t, workers’ real
wage growth can (approximately) be described by a linear equation:
∆wi,t =
L∑
l=1
I¯l,i,t∆wl,i,t −
L∑
l=1
∆Il,i,tv¯l,i,t (3.5)
I¯l,i,t = Il,i,t−1+Il,i,t2 is an “average” choice indicator equal to 0 when worker i
did neither work in l at t or t− 1; equal to 1 if he decided to stay in l between
these periods; and equal to 0.5 if he either entered or left l at t or t−1. Hence,
I¯l,i,t describes the average sorting between two periods.14
In turn, ∆Il,i,t = Il,i,t−Il,i,t−1 contains information on the changing sorting.
∆Il,i,t equals +1 if i switched into l at t, equals -1 if i left l at t, and is zero
otherwise. Because of the general difference between ∆Il,i,t and I¯l,i,t when
there is enough regional mobility, average amenities and changes in potential
wages can be separately identified from workers’ wage growth and their location
decisions relative to a base period t = Tbase and relative to a base region
l = Lbase.
12Data on local price differences comes from Kawka et al. (2009) who compute consumer
prices by district with prices collected between 2006 and 2008. Unfortunately, up to now, there
is no comprehensive panel data available with information on how prices have changed over
time and across German regions.
13In their application, a market refers to an occupation k. See their Appendix B for the
details on the derivation of an estimable equation with respect to both changing occupational
skill prices and amenities.
14Likewise, v¯l,i,t = vl,i,t+vl,i,t−12 denotes the average amenity value of region l between
t − 1 and t including the systematic part ψ¯l,t = ψl,t+ψl,t−12 as well as the idiosyncratic part
ε¯vl,i,t =
εv
l,i,t
+εv
l,i,t−1
2 .
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Intuition In total, Equation (3.5) consists of two sums. The first summand
on the right hand side of Equation (3.5) is a purely pecuniary part: if a worker
stays in local labor market l (I¯l,i,t = 1, ∆Il,i,t = 0 ), his observed wage gain
equals the potential wage change ∆wl,i,t in that local labor market. In turn,
the potential wage change depends on how market wage premia evolve and how
the worker’s skill changes.
In contrast, if the worker switches from market l to m (I¯l,i,t = 12 , ∆Il,i,t =
−1 as well as I¯m,i,t = 12 , ∆Im,i,t = 1), one half of his wage growth is ap-
proximated to stem from the origin region’s potential wage change; and one
half of the wage growth to stem from the destination region’s potential wage
change. The exact allocation of wage growth into origin and destination region
is unknown as the data does not contain any information at what exact wage
the worker would be indifferent (Böhm et al., 2019).
However, the observed wage change of a moving worker will not only de-
pend on pecuniary motives. Instead, the observed wage change also depends
on the amenity differences between regions l and m as amenities serve as com-
pensating differentials in this framework (Rosen, 1986; Roback, 1988). If, for
instance, amenity values in Northern Germany are comparably low, wage growth
of migrants from Southern to Northern Germany should be relatively high to
compensate workers for the potential decline in utility due to low amenities in
the destination region. Not accounting for the importance of amenities in loca-
tion decisions (as is also the case in simple fixed effects models) might therefore
severely bias the results as high wage growth of movers would then be attributed
to high skill growth.15
The second summand on the right of Equation (3.5) incorporates the in-
fluence of amenities on workers’ observed wage growth: with optimal choices,
a worker’s observed wage growth is the change in the potential wage of the
destination region minus the utility gain (or loss) from the behavioral response
of switching region. That is, if a utility-optimizing worker chooses to move
from the less desirable region l to the more desirable region m, in the data that
worker’s wage growth should be lower than predicted by the changing relevant
potential wage alone. Vice versa, observed wage growth should be higher than
the potential wage change when a worker moves from a more desirable region
to a less desirable one.
Average amenity values can therefore be identified by comparing the (con-
ditional) wage growth of movers to the wage growth of stayers. However, I can
only identify them relative to a base region which I choose to be the rural region
Lbase = Husum located in the most northern part of Germany. Mechanically,
the reason is that the ∆Il,i,t sum to zero over all l which leads to multicollinear-
15Notice that in a fixed effect model, the estimated fixed effect of a worker moving from
a high amenity to a low amenity region would be higher compared to a scenario in which
amenities play no role. The reason for this is that the worker would be compensated for this
less favorable move by a rising wage (Sorkin, 2018). In fact, part of mover’s fixed effect would
reflect amenity differences between regions instead of worker’s time constant ability.
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ity. The economic reason is that choices and wages can only be used to identify
relative utilities but not utility levels.
Disentangling growth in wage premia from growth in individual worker quality
requires a further parameterization of the skill accumulation function:
∆si,t = f(Xi,t−1) + εsi,t (3.6)
= Xi,t−1Γl′,l + εsi,t (3.7)
According to Equation (3.7), workers’ skill accumulation linearly depends on
observables Xi,t−1 and an unobservable skill shock εsi,t which influences workers’
productivity commonly across all regions. I allow skills to change over the life
cycle with the speed of skill growth varying by age group (in the empirics, I
use dummies for ages 25 – 34, 35 – 44 and 45 – 54). Further, I allow age
profiles to vary with previous (l′) and current (l) work location. This reflects
the fact that skill accumulation might be higher in urban places (Glaeser, 1999;
De la Roca and Puga, 2017). As described later, using such a fully saturated
skill model also helps in dealing with endogeneity of the choice with respect to
error realizations. Inserting this yields the following estimation equation with
parameters ∆pil,t, ψ¯l,t,Γl′,l estimable by ordinary least squares:16
∆wi,t =
L∑
l=1
I¯l,i,t(∆pil,t + ∆si,t)−
L∑
l=1
∆Il,i,tv¯l,i,t (3.8)
=
L∑
l=1
I¯l,i,t(∆pil,t +X ′i,t−1Γl′,l)−
L∑
l=1
∆Il,i,tψ¯l,t + ηi,t (3.9)
3.4.2 Identifying Assumptions
I now make the assumptions explicit which are necessary for a consistent esti-
mation of the main parameters of interest ∆pil,t, ψ¯l,t and provide evidence for
their plausibility.
Constant Skill Accumulation Function As already noted in Equations (3.6)
and (3.7), the function describing the accumulation of workers’ skills ∆si,t =
f(Xi,t−1) + εsi,t = Xi,t−1Γl′,l + εsi,t must not contain a time t subscript to avoid
perfectly collinearity between changes in wage premia and skill changes since
I¯l,i,t is interacted with both ∆pil,t (i.e., year dummies) as well as Xi,t−1Γl′,l (i.e.,
dummies for age groups, previous and current location). This, in turn, implies
the assumption that skill growth over the life cycle for a worker starting in a
16Notice once more that the local price index used to deflate wages across space is time
constant because of lacking panel data (Kawka et al., 2009). As the estimation method will
exploit changes over time, the price index cancels out in ∆wi,t for regional stayers, therefore.
Wage growth of movers, which is especially relevant for the estimation of amenities, depends
on differences in local prices and so does not cancel out, however.
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market in 1975 is the same as it was in 2010.17 Note that this assumption does
not make any restrictions on the skills of entering workers so that the average
skill can change freely. Unfortunately, this identifying assumption is not testable
directly.
Figure 3.3: Wage growth differences
(a) 25–34 relative to 45–54 year olds
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(b) 35–44 relative to 45–54 year olds
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Notes: The lines show average individual wage growth from t− 1 to t by year of 25–34 (Figure 3.3a)
and 35–44 (Figure 3.3b) year olds minus average wage growth of 45–54 year olds. Results are centered
at zero to show trends over time. The shaded areas around the four lines are 95% confidence intervals.
The four groups show a classification of local labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban
areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria.
The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014).
Nevertheless, Figure 3.3 shows that wage growth rates between age groups
did not change too much during 1985–2010, at least within the four aggregated
local labor markets. The figures present a difference-in-difference result showing
residual wage growth of young workers (25–34 year olds, Figure 3.3a) and middle
aged workers (35–44 year olds, Figure 3.3b) relative to older workers (45–54 year
olds) over time. Holding everything else constant in the model, wage growth
differences between two samples in different age groups but the same local
market should only reflect changes in skill accumulation between these two
groups over time as wage premia and common amenities cancel out for workers
within a region. The missing of a clear trend in these figures shows that wage
growth between age groups (and thereby skill growth rates in the model) did
not change much over time.
With respect to the detailed local labor markets, Appendix Figure 3.19 shows
a difference-in-difference-in-difference (i.e., triple difference) result. First, I split
the sample in the middle (1993). Then I calculate workers’ wage growth between
two periods and subtract the wage growth of 45–54 year olds from the wage
growth of 25–34 year olds and 34-45 year old workers. After that, I take averages
before and after 1993 and subtract them from each other. Figure 3.19 shows
17This assumption is the same as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Yamaguchi (2018).
Complementary to that, Heckman et al. (1998) propose to use old workers for estimation of
skill price changes as their wage growth might be less confounded by skill growth.
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the results of this exercise plotted against employment changes. Admittedly,
there is more variation than for the four broad regions so that the assumption
of a time constant skill accumulation function is possibly not exactly fulfilled for
every local labor market. However, most of the accelerations or decelerations
in wage growth after 1993 are very close to zero. Importantly, there seems to
be no relation to employment growth.
Base Period With Constant Wage Premia To separately identify changes
in wage premia and skill accumulation parameters from each other, a further
restriction on the change in wage premia is necessary: there needs to be a
period in which wage premia have been constant. Setting ∆pil,t = 0, t =
1975, . . . , Tbase then allows me to estimate Γl′,l in that period. As Γl′,l does
not change over time by assumption, the conditional wage growth after Tbase
is, hence, informative on the change in wage premia. Analog to Böhm et al.
(2019), I set the end of the base period to Tbase = 1985 for having enough
variation to estimate the skill accumulation parameters. Controlling for how
wage growth evolves over the life cycle, the excess wage growth in t > Tbase
therefore informs the estimates about the changing returns.
Again, this identifying assumption is not testable directly. However, Ap-
pendix Figure 3.20 shows that wage and employment changes were much less
pronounced between 1975 and 1984. In addition, the figure shows that there has
been no change at all in the density size premium taken place between 1975 and
1985.18 Overall, these results suggest that the time period 1975–1984 was at
least a period with less wage and employment changes compared to 1985–2010.
In addition to that, Böhm et al. (2019) show that, even when the assumption of
constant premia in the base period were violated, the method still identifies an
important parameter: namely, how wage premia changed relative to the change
that occurred during 1975–1984. That is, how much the change in wage premia
accelerated or decelerated over time.
Distribution of Shocks If ε¯vl,i,t is not common across all markets l = 1, . . . , L
and therefore the locational choice is influenced by the the error draw, a cor-
relation between the choice variables and the error appears which leads to an
endogeneity bias because:
ηi,t = εsi,t −
L∑
l=1
∆Il,i,tε¯vl,i,t (3.10)
Nevertheless, l specificity of ε¯vl,i,t makes the model much more realistic as work-
ers move in all kinds of directions during their life cycle for presumably idiosyn-
18I measure this premium as the elasticity of average wages with respect to market density.
Market density is defined as the number of employed workers in a local labor market divided
by the area of a market in square kilometers. The elasticity was 6.9 log points in 1975 and
7.0 log points in 1985.
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cratic reasons.19 This is why Böhm et al. (2019) show a large set of Monte
Carlo experiments which suggest that the bias is of small magnitude in realistic
scenarios. The reason for that is that the interaction between previous and
current work location in the fully saturated skill accumulation model already
picks up most of the endogeneity as the corresponding parameters in Γˆl′,l, l′ 6= l
are identified from the (time constant) sorting of regional movers together with
their (biased) wage growth stemming mainly from the error realizations.
In fact, region specificity of ε¯vl,i,t introduces a substantial bias in the esti-
mates for the skill accumulation parameters Γˆl′,l, l′ 6= l. However, if the shock
distribution stayed constant during the base period and afterwards, the over-
all bias for the (time varying) wage premium estimates and the (time varying)
amenity estimates is minimal: there should be no excess wage growth due to the
shocks after the base period compared to the wage growth which took place dur-
ing the base period (provided the shock distribution remained constant). Notice
that this is different for fixed effects models as in Combes, Duranton, and Go-
billon (2008) who rely on the exogenous mobility assumption which postulates
that workers must not move because of idiosyncratic shock realizations.
3.5 Local Wage Premia and Worker Quality
This section first presents the estimates of changes in wage premia paid for a unit
of skill and changes in worker quality. After that, I show observable determinants
of changing worker quality which includes evidence on spatial differences in
the occupation, industry and education structure as well as variation in local
amenities.
Figure 3.4 shows the main result of this paper. Changes in local wage premia
and employment growth between 1985 and 2010 were essentially uncorrelated
across local labor markets (p-value = 0.63). Put differently, changes in wage
premia paid for a unit of skill were roughly equal between declining and growing
regions. This finding is in contrast to Figure 3.2 which showed that growing
employment came in hand with growing wages. Figure 3.4b shows the reason
for this. It plots the change in worker quality between 1985 and 2010 by market
19I assume that skill shocks εsi,t have the same influence across all local labor markets. This
is in line with the assumption that worker productivity is the same across all regions. Hence,
there is no endogeneity problem with respect to the skill shocks as they do not influence
workers’ location choices.
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Figure 3.4: Worker quality increased in growing regions
(a) Changes in wage premia (b) Changes in worker quality
Notes: Figure 3.4a shows estimated changes in local wage premia between 1985 and 2010. OLS
estimates as described by Equation (3.9). Figure 3.4b shows estimated changes in worker quality as
described by Equation (3.11). The horizontal axes depict the change in log employment between
1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor markets aggregated
from political districts as suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size corresponds to the
number of employed workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The four groups show
a classification of local labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix
Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of
local labor markets into rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression lines across all areas
(black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
as the residual between changes in wage premia and changes in average wages:
2010∑
t=1986
E[sl,i,t|Il,i,t = 1]− E[sl,i,t−1|Il,i,t−1 = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mean skill change in l
= (3.11)
2010∑
t=1986
E[wi,t|Il,i,t = 1]− E[wi,t−1|Il,i,t−1 = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mean wage change in l
−
2010∑
t=1986
∆pil,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in wage premium
Worker quality strongly increased in regions with growing employment. On
average, a market whose employment increased by 10% experienced an increase
in worker quality of 1.2%. This finding is in line with the hypothesis that
growing regions were able to attract workers of comparably high quality as
already suggested in Section 3.3.2 that showed remarkable differences in changes
of the occupation and industry structure between growing and shrinking regions.
Figure 3.5 shows the differential changes in wages premia and worker quality
across Germany. There appears to be no clear pattern with respect to changes
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Figure 3.5: Geography of changes in wage premia and skills, 1985 – 2010
(a) Changes in wage premia (b) Changes in worker quality
Notes: Figure 3.5a shows estimated changes in local wage premia between 1985 and 2010. OLS
estimates as described by Equation (3.9). Figure 3.5b shows estimated changes in worker quality as
described by Equation (3.11). Assignment of political districts to West German local labor markets is
based on commuting flows and follows Kropp and Schwengler (2011). East Germany is left out of the
analysis.
in wage premia (Figure 3.5a). In contrast, Figure 3.5b suggests that worker
quality primarily increased in Southern Germany.20
The general pattern of improving worker quality also appears when using
different estimation methods. Appendix D shows the results of four robustness
checks. First, I drop the terms in Equation (3.9) which control for chang-
ing local amenities. This increases the elasticity between skill and employment
changes further. Second and third, I allow for a more flexible skill accumulation
function by including dummies for occupation and education separately. This
also slightly increases the elasticity between worker quality changes and employ-
ment changes. Last, I estimate changes in wage premia using a fixed effects
approach following Cortes (2016). I identify changes in wage premia from year
times region dummies and control for unobserved worker quality with worker
times region fixed effects. Additionally, I allow for region specific, concave wage
profiles over the life cycle by adding age times region dummies to the regression.
Using this complementary approach, the estimated skill elasticity rises further.
In summary, in all of these robustness checks, there is a zero (or even
negative) correlation between changing wage premia and employment growth.
In contrast, employment growth and skill changes are strongly correlated in all
specifications.
20Appendix Figure 3.21 shows the accumulated skill of a hypothetical stayer by market
density. In line with De la Roca and Puga (2017), I find that workers in urban places have higher
skill accumulation rates. However, there is also a lot of variation between urban places. For
instance, stayers’ estimated skills at age 54 in Munich are roughly 60 log points higher than in
Essen. Part of this difference might be explained by differences in the occupation structure with
high shares of low accumulation, production jobs in Essen and high accumulation, professional
jobs in Munich. See Böhm et al. (2019) for skill profiles by occupation.
202 CHAPTER 3. SPATIAL WAGE INEQUALITY
There are several (model independent) explanations for the positive corre-
lation between worker quality changes and employment growth as well as the
concentration of positive worker quality changes in Southern Germany: shifts
in observable characteristics such as the occupation, education and industry
structure might have been different between booming and declining regions
(Findeisen and Südekum, 2008); increasing density of employment could have
raised agglomeration economies in booming regions making workers and firms
become more productive (Duranton and Puga, 2004); there might be an impor-
tant role which local amenities play to attract skilled workers (Glaeser, Kolko,
et al., 2001; Diamond, 2016).
My aim in this paper is not to fully disentangle these explanations or even
uncover causal relations that determine the performance of local labor markets.
Instead, I will develop new stylized facts about the processes of changing worker
quality and employment growth: what have been the main (observable) char-
acteristics of successful places that experienced a growth in all three: wages,
worker quality and employment? I will focus on the role played by occupations,
industries and education as well as local amenities in greater depth.
3.5.1 The Role of a Shifting Occupation, Industry, and Education
Structure
It is well documented across a wide range of countries that the distribution of
occupational and industrial employment has shifted a lot of over the last few
decades. Employment declined in routine, producing occupations and increased
in analytical, professional as well as manual, service jobs (Dustmann, Ludsteck,
et al., 2009). Similarly, employment decreased in manufacturing industries and
rose in high- as well as low-skill services (Bárány and Siegel, 2018).
What has been less well documented is the fact that changes in occupational
and industrial employment are far from evenly distributed across regions within
countries (Autor, 2019). Section 3.3.2 already showed up huge differences in
changes of the occupation and industry structure across space. For instance,
although the countrywide share of employment within producing occupations
decreased from 58 percentage points to 50 points over time in Germany, the
shifts across local labor markets range from -18 to +3 percentage points (see
Appendix Figure 3.11c). In this section, I will now investigate the impact of
differential changes in the occupation, industry, and education structure on
changes in worker quality.
Panel A in Table 3.1 shows the results from a regression of the estimated
changes in worker quality between 1985 and 2010 on changes in occupational
(log) employment. Variation comes from differential changes in occupational
employment as well as quality changes between local labor markets. Worker
quality increased in regions which experienced an increase in managerial, profes-
sional and technical (Mgr-Prof-Tech) employment. In contrast, worker quality
declined where low wage, service and care (Srvc-Care) employment rose as well
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Table 3.1: Observable determinants of changing worker quality
∆s¯l,2010 ∆s¯l,2010 ∆s¯l,2010 ∆s¯l,2010 ∆s¯l,2010 ∆s¯l,2010 ∆s¯l,2010 ∆s¯l,2010
Panel A
Occupation Mgr-Prof-Tech 0.30 (0.00) 0.14 (0.04)
growth Sales-Office 0.08 (0.06) -0.07 (0.26)
Prod-Op-Crafts -0.36 (0.00) -0.52 (0.01)
Srvc-Care -0.04 (0.10) -0.09 (0.00)
Panel B
Industry Machine building 0.06 (0.01) 0.08 (0.02)
growth High-skill services 0.19 (0.00) 0.21 (0.00)
Manufacturing -0.15 (0.00) 0.04 (0.31)
Low-skill services -0.07 (0.11) 0.07 (0.10)
Panel C
Education University degree 0.13 (0.00) -0.09 (0.04)
growth Medium educated -0.15 (0.01) 0.12 (0.61)
Low educated 0.03 (0.16) 0.00 (0.86)
Panel D
Amenities Estimated ψ¯l,2010 2.23 (0.00)
Amenity index 0.68 (0.00) 0.65 (0.00)
Criminal offenses -0.08 (0.02) 0.01 (0.72)
Students per school 0.07 (0.08) 0.04 (0.31)
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.20 0.06 0.13 0.33 0.03 0.01 0.59
N 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182
Notes: The panels show results from regressions of estimated worker quality changes on variables vary-
ing across panels. Variation comes from differential changes across local labor markets between 1985
and 2010. Changes in worker quality are estimated according to Equation (3.11). Results are weighted
by the number of employed workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. p-values are
in parentheses. Occupations: Mgr-Prof-Tech: managers, professionals, technicians; Prod-Op-Crafts:
production, operators, craftsmen; Srvc-Care: services and care. Classification of detailed occupations
follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011), see Böhm et al. (2019) for the exact mapping. Industries: Ma-
chine building: manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment,
electrical and optical equipment, transport equipment; High skill services: education, health and so-
cial, public administration and defense, compulsory social security, financial intermediation, real estate,
renting and business activities, electricity, gas and water supply, other community, social and personal
service activities, communication; Manufacturing: manufacture of wood and wood products, coke,
refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, chemicals; Low-skill services: hotels, restaurants, whole-
sale, food. Education: University degree: technical college or university; Medium educated: Abitur
or apprenticeship training; Low educated: without postsecondary education or missing. Amenities:
ψ¯l,2010 are the estimated amenity values according to Equation (3.9). The amenity index was com-
puted by prognos (2018) combining information on 53 amenity values ranging from sunshine duration
to restaurant and physician density. Data on criminal offenses comes from Bundeskriminalamt (2018).
The measure was computed as offenses divided by population collected from Statistische Ämter des
Bundes und der Länder (2017a). Information on students per school was retrieved from Statistische
Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2017b).
as the number of workers employed in production, operator and crafts (Prod-
Op-Crafts) occupations increased.
Similar results apply to the influence of changes in the industrial and edu-
cation structure (Panels B and C). Worker quality surged where the amount of
workers employed in high-skill service industries and machine building expanded
as well as the number of university graduates increased . Hence, only regions
which were able to “reinvent” (Glaeser, 2005) themselves through changing
its employment structure where able to attract workers of high quality. These
results are very similar to the findings in Findeisen and Südekum (2008).
To quantify the importance of changes in the occupation and industry struc-
ture, Figure 3.6 repeats the decomposition of changes in wages into changing
wage premia and worker quality according to Equation (3.11). In addition to
Figure 3.4, I reweighted observations when computing average wages to elim-
inate the impact of geographic differences in the number of workers employed
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Figure 3.6: Reweighted skill changes
(a) Match 1985’s occupation structure (b) Match 1985’s occupation × industry
structure
Notes: Figure 3.6a shows estimated changes in worker quality as described by Equation (3.11). Ob-
servations were reweighted following DiNardo et al. (1996) to eliminate differential changes in the
occupation structure across local labor markets. Figure 3.6b repeats this by reweighting observations
to eliminate differential changes in the industry times occupation structure across local labor markets.
The horizontal axes depict the change in log employment between 1985 and 2010. One bubble repre-
sents one of 182 West German local labor markets aggregated from political districts as suggested by
Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed workers in a market
averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The four groups show a classification of local labor markets into
northern and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located
in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban
is based on BBSR (2014). Regression lines across all areas (black) and within the four broad groups
(colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
in certain occupations, as well as industry times occupation cells, following Di-
Nardo et al. (1996).21 Compared to the baseline density of skill changes with
respect to employment of 12 log points, both elasticities are smaller and be-
come insignificant (p-values rise from 0.02 in the unweighted scenario to 0.07
and 0.24). Reweighting observations with occupation shares of 1985 induces
the elasticity to drop to eight log points. Further reweighting observations to
match the combined occupation times industry structure of 1985 decreases the
elasticity further to five log points. Overall, this shows that roughly one third
to one half of the increase in skill within expanding regions is due the dispro-
portionate growth of high paying managerial, professional and technical as well
as machine building employment within expanding regions.
3.5.2 The Role of Local Amenities to Attract Skilled Workers
The urban economics literature has always put focus on the role of local ameni-
ties for the locational choices of the workforce and the spatial equilibrium
21Reweighting observations with education shares of 1985 does not substantially affect the
elasticity which decreases to 11 log points, see Appendix Figure 3.26. The reason for this
is that education and employment growth are virtually uncorrelated (Appendix Figure 3.15).
Appendix Figure 3.26 also shows the results for reweighting with industries alone instead of
industry times occupation cells. The elasticity amounts to 7 log points.
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(Glaeser and Maré, 2001; Glaeser, 2011). Following this literature, I will in-
vestigate the correlation between the estimated amenity changes as well as
information on collected (time constant) amenity proxies as is also done by
Diamond (2016).
Appendix Figure 3.27 shows the distribution of estimated amenities, an
amenity index based on information on 53 categories ranging from sunshine
duration to restaurant and physician density, data on crime rates as well as stu-
dents per school.22 In general, local amenities appear to be higher in Southern
than Northern Germany. This is true for both the estimated amenities as well
the amenity index. Consistently, crime rates are lower in the south. In addition,
the number of students per school is also lower in Southern Germany.
The results from a bivariate regression of estimated quality changes on
amenities are depicted in Panel D of Table 3.1. Again, variation comes from
differences in average skill changes and amenities across local labor markets.
Regions with high estimated amenity values experienced increases in skill. The
same holds for the amenity index. Contrary, areas with high crime rates exhib-
ited lower skill growth. The relation to the number of students per school is
not significant at the 5% level. This might indicate that differences in schooling
quality between regions (e.g., Baumert et al., 2013) play a minor role for the
variation in worker quality changes. In total, this exercise shows that regions
which experienced an increase in worker quality also had higher local amenity
values. An explanation for this could be the increasing sorting of high quality
workers into regions with attractive living standards (Diamond, 2016).
Taking all external explanatory variables together, 59% of the variation in
worker quality changes can be explained by these observables.
3.6 Sources of the Rising Density Wage Premium
This section analyses the impact of changing regional wage premia and worker
quality on the increasing wage disparities between German local labor markets.
There is a sizable wage premium which workers receive for working in more
dense areas across countries (Glaeser and Maré, 2001; Combes, Duranton, and
Gobillon, 2008; De la Roca and Puga, 2017; Dauth, Findeisen, Moretti, et al.,
2019). Germany is no exception. On the contrary, the German density wage
premium has even increased over time. Figure 3.7 shows that having worked
in a 100 log point denser region (the difference in density between Munich and
Göttingen) was associated with seven log points higher annual wages in 1985.23
22The amenity index was computed by prognos (2018). Data on crime rates per person
is from Bundeskriminalamt (2018). Information on students per school was retrieved from
Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2017b). Reassuringly, there is a strong positive
correlation between estimated amenities ψ¯l,2010 and the amenity index (p-value < 0.01, see
Appendix Figure 3.28). This provides additional plausibility for the estimation approach.
23Density refers to number of employed workers in a region divided by area measured in
square kilometers.
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Figure 3.7: Density wage premium increased over time
(a) Density premium 1985 (b) Density premium 2010
Notes: Figure 3.7a shows average wages in 1985 plotted against market density defined as number
of employed workers divided by area in square kilometers. Figure 3.7b repeats this for 2010. One
bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor markets aggregated from political districts as
suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed
workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The four groups show a classification of local
labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern
areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into
rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression lines across all areas (black) and within the four
broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
This elasticity increased until 2010 by roughly 17%. Is the source of that rise an
increased sorting of high quality workers to dense places like Essen and Munich?
Or did wage premia rise more in dense places because of higher skill demand?
Figure 3.8a shows the change in estimated wage premia plotted against log
density in 1985. The elasticity of price changes with respect to log density
is negative. A 100 log point denser region experienced a 1.8 log point lower
increase in wage premia. One reason for that could be that dense areas have
higher estimated amenity values and so firms in dense places do not need to pay
higher wage premia to compensate workers (see Appendix Figure 3.29 for the
positive correlation between estimated amenities and market density). Instead,
workers might sort into dense places because of these higher amenities and give
up rising wage premia they could have earned in less dense places (Roback,
1988).
Notice, however, that the pattern of more favorable amenities in denser
places does not appear with respect to the externally collected amenity data.
This might indicate the necessity of identifying amenities from worker choices
within a revealed preference approach instead of relying on external measures.24
In fact, when I estimate wage premia according to Equation (3.9) but omit the
controls for amenities, the interpretation turns around. Appendix Figure 3.30
24Alternatively, this might also reflect that amenities increased more in cities and this increase
has been relevant for the changing worker sorting (instead of absolute amenity values). This
would not be visible (by definition) in the externally collected amenity proxies as they are time
constant and refer to the values at the end of the sample period.
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Figure 3.8: Changes in wage premia and worker quality by 1985’s density
(a) Changes in wage premia (b) Changes in worker quality
Figure 3.8a shows estimated changes in wage premia between 1985 and 2010. OLS estimates as
described by Equation (3.9). Figure 3.8b shows estimated changes in worker quality as described
by Equation (3.11). The horizontal axes depicts log employment density 1985 defined as number of
employed workers in a market divided by area in square kilometers. One bubble represents one of
182 West German local labor markets aggregated from political districts as suggested by Kropp and
Schwengler (2011). Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed workers in a market averaged
across years 1985 to 2010. The four groups show a classification of local labor markets into northern
and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-
Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban is based on
BBSR (2014). Regression lines across all areas (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are
weighted by the number of employed workers.
shows the results: when omitting the terms which control for local amenities,
I find that denser places experienced larger increases in wage premia. This
also holds when estimating changes in wage premia via year times region fixed
effects while controlling for unobserved worker heterogeneity via worker times
region fixed effects similar to Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008) or Cortes
(2016). This underscores the importance of a method which is able to distin-
guish worker sorting because of pecuniary motives from worker sorting because
of non-pecuniary motives. When ignoring the influence of amenities, estimated
changes in wage premia might be biased as workers also sort with respect to
non-pecuniary aspects instead of potential wages alone. The sign of the bias,
in turn, depends on the correlation between amenities and market density.
In contrast to the negative wage premium elasticity (again, which only ap-
pears when controlling for local amenities), the relation between skill changes
and density is positive (Figure 3.8b). A 100 log point denser region experienced
a 1.6 log point higher increase in worker quality. This effect thereby almost
exactly offset the relative decline in wage premia within dense areas.
If changes in wage premia and worker quality balanced each other, why
then did the density premium increase over time? The reason for this is that
employment in dense German regions did not rise further. On the one hand,
previously dense places such as the Ruhrgebiet including Essen lost large frac-
tions of their employment force as shown in Figure 3.9a. On the other hand,
many less dense areas – mainly in southern Germany – gained employment and
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Figure 3.9: Changes in employment and wages by 1985’s density
(a) Density declined in formerly dense areas (b) Wage changes unrelated to 1985’s den-
sities
Figure 3.9a shows changes in employment density of a local labor market between 1985 and 2010.
Figure 3.9b shows the change in average wages. The horizontal axes depicts log employment density
1985 defined as number of employed workers in a market divided by area in square kilometers. One
bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor markets aggregated from political districts as
suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed
workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The four groups show a classification of local
labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern
areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into
rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression lines across all areas (black) and within the four
broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
so became denser over time. In combination with almost density independent
changes in average wages (see Figure 3.9b showing the sum of Figures 3.8a
and 3.8b for completeness), this made the slope of the density wage premium
become steeper over time. Therefore, the rise in the premium is mainly because
of declining employment in the formerly densest areas as well as expanding em-
ployment in previously less dense places. Changes in wage premia and changes
in worker quality, however, have offset each other on average across markets of
different density.
3.7 Conclusion
There has been considerable variation in wage and employment changes across
German local labor markets during the last few decades. Whereas southern
regions experienced both an increase in wages and employment on average,
the opposite was true for many northern regions. This resulted in a strong
connection between wage and employment growth across markets, seemingly
consistent with geographic differences in shocks to demand. This paper has
investigated the drivers of these opposing trends in more detail: did demand
increase relatively more in regions with growing employment? Or did worker
quality improve in expanding areas?
To separate these two competing explanations, I have estimated selection
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corrected local wage premia paid for a unit of skill as well as differences in local
amenities within a generalized Roy model setting. In that framework, workers
decide in what region to work in based on latent, potential real wages and local
amenities. The model was informed by variation in workers’ wage growth and
their location decisions including workers’ moving behavior.
The results have shown that, contrary to average wages, quality adjusted
wage premia have not increased more in expanding regions. That is, the increase
in wage premia workers get paid for their skills was roughly the same in growing
and shrinking local labor markets. Instead, the quality of workers employed in
regions with expanding employment improved. This resulted in comparably high
wage growth within these regions.
I have investigated several potential explanations for this finding by com-
paring observables of regions with growing worker quality to the observables of
regions with declining skill. Worker quality improved in regions which were able
to attract professional and technical occupations as well as firms engaged in
the machine building sector. This primarily happened in Southern Germany; a
region which was able to “reinvent” itself over time (Findeisen and Südekum,
2008). Average skill also increased in regions with high estimated amenity val-
ues. This suggests that skilled workers might sort into regions with attractive
living standards although local prices might be higher in these areas as well
(Diamond, 2016); a possibility for which I control in the estimation.
Last, I have explored the determinants of the rising market density premium.
I found that worker quality has increased more in dense places. This effect,
however, was offset by a relative decline in wage premia of dense places. A
potential explanation for that might be the rising importance of amenities in the
location decisions of workers and their wage compensating nature. In line, dense
places have higher estimated amenity values in the estimation. This pattern does
not appear with respect to external data on amenity values, however.
Further disentangling possible mechanisms which influence the sorting of
skill across space is a fruitful topic for future research and policy. The answer
to the question about how local labor markets can attract skilled workers and
successful firms is of first order importance in a world of rising disparities (Arntz,
2010; Moretti, 2012); especially in the light of increasing political polarization
between regions because of regional differences in the vulnerability to technical
change and competition from abroad (Autor et al., 2016).
Additionally, it would be interesting to investigate possible sources for spatial
differences in occupational and industrial change. In a first step, one might
therefore estimate how the returns to occupational skill have changed over time
and across regions. For instance, Manning and Petrongolo (2017) show that
local labor markets are indeed quite local and so should be the returns to skill.
Holding the composition of skill constant, such an exercise would then also allow
to investigate possible sources of changing occupational skill prices by exploiting
additional variation across local labor markets. Such regional variation could
range from market thickness in the supply of potential skill (Bleakley and Lin,
210 CHAPTER 3. SPATIAL WAGE INEQUALITY
2012) to technology investments (Czernich et al., 2011).
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Aggregation of Local Labor Markets
Assignment of political districts to West German local labor markets is based on
commuting flows and follows Kropp and Schwengler (2011). East Germany is
left out of the analysis. Local labor markets are further classified into the groups:
urban - north (red), rural - north (orange), urban - south (darkblue) and rural
- south (lightblue). Southern areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and
Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban is based
on BBSR (2014). Figure 3.10 shows the classification across Germany.
Figure 3.10: Spatial distribution of rural and urban Regions
A.2 Aggregation of Occupations
Occupations are categorized into:
1. Managers-Professionals-Technicians (Mgr-Prof-Tech)
2. Sales-Office (Sales-Office)
3. Production-Operators-Craftsmen (Prod-Op-Crafts)
4. Services-Care (Srvc-Care)
Classification of detailed occupations follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011), see
Böhm et al. (2019) for the exact mapping.
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A.3 Aggregation of Industries
Machine building: manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products,
machinery and equipment, electrical and optical equipment, transport equip-
ment; High skill services: education, health and social, public administration
and defense, compulsory social security, financial intermediation, real estate,
renting and business activities, electricity, gas and water supply, other com-
munity, social and personal service activities, communication; Manufacturing:
manufacture of wood and wood products, coke, refined petroleum products and
nuclear fuel, chemicals; Low-skill services: hotels, restaurants, wholesale, food.
This largely follows Bárány and Siegel (2018) with the additional differentiation
between manufacturing and machine building as, compared to other countries,
Germany has a very large and increasing share of machine building firms (Dauth,
Findeisen, and Südekum, 2017).
A.4 Education
University degree: technical college or university; Medium educated: Abitur
or apprenticeship training; Low educated: without postsecondary education or
missing. This classification follows Fitzenberger et al. (2006).
A.5 Amenity Data
The amenity index was computed by prognos (2018) combining information on
53 amenity values ranging from sunshine duration to restaurant and physician
density. Data on criminal offenses comes from Bundeskriminalamt (2018). The
measure was computed as offenses divided by population collected from Statis-
tische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2017a). Information on students
per school was retrieved from Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder
(2017b). Data on a local price index comes from Kawka et al. (2009). Local
price differences correspond to 2006 – 2008.
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B Observables of Growing Regions
B.1 Occupation Growth
Figure 3.11: Changes of occupational employment
(a) Mgr-Prof-Tech (b) Sales-Office
(c) Prod-Op-Crafts (d) Srvc-Care
Notes: The vertical axes show changes in occupational employment shares between 1985 and 2010.
The horizontal axes depict the change in log employment between 1985 and 2010. Mgr-Prof-Tech:
managers, professionals, technicians; Prod-Op-Crafts: production, operators, craftsmen; Srvc-Care:
services and care. Classification of detailed occupations follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011), see Böhm
et al. (2019) for the exact mapping. One bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor
markets aggregated from political districts as suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size
corresponds to the number of employed workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The
four groups show a classification of local labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban
areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria.
The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression
lines across all areas (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number
of employed workers.
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Figure 3.12: Changes of occupational employment across space
(a) Mgr-Prof-Tech (b) Sales-Office
(c) Prod-Op-Crafts (d) Srvc-Care
Notes: The maps show changes in occupational employment shares between 1985 and 2010 across
space. Mgr-Prof-Tech: managers, professionals, technicians; Prod-Op-Crafts: production, operators,
craftsmen; Srvc-Care: services and care. Classification of detailed occupations follows Acemoglu and
Autor (2011), see Böhm et al. (2019) for the exact mapping. Assignment of political districts to West
German local labor markets is based on commuting flows and follows Kropp and Schwengler (2011).
East Germany is left out of the analysis.
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B.2 Industry Growth
Figure 3.13: Changes of industrial employment
(a) Machine building (b) High-skill services
(c) Manufacturing (d) Low-skill services
Notes: The vertical axes show changes in industrial employment shares between 1985 and 2010. The
horizontal axes depict the change in log employment between 1985 and 2010. Machine building: manu-
facture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment, electrical and optical
equipment, transport equipment; High skill services: education, health and social, public administra-
tion and defense, compulsory social security, financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business
activities, electricity, gas and water supply, other community, social and personal service activities,
communication; Manufacturing: manufacture of wood and wood products, coke, refined petroleum
products and nuclear fuel, chemicals; Low-skill services: hotels, restaurants, wholesale, food. One
bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor markets aggregated from political districts as
suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed
workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The four groups show a classification of local
labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern
areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into
rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression lines across all areas (black) and within the four
broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
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Figure 3.14: Changes of industrial employment across space
(a) Machine building (b) High-skill services
(c) Manufacturing (d) Low-skill services
Notes: The maps show changes in industrial employment shares between 1985 and 2010 across space.
Machine building: manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, machinery and equip-
ment, electrical and optical equipment, transport equipment; High skill services: education, health
and social, public administration and defense, compulsory social security, financial intermediation, real
estate, renting and business activities, electricity, gas and water supply, other community, social and
personal service activities, communication; Manufacturing: manufacture of wood and wood products,
coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, chemicals; Low-skill services: hotels, restaurants,
wholesale, food. Assignment of political districts to West German local labor markets is based on
commuting flows and follows Kropp and Schwengler (2011). East Germany is left out of the analysis.
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B.3 Educational Changes
Figure 3.15: Changes of education shares
(a) University degree (b) Medium educated
(c) Low educated
Notes: The vertical axes show changes in education shares between 1985 and 2010. The horizontal axes
depict the change in log employment between 1985 and 2010. University degree: technical college or
university; Medium educated: Abitur or apprenticeship training; Low educated: without postsecondary
education or missing. One bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor markets aggregated
from political districts as suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size corresponds to the
number of employed workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The four groups show
a classification of local labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix
Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of
local labor markets into rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression lines across all areas
(black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
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Figure 3.16: Changes of education shares across space
(a) University degree (b) Medium educated
(c) Low educated
Notes: The maps show changes in education shares between 1985 and 2010 across space. University
degree: technical college or university; Medium educated: Abitur or apprenticeship training; Low
educated: without postsecondary education or missing. Assignment of political districts to West
German local labor markets is based on commuting flows and follows Kropp and Schwengler (2011).
East Germany is left out of the analysis.
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B.4 Entrants’ wages
Figure 3.17: Wages of regional entrants minus wages of incumbents
(a) Raw (b) Cond. on age, education
(c) Cond. on age, education, occupation (d) Entrant = migrant from another region
Notes: The vertical axis in Panel 3.17a shows the average wage of an entrant to a region relative to
the average wage of incumbents in that region. The vertical axis in Panel 3.17b shows the (relative)
residual wage of entrants after a regression on age and education dummies. Panel 3.17c repeats this
and additionally adds occupation dummies to the regression. The vertical axis in Panel 3.17d shows the
average wage of a mover from another local labor market relative to the average wage of incumbents in
the destination region. Averages are taken across years 1985 until 2010. The horizontal axes depict the
change in log employment between 1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of 182 West German
local labor markets aggregated from political districts as suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011).
Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed workers in a market averaged across years 1985
to 2010. The four groups show a classification of local labor markets into northern and southern,
rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg
and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014).
Regression lines across all areas (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by
the number of employed workers.
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Figure 3.18: Entrants’ relative wages across space
(a) Raw (b) Cond. on age, education
(c) Cond. on age, education, occupation (d) Entrant = migrant from another region
Notes: The map in Panel 3.18a shows the average wage of an entrant to a region relative to the
average wage of incumbents in that region. The map in Panel 3.18a shows the (relative) residual wage
of entrants after a regression on age and education dummies. Panel 3.18a repeats this and additionally
adds occupation dummies to the regression. The map in Panel 3.18a shows the average wage of a
mover from another local labor market relative to the average wage of incumbents in the destination
region. Averages are taken across years 1985 until 2010. Assignment of political districts to West
German local labor markets is based on commuting flows and follows Kropp and Schwengler (2011).
East Germany is left out of the analysis.
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C Additional Results for Section 3.4.2
Figure 3.19: Wage growth between age groups
(a) [25, 34] year olds - [44, 54] (b) [35, 44] year olds - [44, 54]
Notes: The figures show a triple difference-in-difference result: how much has wage growth of young
(Figure 3.19a) and medium old (Figure 3.19b) workers relative to the wage growth of old workers
changed after 1993 relative to 1993 and before? The horizontal axes depict the change in log employ-
ment between 1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor markets
aggregated from political districts as suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size cor-
responds to the number of employed workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The
four groups show a classification of local labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban
areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria.
The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression
lines across all areas (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number
of employed workers.
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Figure 3.20: Changes in employment and wages including base period
(a) Wage changes over time (b) Employment changes over time
(c) Density premium 1975 (d) Density premium 1985
Notes: Figure 3.20a shows the change in log wages within local labor markets over time. Figure 3.20b
shows the change in log employment. Shaded lines in the background represent 182 West German
detailed local labor markets. The four groups show a classification of local labor markets into northern
and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-
Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban is based on
BBSR (2014). The thickness of a shaded background line corresponds to the number of employed
workers in a local labor market averaged across years 1985 until 2010. Figure 3.20c shows average
wages in 1975 plotted against market density defined as number of employed workers divided by area
in square kilometers. Figure 3.20d repeats this for 1985. One bubble represents one of 182 West
German local labor markets aggregated from political districts as suggested by Kropp and Schwengler
(2011). Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed workers in a market averaged across years
1985 to 2010. The four groups show a classification of local labor markets into northern and southern,
rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg
and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014).
Regression lines across all areas (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by
the number of employed workers.
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D Additional Results for Section 3.5
Figure 3.21: Skill accumulation
(a) Dense places have higher skill accumu-
lation
(b) Skill accumulation across space
Notes: Figure 3.21a shows estimated skill accumulation rates Γl,l for a hypothetical market stayer at
age 54. OLS estimates as described by Equation (3.9). The horizontal axis depicts log employment
density 1985 defined as number of employed workers in a market divided by area in square kilometers.
One bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor markets aggregated from political districts
as suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed
workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The four groups show a classification of local
labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern
areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into
rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression lines across all areas (black) and within the four
broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers. Figure 3.21b plots estimated
skill accumulation rates across Germany. Assignment of political districts to West German local labor
markets is based on commuting flows and follows Kropp and Schwengler (2011). East Germany is left
out of the analysis.
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Figure 3.22: Omitting controls for changes in amenities
(a) Changes in wage premia (b) Changes in worker quality
Notes: Figure 3.22a shows estimated changes in wage premia between 1985 and 2010. OLS estimates
as described by Equation (3.9) but omitting controls for changing amenities. Figure 3.22b shows esti-
mated changes in worker quality as described by Equation (3.11) again omitting controls for changing
amenities. The horizontal axes depict the change in log employment between 1985 and 2010. One
bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor markets aggregated from political districts as
suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed
workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The four groups show a classification of local
labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern
areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into
rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression lines across all areas (black) and within the four
broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
Figure 3.23: Education dependent skill accumulation function
(a) Changes in wage premia (b) Changes in worker quality
Notes: Figure 3.23a shows estimated changes in wage premia between 1985 and 2010. OLS estimates
as described by Equation (3.9) but omitting controls for changing amenities. Additionally, speed of
skill accumulation depends on three education groups. University degree: technical college or uni-
versity; Medium educated: Abitur or apprenticeship training; Low educated: without postsecondary
education or missing. Figure 3.23b shows estimated changes in worker quality as described by Equa-
tion (3.11) again omitting controls for changing amenities. The horizontal axes depict the change in
log employment between 1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor
markets aggregated from political districts as suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size
corresponds to the number of employed workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The
four groups show a classification of local labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban
areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria.
The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression
lines across all areas (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number
of employed workers.
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Figure 3.24: Occupation dependent skill accumulation function
(a) Changes in wage premia (b) Changes in worker quality
Notes: Figure 3.24a shows estimated changes in wage premia between 1985 and 2010. OLS estimates
as described by Equation (3.9) but omitting controls for changing amenities. Additionally, speed of
skill accumulation depends on four occupation groups. Mgr-Prof-Tech: managers, professionals, tech-
nicians; Prod-Op-Crafts: production, operators, craftsmen; Srvc-Care: services and care. Classification
of detailed occupations follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011), see Böhm et al. (2019) for the exact map-
ping. Figure 3.24b shows estimated changes in worker quality as described by Equation (3.11) again
omitting controls for changing amenities. The horizontal axes depict the change in log employment be-
tween 1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor markets aggregated
from political districts as suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size corresponds to the
number of employed workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The four groups show
a classification of local labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix
Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of
local labor markets into rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression lines across all areas
(black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
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Figure 3.25: Fixed effects estimation
(a) Changes in wage premia (b) Changes in worker quality
Notes: Figure 3.25a shows estimated changes in wage premia between 1985 and 2010. Results were
obtained from a fixed effects estimation including a separate worker-region fixed effect each time a
worker revisits a local labor market similar to Cortes (2016). Wage premia are identified from year-region
fixed effects. Region times detailed age dummies control for life cycle skill accumulation. Figure 3.25b
shows estimated changes in worker quality as described by Equation (3.11) using wage premia estimated
as in Figure 3.25a. The horizontal axes depict the change in log employment between 1985 and 2010.
One bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor markets aggregated from political districts
as suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed
workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The four groups show a classification of local
labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern
areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into
rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression lines across all areas (black) and within the four
broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
Figure 3.26: Reweighted skill changes, education and industry
(a) Match 1985’s education structure (b) Match 1985’s industry structure
Notes: Figure 3.26a shows estimated changes in worker quality as described by Equation (3.11).
Observations were reweighted following DiNardo et al. (1996) to eliminate differential changes in the
education structure across local labor markets. Figure 3.26b repeats this by reweighting observations to
eliminate differential changes in the industry structure across local labor markets. The horizontal axes
depict the change in log employment between 1985 and 2010. One bubble represents one of 182 West
German local labor markets aggregated from political districts as suggested by Kropp and Schwengler
(2011). Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed workers in a market averaged across years
1985 to 2010. The four groups show a classification of local labor markets into northern and southern,
rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg
and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014).
Regression lines across all areas (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by
the number of employed workers.
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Figure 3.27: Amenities across space
(a) Estimated ψ¯l,2010 (b) Amenity index
(c) Criminal offenses per person (d) Students per school
Notes: The maps show the distribution of estimated amenities ψ¯l,2010 according to Equation (3.9) as
well as collected amenity proxies across space. The amenity index was computed by prognos (2018)
combining information on 53 amenity values ranging from sunshine duration to restaurant and physician
density. Data on criminal offenses comes from Bundeskriminalamt (2018). The measure was computed
as offenses divided by population collected from Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2017a).
Information on students per school was retrieved from Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder
(2017b). Assignment of political districts to West German local labor markets is based on commuting
flows and follows Kropp and Schwengler (2011). East Germany is left out of the analysis.
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Figure 3.28: Estimated amenities ψ¯l,2010 and the external amenity index
Notes: The vertical axis shows estimated amenity values ψ¯l,2010 according to Equation (3.9). The
horizontal axis shows an amenity index computed by prognos (2018) combining information on 53
amenity values ranging from sunshine duration to restaurant and physician density. One bubble repre-
sents one of 182 West German local labor markets aggregated from political districts as suggested by
Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size corresponds to the number of employed workers in a market
averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The four groups show a classification of local labor markets into
northern and southern, rural and urban areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located
in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban
is based on BBSR (2014). Regression lines across all areas (black) and within the four broad groups
(colored) are weighted by the number of employed workers.
E. ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR SECTION 3.6 229
E Additional Results for Section 3.6
Figure 3.29: Relation between amenities and density
(a) Estimated ψ¯l,2010 (b) Amenity index
(c) Crime per person (d) Students per school
Notes: The vertical axes show estimated amenities ψ¯l,2010 according to Equation (3.9) (Figure 3.29a)
as well as collected amenity proxies. The horizontal axes depicts log employment density 1985 defined
as number of employed workers in a market divided by area in square kilometers. The amenity index
was computed by prognos (2018) combining information on 53 amenity values ranging from sunshine
duration to restaurant and physician density. Data on criminal offenses comes from Bundeskriminalamt
(2018). The measure was computed as offenses divided by population collected from Statistische Ämter
des Bundes und der Länder (2017a). Information on students per school was retrieved from Statistische
Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2017b). One bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor
markets aggregated from political districts as suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size
corresponds to the number of employed workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The
four groups show a classification of local labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban
areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria.
The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression
lines across all areas (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number
of employed workers.
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Figure 3.30: Wage premia vs density, omitting amenities, fixed effects
(a) Changes in wage premia, no amenities (b) Changes in worker quality, no amenities
(c) Changes in wage premia, fixed effects (d) Changes in worker quality, fixed effects
Notes: Figure 3.30a shows estimated changes in wage premia between 1985 and 2010. OLS estimates
as described by Equation (3.9) but omitting controls for changing amenities. Figure 3.30b shows esti-
mated changes in worker quality as described by Equation (3.11) again omitting controls for changing
amenities. Figure 3.30c shows estimated changes in wage premia by means of a fixed effects estimation
including a separate worker-region fixed effect each time a worker revisits a local labor market similar
to Cortes (2016). Wage premia are identified from year-region fixed effects. Region times detailed
age dummies control for life cycle skill accumulation. Figure 3.30d shows estimated changes in worker
quality as described by Equation (3.11) using wage premia estimated as in Figure 3.30c. The hori-
zontal axes depicts log employment density 1985 defined as number of employed workers in a market
divided by area in square kilometers. One bubble represents one of 182 West German local labor
markets aggregated from political districts as suggested by Kropp and Schwengler (2011). Bubble size
corresponds to the number of employed workers in a market averaged across years 1985 to 2010. The
four groups show a classification of local labor markets into northern and southern, rural and urban
areas (see Appendix Figure 3.10). Southern areas are located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria.
The classification of local labor markets into rural and urban is based on BBSR (2014). Regression
lines across all areas (black) and within the four broad groups (colored) are weighted by the number
of employed workers.
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